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Harbring, C., Irlenbusch, B. (2001). Eine experimentelle Studie zur strategischen Wahl von Entlohnungsschemata. In: Albach, H., Jost, PJ. (eds) Theorie der Unternehmung. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft Ergänzungshefte, vol 4. Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86554-0_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86554-0_9
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