Abstract
Motivated by cloud computing, we study a market-based approach for job scheduling on multiple machines where users have hard deadlines and prefer earlier completion times. In our model, completing a job provides a benefit equal to its present value, i.e., the value discounted to the time when the job finishes. Users submit job requirements to the cloud provider who non-preemptively schedules jobs to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the sum of present values of completed jobs. Using a simple and fast greedy algorithm, we obtain a \(1+s/(s-1)\) approximation to the optimal schedule, where \(s > 1\) is the minimum ratio of a job’s deadline to processing time. Building on our approximation algorithm, we construct a pricing rule to incentivize users to truthfully report all job requirements.
J. Garg—Supported by NSF CRII Award 1755619.
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Garg, J., McGlaughlin, P. (2018). A Truthful Mechanism for Interval Scheduling. In: Deng, X. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11059. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_10
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