Summary
On the basis of interviews with regulatory agencies and business firms in the United States, we outline three implicit “theories” of why business firms violate the law-economic calculation, principled disagreement, and incompetence. Each gives rise to a different emphasis in enforcement-deterrence, negotiation, and education. Enforcement based on any single theory of noncompliance is shown to be counter-productive when violations occur for one of the other reasons. Flexible enforcement, based on the analysis of the specific cause of each particular violation, is inhibited by technical, bureaucratic and political contraints.
Zusammenfassung
Interviews mit staatlichen Aufsichtsämtern (regulatory agencies) und Wirtschaftsunternehmen in den USA führten zu drei „Theorien“, warum Wirtschaftsunternehmen das Recht verletzen: wirtschaftliches Kalkül, grundsätzliche Ablehnung und Unkenntnis. Alle drei führen zu unterschiedlichen Steuerungsstrategien: Abschreckung, Verhandlung und Aufklärung. Durchsetzungsversuche, die nur auf einer der Theorien der Nichteinhaltung beruhen würden, wären schädlich, wenn Abweichung aus einem der anderen Gründe erfolgt. Allerdings verhindern technische, bürokratische und politische Zwänge, daß eine flexible Durchsetzung sich an den jeweiligen Nichteinhaltungs-Gründen orientiert.
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Footnotes
See Table 1, photocopied from U.S. Small Business Administration, The Impact on Small Business Concerns of Government Regulations that Force Technological Change, 1975. The list is far from complete with respect to federal “social regulation” We might add the monumentally important Civil Rights Act of 1964, proscribing discrimination by race and sex in employment, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (forbidding employment discrimination against the handicapped). Major environmental enactments were the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (and the major amendments of 1977), the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (1972), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments and the Strip Mine Legislation of 1977. More recent consumer protection and safety acts include the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (1972), the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act (1973), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 1974, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (1974), The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act (1974). For other measures of the growth of federal regulation, see William Lilley III and James C. Miller, III, “The New’ social Regulation’” The Public Interest, No. 47 (April 1977); Nina W. Cornell, Roger G. Noll, and Barry Weingast, “. Safety Regulation” in Setting National Priorities: the Next Ten Years. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1976, pp. 457-504.
These interviews were undertaken as part of a study of the regulatory process directed by Professor Eugene Bardach, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, and by Professor Robert A. Kagan, Department of Political Science at the same university. The study is funded by the Twentieth Century Fund, New York City. The Center for the Study of Law and Society in Berkeley has provided office space and other assistance. We (or our research assistants) conducted open-ended interviews of inspectors and higher enforcement officials of the federal Food and Drug Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. We also interviewed inspectors and directors of enforcement at a number of California state agencies: the Division of Occupational Safety and Health; the Food and Drug Division and Nursing Home Division in the Department of Health; the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety in the California Highway Patrol; the Milk and Dairy Section of the Department of Agriculture; and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District. We also interviewed municipal building and housing code inspectors and fire marshals in the City of Oakland. In several instances we or our research assistants accompanied inspectors on a daily round. Second, we conducted open-ended interviews of executives and managers in companies regulated by each of the above agencies, concentrating on a limited number of firms in certain industries: steel foundries (4) and aluminum manufacturing companies (2) (with respect to workplace safety and health regulation and air pollution regulation); automobile assembly plants (2) (with respect to worker safety); blood banks and blood products manufacturers (2) (with respect to FDA regulation of “biologies”); petroleum refineries (3) (with respect to air pollution); trucking firms or trucking departments (3) (with respect to truck safety regulation); nursing homes (2) and dairy products manufacturers (2). In addition, we interviewed labor union officers in four companies and insurance company representatives from two insurance firms with respect to safety matters. Third, we conducted a two-day workshop in May, 1978, at the Graduate School of Public Policy at Berkeley in which we recorded round-table discussions among enforcement officials from most of the above-mentioned agencies and a few representatives of regulated firms. The sample of agencies and regulated businesses is not systematic. We cannot contend that their responses are “representative in a scientific sense. Our goal, in this exploratory study, was not to compare a broad range of agencies and companies, but to concentrate on in-depth interviewing so as to discover attitudes and analyses by participants in the regulatory process. that pointed to significant problems, as they experienced them, and which suggested directions for more systematic research.
We use the terms “. business firm” and “business corporation” interchangeably, primarily because most of respondents did, although some “theories” seem especially applicable to the large corporation.
