Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird der kurz- und langfristige Erfolg aller US-amerikanischen Aktiengesellschaften untersucht, die zwischen 1984 und 1988 Aktiengattungen mit unterschiedlichen Stimmrechten emittierten („Dual-Class-Firmen“). Diese Unternehmen zeichnen sich durch eine hoch konzentrierte Kontrollstruktur aus, da die mit höherem Stimmrecht ausgestatteten Aktien in der Regel von Mitgliedern der Unternehmensleitung gehalten werden. Um die Auswirkungen einer Dual-Class-Struktur auf den Unternehmenserfolg zu messen, wird eine paarweise zugeordnete Kontrollstichprobe gebildet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß Dual-Class-Firmen eine statistisch und ökonomisch signifikant höhere Aktienrendite haben als die Kontrollfirmen, so daß konsolidierte Kontrolle deutliche Vorteile für die Anteilseigner dieser Unternehmen hat. Die Robustheit dieses Resultats wird durch eine Analyse von Jahresabschlußdaten bestätigt.
Diese Arbeit wurde teilweise von der Schmalenbach Gesellschaft-DGfB und teilweise im Rahmen des DFG-SFB 373 Projekt C1 an der Humboldt-Universität gefördert.
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© 1996 Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler GmbH, Wiesbaden
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Böhmer, E. (1996). Die Auswirkungen von konsolidierter Kontrolle auf den Unternehmenserfolg. In: Sadowski, D., Czap, H., Wächter, H. (eds) Regulierung und Unternehmenspolitik. Gabler Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-82419-6_10
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