Zusammenfassung
Über den Einfluss von Internationalem Währungsfonds (IWF) und Weltbank auf die Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik von Entwicklungsländern herrscht eine bemerkenswerte Uneinigkeit. Während Kritiker aus dem Umkreis der Anti-Globalisierungsbewegung den internationalen Finanzinstitutionen (IFIs) nicht nur vorwerfen, Entwicklungsländern eine „ökonomisch zerstörerische“Wirtschaftspolitik aufzuzwingen (z.B.: Attac 2002a: 2), sondern sogar in den Meinungsbildungsprozess souveräner Staaten einzugreifen (Attac 2002b: 5), finden akademische Beiträge häufig nur einen schwachen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Wirken von IWF und Weltbank und der regulativen Politik in Entwicklungsländern (z.B.: Collier 1997; Burnside/Dollar 1997).8
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Martin, C.W. (2004). Der (konditionale) Einfluss internationaler Finanzinstitutionen auf die Reform der Außenhandelspolitik in Entwicklungsländern. In: Behnke, J., Plümper, T., Burth, HP. (eds) Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie. Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80613-0_6
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