Zusammenfassung
Im neu angebrochenen Zeitalter der Umwelt werden wir laufend dazu ermahnt, umweltbewußt zu leben und unser Tun nach dieser Maxime auszurichten. So werden wir z. B. dazu angehalten, Energie zu sparen, umweltunverträgliche Produkte zu boykottieren und umweltverträgliche zu kaufen, Müll zu vermeiden, fast alles der Wiederverwertung zuzuführen, unseren Urlaub in Ökohotels zu buchen und wenn wir endlich dort sind, die ausgewiesenen Wanderpfade und Skiabfahrten nicht zu verlassen.
Ich danke Garrett Hardin und Gernot Klepper für wertvolle Hinweise. Eine englischsprachige Version dieses Aufsatzes erscheint unter dem Titel “Environmental Norms, Society, and Economics” in Ecological Economics.
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Mohr, E. (1994). Umweltnormen in der Gesellschaft und den Wirtschaftswissenschaften. In: Schmid, J. (eds) Bevölkerung · Umwelt · Entwicklung. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-93524-3_4
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