Abstract
Their miniscule numbers notwithstanding, Lebanese Jews are not a marginal community. They are likewise not unaware of their venerable age-old lineage in Lebanon. This chapter, based on a series of interviews conducted over the span of four years, records the testimonies of Lebanese Jews, most of them in the diaspora, most of them still “dreaming” of a Lebanon they once knew, and most of them trying to retrace their early footsteps back to their ancestral familial home. Although a chapter of “memories,” with testimonies often reproduced verbatim as they were related to the author, the text is heavily footnoted, annotated with commentary, clarifications, and historical references bringing factual confirmation to personal recollections.
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Notes
- 1.
Anonymous, Profile of the Lebanese Jewish Community (Beirut, Confidential, June 1964), Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.031.
- 2.
Philip K. Hitti , A Short History of Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), 64.
- 3.
Hitti, 6–7.
- 4.
Charles Corm , La montagne inspirée (Beirut: Éditions de la Revue Phénicienne, Third Edition, 1987), 105.
- 5.
Philip Hitti , Lebanon in History; From the Earliest Times to the Present (London and New York: St-Martin’s Press, 1957), 244–46.
- 6.
Hitti, Lebanon in History, 244–46.
- 7.
See, for instance, Michel Chiha’s “Progression d’Israël,” Le Jour (Beirut: February 24, 1951). In this, Chiha praises Israel’s accomplishments, while shaming the undisciplined opportunistic Lebanese for not following Israel’s example. Both his introductory and concluding sentences offer an exquisite summation of his despair and yearning—if not the outright admiration (even if also the envy) he had vis-à-vis Israel. “Our neighbors to the South are moving forward at breakneck speed,” he wrote “we ought to pay our respects to this, Israel’s powerful urge towards living and being alive. [… Yet, we, the Lebanese] go on living and thinking in obsolete archaic notions, in the fatal laziness of bygone centuries. […] Let us not forget this painful reality if we do not wish [Lebanon,] this country of light to lapse into the twilight.” By any measure, read from the purview of the twenty-first century and in light of what has befallen a Lebanon bereft of Jews, Chiha’s words are nothing if not painful, premonitory, and woefully prophetic.
- 8.
The poem and song in question are titled Sayfun fa-liyushhar (A Sword, Let it Be Drawn). There is a dispute and a great deal of fuzziness regarding the poem’s authorship. Some argue Saïd Akl wrote it. Others affirm it was the Brothers Rahbani, the musical duo behind Fayrouz who also worked in partnership with Saïd Akl through most of Fayrouz’s career. What is certain, however, is that Saïd Akl himself assured this author, during an interview in 1999, that the poem was indeed his own, even if it does not figure in any of his published works. What’s more, he also noted that even when they wrote their own Modern Standard Arabic texts, the Brothers Rahbani always consulted with Saïd Akl who often edited, corrected, and augmented their texts. This is apparent in the thematic, linguistic, and symbolic parallels any casual reader can draw between Sayfun fa-liyushhar, and another poem titled Zahratu l-Madaa’in (The Flower of Cities) treating a similar topic, and which is an established component of Akl’s corpus.
- 9.
“Le commencement de la fin du Judaïsme libanais” (The Beginning of the End of Lebanese Judaism), Information Israël (Paris: May 17, 1968), the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.079.
- 10.
This last term, “offense,” is an English rendition of the Arabic “Udwaan” (literally “aggression”), a mainstay of Arabic political, journalistic, and academic writing describing the State of Israel .
- 11.
Patricia Khoder, “De Brooklyn à Beyrouth; L’histoire d’un retour,” L’Orient le jour (Beirut: August 8, 2017). https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1066187/de-brooklyn-a-beyrouth-lhistoire-dun-retour.html.
- 12.
Al-Aalam al-Isra’iili , “Theodor Herzl” (Beirut: September 1, 1921), 3–4.
- 13.
Bat Yam is a coastal southern “suburb” of Tel Aviv . It is home to sizeable communities of Turkish Jews and other Jews of Muslim-majority countries.
- 14.
One of Alain Abadie’s hits, his 1973 Aime (Love), was a local sensation that, had Lebanon not been less fortunate in the years that followed, might have rivaled France’s best, namely Michel Sardou’s La maladie d’amour and others, which had been fixtures of the Beirut music and artistic scenes of the time. See Abadie’s Aime here, with excerpts of the lyrics:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMprirR406E.
Caresser un visage, avoir une main dans ta main, / Un sourire qui vous aime, en se réveillant le matin, / Une voix, un murmure, et quelques mots d’amour, / Quand tu t’amuses entre mes bras, je te dis bis au petit jour… / Aime, aime, aime, aime….
Aime la nuit et le jour, aime la vie et l’amour, / Aime l’hiver et l’automne, aime tout ce que je te donne, / Aime le vent et la mer, aime les fruits de la terre, / Aime la vie, les oiseaux, et le ciel quand il fait beau… / Quand ta voix me murmure, autour de mon oreille, / Les mots que j’attends de toi, chaque fois tu m’emverveilles…
- 15.
Kirsten E. Schulze , The Jews of Lebanon; Between Coexistence and Conflict (Brighton and London: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 12–30.
- 16.
The patronym Cohen, a rendition of the Hebrew Kohen/Kahen, clearly suggests a priestly lineage.
- 17.
