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International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

SAGT 2018: Algorithmic Game Theory pp 213–225Cite as

Constrained Swap Dynamics over a Social Network in Distributed Resource Reallocation

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 11059))

Abstract

We examine a resource allocation problem where each agent is to be assigned exactly one object. Agents are initially endowed with a resource that they can swap with one another. However, not all exchanges are plausible: we represent required connections between agents with a social network. Agents may only perform pairwise exchanges with their neighbors and only if it brings them preferred objects. We analyze this distributed process through two dual questions. Could an agent obtain a certain object if the swaps occurred favourably? Can an agent be guaranteed a certain level of satisfaction regardless of the actual exchanges? These questions are investigated through parameterized complexity, focusing on budget constraints such as the number of exchanges an agent may be involved in or the total duration of the process.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Engineering & Computer Science, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    Abdallah Saffidine

  2. PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France

    Anaëlle Wilczynski

Authors
  1. Abdallah Saffidine
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  2. Anaëlle Wilczynski
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Anaëlle Wilczynski .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Peking University, Beijing, China

    Xiaotie Deng

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Saffidine, A., Wilczynski, A. (2018). Constrained Swap Dynamics over a Social Network in Distributed Resource Reallocation. In: Deng, X. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11059. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-99659-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-99660-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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