Abstract
Schelling’s segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models of Schelling segregation, where the agents can also have individual location preferences.
For our models we investigate the convergence behavior and the efficiency of their equilibria. In particular, we prove guaranteed convergence to an equilibrium in the version which is closest to Schelling’s original model. Moreover, we provide tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy.
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Notes
- 1.
See the racial dot map [8] for an impressive visualization.
- 2.
A playful interactive demonstration can be found in [13].
- 3.
\( (\alpha ,\beta )<_{lex} (\gamma ,\delta ) \text {, if }\alpha< \gamma \text { or } \alpha = \gamma \text { and }\beta < \delta \). \((\alpha ,\beta ) =_{lex} (\gamma ,\delta ) \text {, if }\alpha = \gamma \text { and} \beta = \delta \). \( (\alpha ,\beta )>_{lex} (\gamma ,\delta ) \text {, if }\alpha> \gamma \text { or } \alpha = \gamma \text { and }\beta > \delta \).
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Chauhan, A., Lenzner, P., Molitor, L. (2018). Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents. In: Deng, X. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11059. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_13
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