See W. G. Carson, “White Collar Crime and Enforcement of the Factory Acts”, British Journal of Criminology (Oct. 1970) p. 394. See also Keith Hawkins’ forthcoming study of water pollution inspectors in England, Pollution, Law and Social Control (London: MacMillan Press: In Press).
See Pietro Nivola, Municipal Agency: A Study of the Housing Inspectorial Service in Boston (Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976) p. 130. The propensity for regulatory enforcement officials informally to classify violations as negligent versus deliberate, excusable or not, has also been observed among consumer fraud investigators. See Susan Silbey, Consumer Justice: The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office of Consumer Protection (Ph.D.Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978).
This pattern was followed in the agencies described in the studies cited in the two preceding footnotes, as well as by some agencies whose officials we interviewed, including the Motor Carrier Safety Unit of the California Highway Patrol and the pre-1972 California Division of Industrial Safety.
See, e.g., James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, “The Effect of the Police on Crime”, 12 Law and Society Review 367 (1978); Gordon Tullock, “Does Punishment Deter Crime?” The Public Interest (Summer 1974), p. 103; and research cited in those essays. See generally Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, Deterrence. The Legal Threat in Crime Control. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973; and James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime. New York: Basic Books, 1975.
This view, it should be noted, is prevalent not only among regulators but among established businessmen, too, who are critical of the ethics of their “fly-by-night” competitors. See, e.g., Robert Lane, “Why Businessmen Violate the Law”, in Gilbert Geis and Robert Meier, eds., White Collar Crime. New York: The Free Press, Rev. ed., 1977.
James Turner, The Chemical Feast. (Ralph Nader Study Group on the Food and Drug Administration) New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970, p. 121.
Id. at p. 40.
See, e.g., David Currie, “The Occupational Safety and Health Act” American Bar Association Research Journal, 1976, 1107, 1134; Eugene Seskin, “. Automobile Air Pollution Policy” in Paul Portney, ed., U.S. Environmental Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
See, e.g., Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U. S. C., Sec. 801ff; California Assembly Bill 1600 (1973) (inspection of nursing homes).
Interviews with supervisors and inspectors in California Division of Occupational Safety and Health, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, California Department of Health Division for Nursing Home Inspections, and with regulated firms in each of these fields.
See Continental Steel Corp., 30 Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Reports 1410 (1974); California Labor Code, Sec. 6428.
A $25 thousand per day criminal fine is authorized, for example, in the 1970 federal Clean Air Act Amendments (with $50 thousand a day for repeat offenders) and the federal Mine Safety Act. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments authorized civil penalties (which are easier for the agency to prove) of un to $25 thousend a day, as did the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.
See e.g., California Labor Code, Sec. 6325-6327 (summary orders to shut down dangerous workplaces); Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, Regulation No.5 (summary orders to shut down polution source); Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (summary orders to reduce train speeds); Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1265 (1970).
See Sec. 304 of the 1977 Clean Air Act; Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir.1972). The Occupational Safety and Health Act has similar provisions. 29 U.S.C. 662 (d). Nursing home advocacy groups have sued federal officials for inadequate enforcement of quality of care regulations and fire marshals have been held liable for failure to close down buildings with fire code violations.
See, e.g., Robert Lane, “Why Businessmen Violate the Law” op. cit. n.8, (a study of shoe manufacturing firms) and Harry Ball, “Social Structure and Rent Control Violations” 65 American Journal of Sociology 598 (1960).
See Robert A. Kagan, Regualtory Justice: Implementing A Wage-Price Freeze. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1978.
There are three major petroleum refineries in the same country in California, each inspected for air pollution violations virtually every day. They have sharply different violation rates, according to enforcement officials we interviewed, and they display different patterns of interaction with the agency, ranging from cooperation to resistance. See also studies by Lane and Ball, op. cit., n. 18.
See Lane, op. cit., n. 8.
For example, in 1978 the government ordered the Ford Motor Company to recall 1971 Pinto cars because a number of them had exploded in collisions, because the gas tank was located too close to the rear of the car. Although that defect had been changed on all models in subsequent years, Ford sustained losses in sales of 1978 Pintos that cost far more than the recall itself.
See Wall Street Journal, November 29, 1978. One apparent reason Firestone officials did not conduct the full range of tests was that sales officials were concerned about bringing out the new line of tires to prevent continued incursions by foreign radial-tire-manufacturers.
See Wall Street Journal, November 27, 1978.
Wall Street Journal, April 9, 1979.
Professor John Dunlop, after having served as U.S. Secretary of Labor, a department that administers several major regulatory programs, observed “Uniform, national rules … do not reflect the reality of the workplace” John Dunlop, “The Limits of Legal Compulsion” The Conference Board Record, March 1976, p. 27.