As mentioned earlier in this volume, 1967 was a particularly trying year for Lebanese Jewry. Christian-dominated Lebanon was an idea on the wane by then; Arab nationalism was becoming increasingly vocal and increasingly hostile to Lebanese specificity and Lebanese neutrality. As a result, Lebanese Jewry suffered the repercussions. It is “The Beginning of the End of a Lebanese Judaism” read one heading of the French periodical Information Israël in June 1968; “Lebanese Start to Leave” read another, a year earlier, in London’s Jewish Chronicle. Many members of Lebanon’s estimated 5000 strong Jewish community were absconding their country noted the Jewish Chronicle : “undeceived by the deceptively calm atmosphere prevailing there at the moment, and not completely reassured by the Lebanese Government’s announced determination to maintain law and order,” Lebanese Jewry had begun its exodus. “There is now a permanent police guard on the Jewish quarter of Beirut , where most Lebanese Jews live, as well as on their synagogues and other buildings. What the Jews are afraid of, however, is a clash between Christians and Moslems over the Middle East situation. If this occurs, and there are signs that it is brewing, the Jews will be caught in the middle, they fear. Almost to a man, Lebanese Moslems are pro-Nasser and fiercely anti-Israel, whereas the Christians (mostly Maronites) take a realistic attitude. They feel that, now that a ceasefire is in operation, everyone concerned should calm down and take a long hard look at the situation as it really is, without any illusions. The Moslems, who make up something over half the total population, are firmly in favour of a climb-down by Israel , and they fully support Arab intransigence. The first 20 Jewish families from Lebanon arrived in France this week, en route for the United States, Brazil, Canada and Australia. They and their coreligionists who are still leaving have been able to transfer their assets abroad and take with them all their belongings.” See the Jewish Chronicle, London, June 30, 1967, in the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.061.
Relative to this, and true to the Arabic adage “Egypt writes, Lebanon publishes, and Iraq reads,” there have reportedly been some 300,000 copies of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion , published in Lebanon during the summer of 1968. This sizeable production of this “infamous and hoary anti-Semitic forgery” was reportedly being circulated throughout Lebanon and the world, and according to “reliable sources,” the printing and distribution of this tract were being subsidized by King Feisal of Saudi Arabia . Likewise, some 200,000 copies were reported to have been printed in French and destined to French-speaking majority Muslim African countries, while another 100,000 copies were rendered in English, Italian, Arabic, and Spanish, and destined for distribution, through the good offices of the Arab League , in various Arabophone countries and other Spanish-speaking, English-speaking, and Italian-speaking lands with a sizeable Muslim expatriate community. See The Jerusalem Post , July 5, 1968, in the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.090.
- 18.
Things were still tenuous for Lebanese Jews, namely beginning in the 1950s, and harassment had become the lot of their daily existence, especially as Arab nationalists and “Muslim fanatics” emboldened by the growing weakness of Lebanon’s Christians, began exacting stricter controls over the movements and activities of Lebanese Jews. However, things took a turn for the worst in the aftermath of 1967, as the Lebanese Jewish community grew increasingly concerned about its well-being and its security. This ultimately led to the shuttering of Jewish businesses through 1967–1969, contributing to heightened urgency among Lebanese Jews to leave the country. “The hostile attitude towards the Jewish community in Lebanon has increased with the growth of the influence of the terrorist organizations there,” wrote the Jerusalem Post in July 1969. And hard as the Lebanese government—and armed vigilante elements of the Maronite-dominated Kataëb Party—tried to safeguard the security of their Jewish compatriots and their urban quarters, their efforts seemed always offset by radical Muslim elements. Those Jews who opted to stay put, resisting emigration, were in the main small businessmen, shopkeepers, teachers, and craftsmen according to a Jerusalem Post report from September 1969. But the Lebanese government itself, under the conciliatory—not to say “weak”—leadership of the Maronite Charles Helou , was overly beholden to Arab phobias and Arab obsessions vis-à-vis Israel —a kind of “national frailty” that often translated into a dereliction of duty vis-à-vis Lebanese Jewry. Jews were therefore apprehensive about their future in Lebanon, and the tensions between Lebanese Christians and Lebanese Muslims with regard to the Arab–Israeli conflict and the presence of a large Palestinian (Muslim) refugee community in Lebanon often impacted Lebanese Jews negatively. It is worth stressing, again, that the Lebanese government’s record toward Jews was always favorable and discrimination as such—let alone persecution—was non-extant. But the Christians in government were under pressure to burnish their “Arab” credentials, which often led to less than “enlightened” policies vis-à-vis the Jews; Muslims were gaining in influence and strength in Lebanese public life, and during the Six-Day War Muslim mobs expressly began fomenting anti-Jewish feelings, harassing Jewish persons, attacking and boycotting Jewish businesses, and ordering Jewish shopkeepers to shutter their stores. Ultimately, these sorts of attitudes began getting formalized in “official” policy. To wit, “no new civil servants are taken from the Jewish community,” noted the Jerusalem Post in the summer of 1967, even as “those who are already in government employ are kept on so far.” Still, some Lebanese Jews opted to stay put at the behest of their Christian compatriots. Allegedly, some Lebanese tend to “think of the Jews as a barometer of world opinion. If [they] are well treated, then Lebanon is still [considered] a civilized place.” However, Lebanese Jewry lives a precarious existence; their attitudes toward Israel are often a mixed bag of pride and apprehension; pride in Jewish resiliency and accomplishments, and apprehension of what may befall Lebanese Jewry should there be a more radical shift in Lebanon’s political and religious balance. Yet, Israeli visitors to Lebanon were common throughout the 1960s, and Hebrew was often heard in Beiruti cafés and restaurants; Israeli interlocutors were only asked “not to mention Israel by name” in public and refer to it euphemistically only, as “over there.” Otherwise, “being Jewish” in post-1967 Lebanon was not a particularly “curious” affair, suggesting that even at the height of anti-Jewish radicalism, Lebanese Jews “being Jews” and conversing publically in Hebrew was not a matter looked upon askance. See “Lebanese Jews in Danger” and “Jews in Lebanon,” in The Jerusalem Post , July 21, 1969, and September 12, 1969, in the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.126, and 04.128.
