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Anreizeffekte bei Performance Fees mit stochastischem Benchmark

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© 1997 Gabler-Verlag

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Reichling, P. (1997). Anreizeffekte bei Performance Fees mit stochastischem Benchmark. In: Albach, H. (eds) Personal. ZfB-Ergänzungshefte. Gabler Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86608-0_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86608-0_5

  • Publisher Name: Gabler Verlag

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-409-13954-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-86608-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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