Abstract
Complex tasks that cannot be routinized define professional and knowledge intensive work. When such tasks are carried out by collective actors (such as professional committees or workgroups), cooperation and mutual adjustments by these actors are not accounted for by models such as Weberian bureaucracy. Instead of weakening the concept of bureaucracy — as did the sociology of organizations during the past century — I would like to argue that two conflicting trends currently take place in societies where the knowledge economy accounts for an increasing part of production and growth. The first trend is simply the continuation of Weberian rationalization through bureaucratization. The second trend is another kind of rationalization through collegiality and its particularistic social processes. I assume that understanding this second trend provides insights into modern professions since their practice seems to become more collective and organizational — with the further loss of independence. Competition between the two trends characterizes an increasingly large area of production, as it becomes knowledge-intensive.
I would like to thank Professors Thomas Klatetzki and Veronika Tacke for their invitation to the University of Siegen in October 2003 and for their helpful comments on a draft of this presentation. I would also like to thank Richard Scott and Richard Abel who provided stimulating comments.
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Lazega, E. (2005). A Theory of Collegiality and its Relevance for Understanding Professions and knowledge-intensive Organizations. In: Klatetzki, T., Tacke, V. (eds) Organisation und Profession. Organisation und Gesellschaft. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80570-6_9
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