See, e.g., The President’s Interagency Task Force on Workplace Safety and Health, “Making Prevention Pay” Draft Report (1978); H. Northrup, et al. The Impact of OSHA, Philadelphia: The Wharton School, 1978. In addition, OSHA has frequently demanded extensive redesign of manufacturing equipment even though much less expensive personal protective equipment for workers (respirators, ear plugs, etc.) would produce roughly equivalent worker protection.
U.S. Small Business Administration, The Impact on Small Business Concerns of Governmental Regulations That Force Technological Change, 1975; Bruce Ackerman, et.al., The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality. New York: The Free Press, 1974. Sometimes insensitive “. technology-forcing“is not only unduly expensive but is actually counter-productive. In Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (1978), the court struck down a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulation requiring improved braking systems for trucks, because of evidence showing that the required new systems were not reliable and may in fact have increased the likelihood of truck accidents. The NHTSA apparently promulgated the regulation despite this evidence because it distrusted the arguments from industry and because it wanted a law to enforce in order to give industry an incentive to improve.
That legalistic rule-following tends to undermine “. purposive” law-enforcement is a recurrent theme in legal theory. For a recent and provocative restatement, see Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law. New York: Harper-Colophon, 1978.
See Northtrup, et al, The Impact of OSHA, op. cit, n. 27, pp. 46-66, 228-233.
Workshop on “The Inspectorate” Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, May 1978.
See, e. g., Edwin Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976, p. ix. For a overview of sociological theories of criminal behavior, see Gwynn Nettler, Explaining Crime. New York: McGraw-Hill 1974; Gresham Sykes, Criminology. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1978.
See, e. g., Albert Reiss, Jr. The Police and the Public. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, p. 58; Piliavin and Briar, “. Police Encounters with Juveniles” 70 Amer. Journal of Sociology 206 (1964); Lloyd Klemke, “. Does Apprehension for Shoplifting Amplify or Terminate Shoplifting Activity” 12 Law and Society Review 395 (1978).
See, e. g., Albert Cohen, Delinquent Boys. New York: The Free Press, 1955; Marvin Wolfgang and F. Ferranti, The Subculture of Violence. London: Tavistock Publishing Co., 1967: Edwin Sutherland’s theory that criminal activity is behavoir that is learned via “differential association” with members of subcultures has been extremely influential. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology. New York: Lippincott, 1939. These theories and the works cited here have not escaped criticism from other criminologists. For a summary, see Gresham Sykes, Criminology, op. cit., n. 32
On unreasonable reporting requirements, see U.S. Commission on Federal Paperwork, Final Summary Report (Washington, 1977); For an example of the harmful effects of bureaucratic delay, see William Tucker, “Of Mites and Men” Harper’s, August 1978, p. 43, reporting such extensive delays in regulated approval of new “. biological“pest control techniques that some companies have abandoned development efforts.
The chief executive officer of an Alabama bank, after referring to the 24 separate federal sets of regulations and reporting requirements he had to comply with, was quoted as saying, “. It’s no crime to be a banker, but it might as well be” G. A. LeMaistre, “A Plethora of Regulations: A Case of Too Many Cooks?” National Law Journal (December 4, 1978), p. 26.
Harry Ball, “Social Structure and Rent Control Violations” 65 American Journal of Sociology 598 (1960).
George Katona, Price Control and Business. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1945, p. 141; Marshall Clinard, “. Criminological Theories of Violations of Wartime Regulations” 11 American Sociological Review 258 (1946).
Fred Delmore and Kermit Sloane, “FDA’s Voluntary Compliance Program” quoted in James Turner, The Chemical Feast, op. cit., n. 9. p. 123. This theme was repeated by representatives of 15 regulatory agencies at a workshop an “. The Inspectorate” at the University of California, Berkeley, May 1978.
Report of the Committee on Safety and Health at Work, Lord Robens, Chairman (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1972) (Robens Report) p. 63.
Chester Bowles, head of the Office of Price Administration during World War II, reflected this view when he said that 20 percent of the population would automatically comply with any regulation, 5 percent would attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75 percent would go along with it as long as the 5 percent were caught and punished. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. One study of the liquor industry noted that most firms believed that their competitors generally ignored the law. “. The assumption that other participants have few scruples fosters the belief that survival in such an arena depends upon the adoption of the same attitude” Thus, weak enforcement, among other factors, weakened normative inducements to comply with liquor laws and even fostered attitudes supportive of ignoring the laws. See Norman K. Denzin, “. Notes on the Criminogenic Hypothesis: A Case Study of the American Liquor Industry” 42 American Soc.Rev. 905 (1977).