- 19.
According to a confidential profile of the Lebanese Jewish community, community events were always well attended by high state dignitaries representing the political and civil authorities, especially so during Jewish holidays. Indeed, Yom Kippur and the first day of Passover figure in the Lebanese state’s official list of public holidays. See “Confidential Profile of the Lebanese Jewish Community” in the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.042.
- 20.
According to the Cahiers de l’Alliance Israélite Universelle, N. 135, February 1962 (at that time, Ambassador Levanon would have been sixteen years of age), the number of students at the Beirut Alliance school for academic year 1961–1962 was 1026 students—589 girls and 437 boys. The Beirut Selim Tarrab School on the other hand had 193 students, while the Sidon Alliance school, a much smaller operation, had a total of 82 students. However, only 36 students of the Sidon Alliance school were Jewish; the rest were Muslim (24) and Christian (22). See the Cahiers de l’Alliance Israélite Universelle, N. 135, February 1962, in the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.028.
- 21.
For this purpose, the communal structure was organized under the supervision of the Jewish Community Council —an elected body of twelve members whose duties, among others, included the levying of taxes known as “arikha” (or “assessment taxes”) in addition to those ordinarily excised by the Lebanese state. The “arikha” was collected from all members of the Jewish community, was commensurate with each member’s means, and was used primarily to cover communal needs. To wit, in 1929, one of the few periods for which statistics are currently available, the medical services provided by one of the Jewish communal institutions, the Bikur Cholim , covered some 5000 persons, fifty of whom were hospitalized, and thirty of whom were cared for at maternity wards. It is worth noting that long into the 1960s, the Bikur Cholim dispensary was staffed by at least one registered nurse and one medical doctor, three times a week, providing medical services to an average of fifteen patients per day of operation. For more on this, see the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 3, Lebanon, 1960–1969, 04.035-6.
- 22.
Indeed, according to a 1957 World Jewish Affairs memo, the official Lebanese attitude vis-à-vis Lebanese Jews was “definitely not hostile” and markedly “more liberal than that of any other Arab country.” Many Lebanese Jews, noted the report, had “if not power, then at least a considerable degree of influence” on Lebanese society. They were full-fledged citizens, with the right to vote and to participate in the country’s political and cultural life. They had synagogues , Jewish kindergartens and educational institutions, a mikvah, and a Maccabi movement for recreation… Yet, the Jews of Lebanon were always made to be aware of an undercurrent of anti-Jewish bias, and they were acutely sensitive to their tenuous status in Lebanon even if by law they were on equal footing with other Lebanese citizens and had full recourse and access to the protection of Lebanese law. Lebanon remained aloof from the “Arab–Israeli” conflict, and the Lebanese-Israeli border was notorious for being the most tranquil in the region. This often placed Lebanese Jewry in an awkward situation: With Lebanon not being at war with Israel meant that should the Arab states accuse Lebanon of “leniency toward Israel,” Lebanese authorities may opt to “clarify their attitude at the expense of the local Jews.” See World Jewish Affairs , London, August 20, 1957.
- 23.
The educational system in Lebanon is largely private, even if governmentally regulated. Otherwise, private schools constituted the bulk of educational institutions and had much autonomy with regards to programmatic and curricular matters. Although Lebanese Jews would have been hard-pressed opting for secondary or higher education at “Muslim-dominated” institutions, they still gravitated toward Anglophone and Francophone institutions of higher learning—namely the American University of Beirut and the Jesuit Saint-Joseph University. That being said, things were about to change dramatically in the aftermath of 1948 and on the heels of the massive exodus of some 13,000 Syrian Jews and their settlement in Lebanon. The Syrian government demanded that the Lebanese refrain from naturalizing Syrian Jews and often insisted they be altogether expelled from Lebanon. At any rate, by 1969, out of the roughly 15,000 Jews residing in Lebanon (many of whom refugees from Syria), only about 3000 had remained. During that period Syrian Jews and Jews in Lebanon in general were often refused work permits, acceptance into educational institutions, or participation in social or recreational activities. Even at institutes of higher learning, the American University of Beirut, government ordinances (often extorted by the Syrian government) called for the “expulsion of Alien Jews” from university and ultimately from the country.
- 24.
