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Ehrhardt, O., Nowak, E. (2002). Evolution von Aktionärsstrukturen, Kontrolltransfers und Performanceunterschiede bei Börsengängen deutscher Familienunternehmen. In: Albach, H., Schauenberg, B. (eds) Unternehmensentwicklung im Wettbewerb. ZfB-Ergänzungshefte, vol 2. Gabler Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86555-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86555-7_3
Publisher Name: Gabler Verlag
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