Several corporate safety managers told us that they could more readily obtain cooperation from supervisors and foremen for changes in plant safety activity when they could say, “. That’s the law” Similarly, a corporate director of transportation told us that federal truck safety regulations are a great asset to him in pushing for adequate maintenance, restrictions on driver hours, adherence to speed limits, and other useful activities which tend to get overlooked. See also, on this point, Thomas Schelling, “Command and Control” in John McKie, ed., Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament. Washington, D. C: Brookings Institution, 1974.
The classic statement of the idea that “. public service“serves as a motivational device is Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938, p. 147.
In Kreisberg’s study of the steel industry during the Korean conflict, only the smaller, more marginal suppliers routinely charged “gray market” prices above those agreed upon by the industry to control wartime shortage-induced inflation. Firms with established reputations eschewed profiteering even though there was no agency to enforce the agreed price and no legal penalties for charging higher prices. Louis Kreisberg, “National Security and Conduct in the Steel Gray Market” 34 Social Forces (1956), 268–277. For a persuasive analysis of the economic value of a reputation for honesty and, by implication, good citizenship, see Robert Nelson, “. The Economics of Honest Trade Practices” 24 Journal of Industrial Economics 281 (1976). In these respects, the image of the corporation as citizen tends to converge with the picture of the corporation as self-interested and amoral calculator. The amoral calculator that took long-term public relations and adverse publicity liabilities into account might be a good corporate citizen. Adherents of the amoral calculator image, however, tend to emphasize short-run calculations and strictly legal “. costs“. ; that is the distinguishing feature of the “. image”
Thomas Schelling, “. Command and Control” op. cit., n. 42.
See Robert A. Kagan, Regulatory Justice, op. cit., n. 19.
In contrast, the California Air Resources Control Board, taken over in the mid-seventies by strong environmentalists, abolished an industry advisory commitee that had served to provide technical advice to the board, and pushed local enforcement officials to increase formal enforcement. One result is increasing political opposition, and some clear cases of legalistic opposition by industry, whose representatives often cite the technically-flawed and unrealistic nature of CARB regulations.
Where trade associations do exist, they can be valuable allies for enforcement agencies that are not too mistrustful to work with them. The U.S. Department of Transportation adopted a plan whereby the standards for safety of cast aluminum wheels, used on racing and sports cars, were set by the Speed Equipment Manufacturers Association. The Association assures compliance by denying its “. seal of approval” to wheel manufacturers that do not establish adequate quality control programs and send castings to the Association regularly for testing. Association inspectors—who are inevitably more knowledgeable, because more specialized, than governmental inspectors—visit the plants of members and make suggestions. The Association “seal” is an invaluable sales aid, thus assuring high levels of membership in the Association.
See Maureen Mileski, Policing Slum Landlords, Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1973; and Pietro Nivola, Municipal Agency: A Study of the Housing Inspectorial Service in Boston, Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976, chapter 5.
See I. Scharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, Vol 1, pp. 270–273; Vol.4, pp. 75-77; U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, An Evaluation of Railroad Safety. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970.
Air pollution control agencies recently have begun to make agreements with large industrial installations, such as refineries, whereby the company has more discretion over which pollution sources to concentrate on and which technologies to use, so long as improvement is shown; this is a departure form traditional techniques, under which the agency insisted on strict enforcement of uniform rules controlling every source and prescribing the control technology to used. See e.g., M. T. Maloney and Bruce Yandle, “Bubbles and Efficiency” Regulation (May/June 1980)
See generally Berry, “An Overview of the Meat and Poultry Inspection Program, 33 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law Journal 44 (February 1978).
See, e.g., Peter Schräg, “On Her Majesty’s Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York City” 80 Yale Law Journal 1529 (1971); Christopher Stone, Where the Law Ends: Social Control of Corporate Behavior. New York: Harper Colophon, 1975. Recently, U.S. House of Representative documents revealed that a large chemical company failed to notify nearby residents that their health was endangered by toxic chemicals dumped into waste sites because the company feared incurring legal liability. San Francisco Chronicle (April 11, 1979), p. 7; Ken Galdston, “. Hooker Chemical’s Nightmarish Pollution Record” Business and Society Review, (Summer 1979) p. 25. Aluminum industry officials we interviewed are of the opinion that several American steel companies have been rather unscrupulous in resisting compliance with air pollution regulations.