Contrary to popular belief and the normative depictions in the traditional scholarship on Lebanon and Lebanese Jewry, the Wadi Boujmil neighborhood of Beirut, sometimes referred to as “Wadi l-Yahood ” (the Valley of the Jews), is a relatively small neighborhood. In American terms, it does not exceed two city blocks. Abutting the Bab-Idriss commercial sector of Beirut, Wadi Boujmil is never colloquially referred to as “The Valley of the Jews” in Lebanon. As far as the neighborhood’s Jewish population, by most optimistic estimates the number of Jews residing in this neighborhood could not have exceeded 500, out an estimated total of 3000 by 1970. Those numbers are of course estimates and approximations. However, they constitute the maximum possible demographic numbers. Therefore, the Jewish population of Wadi Boujmil would have been at most a fraction of the total numbers of the Lebanese Jewish community—one-sixth to be exact, which is to say 16% of the country’s Jewish population. What’s more, and contrary to other places in the world—Europe included and not necessarily so only Muslim-majority countries—Lebanese authorities never attempted to confine Lebanese Jews to exclusively Jewish neighborhoods, even if some 90% of the community resides in Beirut. For more on this, see “La situation des Juifs au Liban,” Le Monde (Paris: January 1, 1970).
- 25.
In this context of Lebanese Jewish circumspection, it is worth noting that Lebanese Prime Minister Rachid Karamé never missed an opportunity throughout his tenure in the late 1960s to excoriate Israel and browbeat Lebanese public opinion with his trademark bluster and hectoring about “Lebanon’s unreserved support for the cause of the Palestinian Commandos.” Never mind that there was no such explicit policy in Lebanon at the time—indeed “official” Lebanon took great care to protect and flaunt its neutrality. But public stances such as Karamé’s, issuing from the office of the Prime Minister no less, had the compelling effect of riling up Muslim public opinion (against Lebanese Jewry and those other Lebanese unmoved by Arab causes), and consequently cowing Lebanese Jews into submission and mutism. To wit, in a December 1969 story filed from Beirut by the French daily Le Monde , Karamé is described to have declared in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies that his government had every intention of unreservedly backing Palestinian Commandos in their activities against the State of Israel . “The Palestinian cause,” he noted, “is the cause célèbre of the Arabs; not only because Zionism is a danger to our very existence, but because the Arab cause in Palestine is a fundamentally just and righteous cause.” One can only imagine the effects of this declaration on a besieged dwindling Jewish community, coinciding with the funeral processions of a Palestinian Fedayeen at the Omari Mosque of Beirut , attended by upwards of 3000 demonstrators and complemented by bursts of machine-gun fire filling the Beirut skies. See “M. Rachid Karamé declare que son pays appuiera sans reserve la cause des commandos palestiniens,” Le Monde (Paris: December 6, 1969). Around this same time period, the Jewish Chronicle reported Lebanese Jewish businesses being shut down by Jewish owners growing increasingly concerned for their safety. The reports also noted Lebanese security forces cordoning off Beirut’s Jewish quarter, but without clarifying whether such measures were put in place “to protect the Jews from Moslem fanatics or to keep a stricter control over their movements and activities.” In either case, whether to offer protection from “Moslem fanatics” or restrict the “movements and activities” of Lebanese citizens who happen to be Jewish, the situation can be deemed less than reassuring. See “Lebanese Jews Close Shops in New Scare,” The Jewish Chronicle (London: July 18, 1969).
- 26.
It should be noted in this regard that the Lebanese Jewish community’s cautious aloofness from Lebanese politics notwithstanding, it was still held hostage of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Christian-Muslim rivalries in Lebanon, Christian-Lebanese “neutrality” (perhaps even hostility to the Palestinian cause), and Muslim-Lebanese anger and resentment of their Christian-dominated government’s distance from the Arabs’ cause célèbre, which is to say the Palestinian cause. By the end of 1969, Lebanon’s Christian leaderships were hastening to contrive a face-saving solution that would spare Lebanon the repercussions of an unresolved Arab–Israeli conflict. In early 1970, Kataëb (Phalanges) Party leader Pierre Gemayel proposed resettling the bulk of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees (some 350 thousand strong by his count) into neighboring Arab countries, in what he called a “functional and equitable” redistribution. This “redistribution” noted Gemayel should be a call to Arabs to show their “Arabist” mettle, rather than wallow in the arenas of rhetoric and empty oratory about Arab unity and solidarity. Arabs should take their fair shares of Arab refugees according to each Arab country’s resources, size, and absorptive capacities. This “redistribution process” should serve a twofold purpose stressed Gemayel: raise the standard of living of the refugees and prevent them from establishing themselves permanently in their host countries. It is unfathomable, he stressed, that Lebanon should be expected to bear the lion’s share of refugees in spite of its modest means and exiguous territory, while Syria, eighteen times the size of Lebanon, hosts less than half of Lebanon’s share of Palestinians . Why doesn’t Iraq, Saudi Arabia , or Libya for that matter, with their rich economies and expansive territories assume their responsibility, he wondered? What’s more, concluded Gemayel, it is imperative that Lebanon maintain the demographic and communal balance that underpins the foundations of its statehood: With the imbalance brought about by the lopsided Palestinian presence, Lebanon is no doubt heading for disaster, noted Gemayel.
- 27.
Known as Bourj Hammoud , the Armenian district is a major commercial, industrial, and residential quarter of East Beirut , inhabited overwhelmingly by Lebanese-Armenians, a large portion of whom are descendants of the victims of the Armenian Genocide during Ottoman times. It is one of the most industrious (and densely populated) districts of Beirut.
- 28.
