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Brussels: The premier league of lobbying

  • Rinus van Schendelen

Zusammenfassung

Lobbying is of all times and places. It also takes place at the level of the European Union (EU), where thousands of lobby groups are active all days. In this chapter the concept of lobbying is used in a technical way, free from emotional connotations. It refers to more unorthodox efforts of both public and private interest groups to influence officials in the desired direction. The EU system appears to be very open and irresistible to lobby groups. Due to the decline of national co-ordination the lobby groups, acting more self-reliantly now and thus showing their idiosyncrasies, get their more European patterns of behaviour by the rise of both collective action and professional lobbying. All groups take part in collective action. But only a few do the lobbying more professional by defining their ambitions carefully, by doing a lot of studious work before and by lobbying prudently. To the many amateurish groups they set the trend. Finally EU lobbying is discussed for four dependent variables: effectiveness, quality of outcomes, democracy and integration.

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Literatur

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Copyright information

© Westdeutscher Verlag/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rinus van Schendelen

There are no affiliations available

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