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Außenwirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft

Politisch-institutionelle Determinanten der Außenwirtschaftsorientierung in Entwicklungsländern

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Politische Ökonomie

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Zusammenfassung

Noch vor wenigen Jahren musste in Europa mit Fragen, gar Durchsuchungen rechnen, wer von einem Staat in den anderen wechselte. Die Grenze war deutlich spürbar, und das Interesse der Grenzbeamten richtete sich nicht nur auf die Einreise unerwünschter Personen, sondern mehr noch auf die illegale Einfuhr von Gütern, für die der jeweilige Staat einen Zoll zu erheben für angemessen erachtete. Mit der Verwirklichung des Europäischen Binnenmarktes und der Unterzeichung des Schengener Abkommens fielen diese Grenzen zwischen den meisten Staaten der Europäischen Union. Doch genügt eine Reise in die Schweiz, um eventuell mit der Frage konfrontiert zu werden, ob man deklarationspflichtige Waren mit sich fähre. Und wer gar versucht, einen Koffer mit Bargeld über die Grenze nach Liechtenstein zu bringen, dem ist das Interesse der Zoll- und Steuerbehörden des Ausreiselandes sicher.

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Authors
  1. Christian W. Martin
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Universität Bremen, Deutschland

    Herbert Obinger

  2. Avenir Suisse, Zürich, Schweiz

    Uwe Wagschal

  3. Graduate School of Social Sciences, Universität Bremen, Deutschland

    Bernhard Kittel

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© 2003 VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

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Martin, C.W. (2003). Außenwirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft. In: Obinger, H., Wagschal, U., Kittel, B. (eds) Politische Ökonomie. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80884-4_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80884-4_10

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-8100-3533-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-80884-4

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