In its heyday, Hamra Street was Beirut’s trendiest, known as the Champs Élysées of the Middle East. It was dotted with luxury stores, sidewalk cafés, theaters, hotels, nightclubs, and cultural centers attracting the rich, the bohemians, the jetsetters, and the intellectuals and free-thinkers (and freewheelers) of both East and West, the Muslim world, and Europe.
- 29.
Orozdi-Back was an old high-end Beirut department store established in 1914. Situated near the quays of the Beirut Harbor, next to the Customs Offices and the Port-Authority warehouses, Orozdi-Back like Beirut itself was at the crossroads of continents and traditions; it straddled the Mediterranean—which is to say it wielded luxury goods issuing from Europe—and the Near Eastern hinterland—which is to say access to regionally produced products.
- 30.
Semiramis was once the cornerstone of Lebanese cuisine and one of Beirut’s most famous, most highly rated, and most decadent restaurants, offering the best of Lebanese cuisine’s gastronomic delights.
- 31.
The Kataëb is an overwhelmingly Maronite Christian political party upholding Lebanese specificity and calling for distance from the Arab–Israeli conflict and inter-Arab disputes—firmly opposed to Arab nationalism , Arab identity for Lebanon, and pan-Arab designs for the region.
- 32.
The Najjaadé was a Sunni Muslim Lebanese political party with strong pan-Arab nationalist and fascist leanings. The party founder was Muhyiddin al-Nusuli , a journalist and Arab nationalist intellectual with great admiration for Hitler and Mussolini, whom he viewed as role models for state building. The party’s ideology was vehemently opposed to the Kataëb’s vision of Lebanon as a non-Arab non-Muslim state.
- 33.
The Ambassador opened a parenthesis here for a bit of trivia about the Maccabi and a local beer in Lebanon named Maccabee. He noted that until 1958 the Lebanese Maccabee Beer was marketed and sold in Israel . The brewers, the Beiruti Jabr family, eventually sold it to an Israeli brewer after 1958. This is important to note because it illustrates that not only Lebanon and Israel were never at war, even at the height of the Arab–Israeli tensions, but that in certain quarters they maintained officious relations, and sometimes commercial, cultural, and personal contacts.
- 34.
According to a report by the President of Lebanon’s Jewish Communal Council , Dr. Joseph Attié , by 1958 the Jewish community of Beirut amounted to some 8500 peoples, 5000 of whom were native Lebanese while the rest were recent arrivals from Damascus and Aleppo. Although no official figures on the numbers of departures were made available, Dr. Attié’s report noted that entire Lebanese Jewish families had left in the aftermath of the 1958 civil war, after liquidating the bulk of their assets and moving their monies abroad. These large-scale emigrations, stressed Dr. Attié, were “not due to the current political situation. The Jews in Beirut are not subject to any form of discrimination, and remain the heart of the city’s commercial life. Indeed many are still doing well for themselves and their families, some even amassing fortunes. However, what’s driving many to leave the country are anxieties and the lack of confidence in what may be lurking in the future of the country.” That being said, noted Attié, the wave of departures is being offset by a slower wave of new Jewish arrivals, bit by bit trickling out of Syria. See the Joseph Golan Correspondence, Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, The World Jewish Congress Collection, Series H: Alphabetical Files, 1919–1981, Box: H235, File 8, Lebanon, Joseph Golan, 1959, 09.008.
- 35.
Farayya is a ski area in the Kesrouan district of Mount Lebanon , in the heart of “Maronite country,” and above the coastal town of Jounié .
- 36.
For the cultural historian, sociolinguist, and philologist, there is certainly “something to say” to the linguistic relics that Ambassador Levanon refers to in this section. Immigrants and exiles often preserve linguistic habits, or certain inflections and accents, and even idiomatic expressions and other shared norms that might have otherwise fallen into desuetude in the mother country—a link of authenticity and belonging that is immediately perceptible to other immigrants and that immediately transports them to the places of their birth. An English example may be illustrative: New Yorkers and Southern Britons, for instance, although both English speakers, do not attach the same emotive or social meaning to the English language that they speak; there are sets of norms, knowledge, cultural accretions, beliefs, and values that dwell in a New Yorker’s English that are lost on a Southern British English speaker.
- 37.
This is actually a feeling shared by many other Near Eastern minorities—not only Jews—who were negatively affected by the rise and popularity of Nasser , and the austere brand of pan-Arabism that he advanced. His was a merciless dogmatic identity model, loath to diversity, and unforgiving vis-à-vis those upholding (and living) differing standards of selfhood. After all, Nasserism, and pan-Arabism in general terms, represented the liquidation of Near Eastern cosmopolitan societies, which had been the hallmark of places like Beirut , Alexandria, and Aleppo. Indeed, the overriding feature of pan-Arabism was cultural homogeneity and linguistic orthodoxy, which put an end to old venerable cosmopolitan societies on the Eastern Mediterranean.
- 38.
It is worth mentioning here that Karamé’s stock in trade had been extorting from Lebanese society a more active role in the Arab–Israeli conflict, and a more resolute commitment to the Palestinian cause. See, for instance, “M. Rachid Karamé declare que son pays appuiera sans reserve la cause des commandos palestiniens” [Mr. Rachid Karamé Affirms That His Country Shall Unreservedly Uphold the Cause of the Palestinian Commandos], Le Monde (Paris: December 6, 1969).
- 39.
This was a period and a condition referred to as “Fatahland” in the literature on Lebanon—Fatah (Ar. Conquest) being the dominant faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which, under the command of Yassir Arafat , had already set up shop in Lebanon.
