Einstein’s Model for Constructing a Scientific Theory

Abstract

Judging by his publications and letters, Albert Einstein considered it one of his important tasks constantly to express and elaborate his views concerning the philosophy of science. There seem to be two reasons for that. First, Einstein experienced in his own work in the early years, and then again among his “ablest students,” how important discussions concerning the aims and methods of the sciences are.¹ Such interest was not merely a matter of intellectual curiosity but, in his opinion, went to the heart of the task of the innovator: epistemology and science, he said, “are dependent on each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is — insofar as it is thinkable at all — primitive and muddled.” At the same time he warned, however, that the scientist cannot permit himself to be too restricted “by the adherence to an epistemological system” (Schilpp, pp. 683–684). He might therefore seem to be more a philosophical opportunist than school philosopher. However, that accusation seemed to bother Einstein as little as did the more serious attacks from so many other quarters upon his science and his other views.