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Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt pp 271–311Cite as

Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und ihre rationalen Rekonstruktionen

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Part of the book series: Wissenschaftstheorie Wissenschaft und Philosophie ((WWP,volume 9))

Zusammenfassung

„Wissenschaftsphilosophie ohne Wissenschaftsgeschichte ist leer; Wissenschaftsgeschichte ohne Wissenschaftsphilosophie ist blind.“ Ausgehend von dieser Paraphrase von Kants berühmtem Diktum, versucht dieser Aufsatz zu erklären, wie die Historiographie der Wissenschaft von der Philosophie der Wissenschaft lernen soll und umgekehrt. Der Zweck meiner Argumente ist zu zeigen, daß a) die Wissenschaftsphilosophie normative Methodologien bereitstellt, mit deren Hilfe der Historiker die ‘interne Geschichte’ eines Gebietes rekonstruiert und so den objektiven Erkenntnisfortschritt rational erklärt; b) daß sich zwei im Wettstreit befindliche Methodologien mit Hilfe einer (normativ interpretierten) Geschichte bewerten lassen; c) daß jede rationale Rekonstruktion der Geschichte der Ergänzung durch eine empirische (sozio-psychologische) ‘externe Geschichte’ bedarf.

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  1. London School of Economics, UK

    Imre Lakatos

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Imre Lakatos Alan Musgrave

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© 1974 der deutschen Ausgabe Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Braunschweig

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Lakatos, I. (1974). Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und ihre rationalen Rekonstruktionen. In: Lakatos, I., Musgrave, A. (eds) Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt. Wissenschaftstheorie Wissenschaft und Philosophie, vol 9. Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-90613-7_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-90613-7_10

  • Publisher Name: Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-528-08333-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-90613-7

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