- 40.
Shulamit Kishik-Cohen (1917–2017), Ambassador Yitzhak Levanon’s mother, deserves a biography of her own. Although some accounts (Arab in the main) insist she’s a native Argentinian, by Ambassador Levanon’s account, she was born and raised in Jerusalem . The fourth child of an Egyptian Jewish father who had spent some time in Argentina, and a Jerusalemite mother, the daughter of a Rabbi, Shulamit spent her early childhood in Jerusalem. Due to her parents’ financial hardships—trying to tend to a household with twelve children—she was given in marriage at a very young age to a well-known, rich, and much older Beiruti merchant, Joseph Kishik-Cohen . This was early 1936. The couple settled in Wadi Boujmil , in a beautiful home very near to the Magen Avraham Synagogue where they raised seven children, among them the future Ambassador Levanon. Shula, as she was known locally, was a woman of extraordinary charm, intelligence, charisma, elegance, and beauty. A socialite of note in the extravagant, cosmopolitan, and libertine Beirut of the first half of the twentieth century, Shula became deeply invested in the local Jewish community, and very active on Lebanon’s cultural and social scenes. She taught Hebrew for many years at the Alliance school in Beirut. Due to curricular and programmatic requirements established by the Lebanese government, Shula had to intercede on behalf of the AIU school, handle official paperwork, and deal with the ins and outs of Lebanese bureaucracy. Over time, she established close relationships with local politicians, civil servants, foreign dignitaries, and diplomats. At home, her salons often attracted a veritable “who is who” of the local high society, representatives of the various political classes, a bevy of artists and bohemians, and members of the Arab and foreign diplomatic corps. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, she was suspected of spying for the benefit of the State of Israel and was as a result arrested, accused, and convicted of espionage. She was subsequently imprisoned and systematically tortured for upwards of seven years. She was finally released in 1967 as part of a prisoner-exchange deal between the Lebanese and Israeli governments, and later moved with her family to Israel where she spent the remainder of her life. Although her times, life, and work were profoundly more complex than the often lurid sensationalized depictions of her in Arabic-language tabloid exposés—and likewise perhaps overly laudatory in Israeli sources—Shula Kishik-Cohen was above all a wife, a mother, a Beiruti, a Jew, and a Zionist of her times. She, therefore, deserves a more thoughtful, unsentimental, and ideologically neutral examination. Such a project is beyond the scope of this volume. But what is appropriate, I thought, was asking Ambassador Levanon to give his own account of his own recollections of his own mother’s life and trials. Telegraphic and abridged a treatment as this important topic was given during our conversation, the Ambassador’s reticence is understandable, and as a biographer myself, I am very sensitive to a respondent’s hesitation.
- 41.
In her book The Jews of Lebanon; Between Coexistence and Conflict, Kirsten Schulze noted, based on interviews conducted with Shula Cohen in 1995, that the latter was very well connected with higher ups in the Lebanese government, that she was a close friend of Sunni Prime Minister Riad al-Solh and many other Muslim and Christian politicians, and that when she was imprisoned, many of her official Lebanese interlocutors left the country for fear of being implicated in the crimes she was accused of. She further noted that during her incarceration many officers, officials, and non-Jewish friends tried to comfort her and her family, including Kataëb Party president, Pierre Gemayel , who visited her often. This arguably contributed to the commuting of what had been initially a capital sentence, to a life sentence, eventually leading to her release.
- 42.
The Deuxième Bureau is Lebanon’s military intelligence. It was made especially powerful during the administration of President Fouad Chehab (1958–1964). A former Commander in Chief of the Lebanese army and heir to an old aristocratic Maronite family, Chehab struck a neutral line in Lebanese politics, assuaging Christian anxieties about rising Arabist radicalism and satisfying Muslims and Arab nationalists who did not see in him a “Lebanese nationalist” as such. His policies were described as measured, pragmatic, and contemptuous of Lebanon’s sectarian divides. But generally speaking, the “General-President” was a less assertive “Lebanonist” than his Maronite predecessors, thus ushering in a period of dithering and a weakened Lebanese Christian resolve. His successor, Charles Hélou (1964–1970) was even weaker, giving free reign to Arab nationalist agitation, hostility to Israel and Jews, and ultimately complete loss of Christian-Maronite prerogatives. This may explain Lebanon’s tilt toward “Arabism” and the behavior of traditional Lebanese politicians now angling for closer “association” with Arabist causes. It is in this context that the arrest and imprisonment of Shula Cohen ought to be looked at. Indeed, there are still to this day rumors swirling around the Shula Cohen affair, suggesting she was scapegoated and thrown under the bus to protect high-ranking Lebanese officials, politicians, and military officers who, prior to the early 1960s and the Chehabist era, were deeply involved in secret officious relations with Israel. Thus, a change of narrative was in the offing, to cover the tracks of important Lebanese officials. And Shula Cohen was made to pay the price.
- 43.
Ambassador Levanon in this segment of his narrative spoke with depth and passion and authority reflecting his very intimate understanding of Lebanon. He is on solid historical and sociological ground when he says “you have to have lived there—been there—to truly understand Lebanon.” This personal testimony is lent confirmation in most serious studies on Lebanon. To wit, the Preface to Philip Hitti’s 1964 A Short History of Lebanon notes the following:
Of the Near East states, Lebanon is in a class by itself. Its historic experience, mountainous geography and the composition of its population combine to give it an identity and a personality of its own. […] History knew Lebanon from the earliest times and never forgot it. Perhaps no other area of comparable size, about 3977 square miles, can match it in the volume of historical events […] Such are the features—geographic, historic, cultural, and political—that make of Lebanon a distinct entity… See Philip Hitti , A Short History of Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), iii and 1–7.