Businessmen may also retrospectively justify or rationalize a violation they committed for purely economic reasons by convincing themselves that the law was unreasonable anyway. For a discussion of this tendency among juvenile law-breakers see David Matza, Delinquency and Drift. New York: John Wiley, 1964, and Gresham Sykes and Davis Matza, “Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency” 22 American Soc. Rev. 664 (1957).
Corporate safety directors we interviewed, some of whom had worked for several companies, referred to clear differences among managements in the importance they placed on safety and their willingness to spend money to reduce risks.
An enforcement official responsible for regulating the quality of care in California nursing homes told us that his inspectors are instructed to treat each inspection as a potential prosecution because a home can change from good to bad in a couple of weeks if personnel changes occur.
See Paul Weaver, “Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict” The Public Interest (Winter 1978).
The resulting “. minimax” strategy—minimizing the maximum harm by treating all citizens as if they were potential criminals—is a common strategy among urban policemen. See William K. Muir, Jr.’s insightful analysis in Police: Streetcorner Politicians (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977).
See, e.g., David Abrahamsen, The Psychology of Crime. New York: John Wiley, 1960.
But see Marshall Clinard, “. Criminological Theories of Violations of Wartime Regulations” in Geis and Meier, White Collar Crime, op. cit., n. 8, supra.
These view occasionally emerge in public discussion. The popular motion picture “. The China Syndrome” portrays a near-disaster in a nuclear power generation station, aggravatey by attempts of greedy company directors to suppress information about it. A prominent nuclear critic was quoted as criticizing the film in one respect: it showed the company’s board chairman as “. an ogre” although “it would have been more realistic to portray him as an idiot. It’s incompetence rather than malevolence” Newsweek, April 16, 1979, p. 31.
Christopher Stone, Where the Law Ends, op. cit., n. 53, supra.
See also the corporate blunders noted in text accompanying footnotes 22-24, supra.
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967, pp. 143–145; see also Martin Landau and Russell Stout, “. To Manage is Not to Control” Public Administration Rev. (1979).
The classic analysis of organizational limits on corporate rationality is Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963. See also Bo Hedberg, et al, “. Camping on a Seesaw” Administrative Science Quarterly (1976). 9
See Thomas Schelling, “. Command and Control” in McKie, op. cit., n. 42.
See Stone, op. cit., n. 53.
See Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1957.
See Cyert and March, op. cit., n. 65.
The propensity of workers to decline to use protective equipment on machine guards provided by management, on grounds of convenience and efficiency of work, was a recurrent theme in our interviews. It is one reason OSHA mandates more expensive “. enginee-ning controls” See n. 27, supra.
For example, after new regulations have been formulated, the federal Food and Drug Administration issues interpretive press releases, prepares educational materials with compliance instructions for distribution through trade associations, conducts workshops with industry’s leaders, sends speakers to trade association meetings, and publicizes regulations and new problems through several FDA publications. One state food and drug official we interviewed began new enforcement campaigns with workshops to plead with and threaten industry’s leaders followed by a well-publicized and carefully-documented prosecution of one major uncooperative firm.
Ellen Worcester, “Policing Debt Collectors: A Case Study of the Enforcement Function” unpublished paper, in possession of authors. In contrast, an FDA enforcement official told us, “. We’re a law enforcement agency, not a service agency If we go into a factory and see someone picking his nose while he is handling shrimp, we don’t say ‘“. Gee, you ought to buy gloves for that guy”. We say, “You have violated Section whatever of the Act”
OSHA inspectors are legally authorized to question employees and corporate agents, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 657 (a) (1970).
See Joseph Hile, “Food and Drug Administration Inspections—A New Approach”, Food Drug and Cosmetic Law Journal, February 1974, p. 101.
This is not a new idea. An 1873 California law required every mine to employ a safety supervisor, who was made criminally responsible for accidents due to neglect of duty on his part. In 1876, San Francisco required the owners and operators of steam engines to appoint a licensed manager for each boiler. Lucille Eaves, A History of California Labor Laws. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1910. The Security and Exchange Commission has for many years forced corporations that wish to sell shares to the public to hire certified public accountants to attest to the reliability of the financial information made public.
Christopher Stone, Where the Law Ends, op. cit., n. 53.
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975) p. 69.
Id., at p. 120.
By the same token, oil refinery pollution control engineers, who worked full time on the subject, were quite willing to dispute regulatory rules for specific pollutants, and the models of ambient air flow or the epidemiological studies in which the rules were based.
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Kagan, R.A., Scholz, J.T. (1980). The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies. In: Blankenburg, E., Lenk, K. (eds) Organisation und Recht. Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, vol 7. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83669-4_21
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