Zusammenfassung
Kryptographische Protokolle enthalten häufig subtile Fehler, die manchmal erst Jahre nach dem Design festgestellt werden. Deswegen hat es sich als günstig erwiesen, diese Protokolle bereits im Designprozeß formal zu analysieren. Eine formale Methode zwingt einen Protokolldesigner dazu, genau aufzuschreiben, welche Voraussetzungen er benötigt und welche Sicherheitsziele er erreichen will.
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© 1999 Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Braunschweig/Wiesbaden
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Kessler, V., Neumann, H. (1999). Eine korrekte Authentifikationslogik zur Analyse von Electronic-Commerce-Protokollen. In: Röhm, A.W., Fox, D., Grimm, R., Schoder, D. (eds) Sicherheit und Electronic Commerce. DuD-Fachbeiträge. Vieweg+Teubner Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84901-4_2
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