- 44.
Crude as this example may be deemed in some quarters, it reflects a profound understanding of Lebanon’s history, sociology, psychology, and best of all the diversity and colorfulness and optimism of its linguistic habits in their rhythms, music, prosodies, and allegories. It is a social and cultural register that is fundamentally Lebanese, and that is completely lost on outsiders.
- 45.
Caek or Ka’ek is a traditional Lebanese “street-bread,” usually crunchy, sprinkled with sesame, and eaten with Zaatar (thyme). Sold mainly by peddling vendors roaming the neighborhoods, its commercial concept is not unlike the “ice-cream van” in the USA, with its target customers mainly children playing in the streets outside their homes.
- 46.
Mezzé is the Eastern Mediterranean, and namely Lebanese, version of the Spanish tapas—a large selection of small dishes of various foods, usually served as appetizers, and to accompany alcoholic beverages.
- 47.
This story has many corollaries, in many other neighborhoods of Beirut , and in many reference works on that period of Lebanese history. It marks the landing of 10,000 US Marines on the Lebanese coast south of Beirut, signaling the end of the 1958 Lebanese Civil War which had pitted Arab nationalists against Lebanese nationalists (see earlier references in Yitzhak Levanon’s narrative). Many Marines from that time period do recall their surreal encounters with a Lebanon supposedly in the throes of civil war. Instead of a war-torn battlefield, disembarking US Marines noted being met by Lebanese children with flowers and Coca-Cola bottles. Returning the “favor,” the Marines themselves often distributed American candy or chewing gum (and in this particular case of Zahava’s, dollar bills) to passersby. This might have been the 1950s iteration of America’s “winning hearts and minds.” But the 1958 Lebanon war was nevertheless a serious political event, considered by many scholars the “dry run” of the more devastating 1975 conflagration, which that was to tear into Lebanon for more than 15 years and lead to its utter collapse and the ending of “Christian” prerogatives in it. The fact that Zahava breezes through the War as “disturbances” is reflective of her very young age in 1958, and arguably the “cocooned” or sheltered existence of the Lebanese Jewish community that ambassador Levanon spoke of earlier. Yet, there is no denying Lebanese Jewry’s entrapment at the time. See earlier footnotes for more detail on the harassment, intimidation, and outright physical violence that Lebanese Jews were subjected to during that time period.
- 48.
Batia Sasson is the daughter of Edouard Sasson , the director of MGM Studios mentioned in earlier chapters. Member of one of Lebanon’s most prominent Jewish families, Sasson was shot to death on February 28, 1970, in his Beirut office, as he was preparing to leave for the USA to celebrate the birth of his grandson and namesake Eddy, Batia’s and Moïse’s second born. Sasson’s assassination took place during a very surreal period in Lebanese political history. At that time, attacks were increasing on Lebanese Jewry—bombings, destruction of property, kidnappings, harassments, and assassinations—the Palestine Liberation Organization was given free reign in the country challenging Lebanese authorities, and the Jews were driven deeper into their communal cocoons. Moreover, as the attacks grew more frequent and more intense, the PLO’s denials of any involvement grew more brazen and insolent. And as the Lebanese government attempted to assuage Jewish fears and instate more robust protection measures, the PLO’s propaganda machine remained relentless, denying any involvement in these agitations, condemning the attacks, and accusing “Zionist agents” of committing them against Lebanese Jewish persons in order to force their immigration to Israel . Meanwhile, most international and local news reports confirmed—in the Sasson case—that it was indeed Fatah elements of the PLO that assassinated Edouard Sasson for refusal to make financial contributions to their guerilla movement. Batia Sasson revealed that her father was under tremendous pressure to begin allowing short PLO “propaganda footage” headline all feature presentations at the MGM movie theaters under Sasson’s direction—all at the express and continuous objection of MGM, New York headquarters, which Sasson relayed repeatedly to PLO representatives in Beirut.
- 49.
Taha Husayn’s “Yassiru an-Nahw wa l-kitaaba!” [Simplify Grammar and Writing!], al-Adab (Beirut: 1956, no. 11, 2, 3, 6).
- 50.
The Spokesman-Review, “Top Lebanon MGM Man Found Shot” (Beirut: The Associated Press , March 1, 1970), https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1314&dat=19700301&id=1rMyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=YOsDAAAAIBAJ&pg=2119,307840&hl=en.
- 51.
Le Monde , “Al-Fath dénonce l’attentat contre l’école Israélite à Beyrouth” (Paris: January 21, 1970).
- 52.
Fatah was the armed Palestinian organization headed by Yassir Arafat (the Arabic acronym of the Movement for the Liberation of Palestine) which would become the founding wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization, also presided over by Arafat as Chairman.
- 53.
International Herald Tribune , Paris, March 2, 1970.
- 54.
International Herald Tribune , Paris, March 2, 1970.
- 55.
International Herald Tribune , Paris, March 2, 1970.
- 56.
Le Monde , September 9, 1971.
- 57.
