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International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

SAGT 2018: Algorithmic Game Theory pp 201–212Cite as

Online Trading as a Secretary Problem

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 11059))

Abstract

We consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a sequence of n buyers and n sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of the traders are selected by an adversary and the sequence is randomly permuted. We give competitive algorithms for two objectives: welfare and gain-from-trade.

Supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 321171 (ALGAME).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Buying from the first sellers cannot be done truthfully unless the algorithm knows an upper bound on their value. But this is not necessary since there is an alternative that has minor effects on the competitive ratio: the algorithm offers each seller the maximum value of the sellers so far. This is a truthful scheme that buys from all but a logarithmic number of sellers, in expectation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Elias Koutsoupias & Philip Lazos

Authors
  1. Elias Koutsoupias
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  2. Philip Lazos
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Philip Lazos .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Peking University, Beijing, China

    Xiaotie Deng

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Koutsoupias, E., Lazos, P. (2018). Online Trading as a Secretary Problem. In: Deng, X. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11059. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_18

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-99659-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-99660-8

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