The Jerusalem Post , September 27, 1971.
- 58.
Le Monde , January 4, 1972.
- 59.
Le Monde , January 4, 1972.
- 60.
The French “Seconde” corresponds roughly to the American Tenth Grade.
- 61.
See earlier comments on Batia Sasson’s Arabic, which falls within the general parameters of Lebanese students of every generation, through 1950s, 1960s, and beyond, not particularly fond of the idea of becoming Arabic grammarians.
- 62.
All three Maronite Christians.
- 63.
A Sunni Muslim.
- 64.
A Shi’ite Muslim.
- 65.
See Karnig Panian , Goodbye, Antoura: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).
- 66.
There is a particularly endearing aspect to the language in which this old priest was awakening his Jewish student for the morning Jewish prayer, as well as his untainted reference to the “tefillin” as a “skin”.
- 67.
“Driv[ing] the Jews into the sea” is one of the most famous quotes attributed to Nasser , promising Arabs to win a decisive victory against Zionism, and put an end to the Jewish state.
- 68.
Georges Picot Street was a major Beirut thoroughfare bordering the Jewish quarter of Wadi Boujmil.
- 69.
This elasticity of the Lebanese—some may call it lack of scruples, others may deem it mercantile opportunism—was brought home to me by an anecdote recounted by Ya’ir Ravid, a former Israeli intelligence officer who spent most of his life in Lebanon, and who was intimately acquainted with Lebanese culture, the Lebanese language, and Lebanese ethos. “You ask a Lebanese kid what’s the total of 1 + 1” said Ya’ir, “and the answer he will give you is ‘that depends’.” In other words, the answer the Lebanese will give you is dependent on what you looking to hear.
- 70.
Bachir Gemayel was one of the sons of Kataëb Party founder Pierre Gemayel , an ally of the Israelis during the Lebanese war of 1975, and president-elect of the Lebanese Republic (elected on August 23, 1982). He was assassinated on September 14, 1982, a week before he was to take office.
- 71.
I can attest to the fact that Fady spoke both Lebanese and French languages imbued in the aromas of his native Beirut , like someone who might have, mere minutes ago, left Lebanon.
- 72.
See, for instance, Al-Aalam al-Isra’iili , “An Israelite Representative in the [Syrian] Chamber of Deputies” (Beirut: March 21, 1931), 3.
- 73.
Camille Chamoun (1900–1987) was the President of the Lebanese Republic from 1952 to 1958. His policy was openly pro-Western, opposed to Arab nationalist designs, and intent on keeping Lebanon outside the orbit of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
- 74.
The younger son of Camille Chamoun , Dany Chamoun was a prominent politician and commander of the Maronite Tigers militia during the Lebanese war of 1975–89. A committed opponent of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, he was assassinated with his family on October 21, 1990, allegedly by Syrian agents.
- 75.
Founded in 1928, La Revue du Liban is Lebanon’s oldest and longest running French-language weekly magazine. Likewise the Commerce du Levant is Lebanon’s (and indeed the entire Near East’s) oldest, preeminent, continuously published commercial weekly (recently monthly) magazine. Currently published under the aegis of the Société de presse et d’édition libanaise, the journal was founded in 1929 by a Lebanese Jew, Toufic Mizrahi (1898–1974).
- 76.
Clearly, Desiré Liniado had taught his daughter well; how could the child of an attorney be expected to speak to any potential accuser without the presence of counsel?
- 77.
This had been a common practice during the Lebanese war of 1975. The prevalent attitude of Palestinian “squatters” had been the following: “The Jews took our homes in Palestine , we take Jewish homes in Lebanon.” But there was also the prevailing notion at the time among “Left wing progressives,” the Palestinians included—who had created a “state within the state”—that Lebanon would be their “substitute homeland.” Of course, the unexpected obstacle to that ambition was the Lebanese Christians, who fought Palestinian hegemony and disrupted their plan.
- 78.
During Ottoman times, Soujoud was an important pilgrimage destination for Jews of the Vilayet of Beirut , which included modern-day Lebanon stretching north to Latakia in Syria, and South to Akko in Israel .
- 79.
In Latin, the word for “fruit” is “Poma,” which in its French iteration reads “pomme” which means “apple.” And since Catechism in Lebanese schools is ordinarily taught in French, the ground was ripe to confuse the Latin “poma” (fruit) for “pomme” (apple).
- 80.
This is reminiscent of the American “Electoral College” system in presidential elections.
- 81.
Although none of Isick’s immediate family members ended up in Israel after leaving Lebanon, he knows many Lebanese Jewish families who did settle there, among them the family of Alain Abadie who is mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Indeed, Isick’s mother is related to the Abadies, and beyond Alain’s Lebanese fame as entertainer and gifted musician, Isick knows him well, and he noted what an “extraordinary sacrifice” it was for Lebanese—Beirutis in particular—to end up in Israel. It is indeed a form of “hardship” for a Lebanese Jew to be living in Israel. Despite the cultural affinities, the geographic closeness, the nearness to the Mediterranean, Lebanon is irreplaceable to Lebanese Jews living in Israel, and perhaps their nearness to Lebanon—their ability to see it and know of its presence without being able to “touch” it—makes the distance so much greater and the yearning so much crueler.
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Salameh, F. (2019). Lebanese Jewish Memory and Memorial: Personal Recollections. In: Lebanon’s Jewish Community. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99667-7_5
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