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Governing Law Solutions to Ideal Laws

  • Billy WheelerEmail author
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Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

Chapter 2 investigates the potential for a theory of the metaphysics of ideal laws based around governing conceptions of lawhood. Three existing approaches are discussed: Armstrong’ theory of nomic necessitation, Cartwright’s capacity conception of laws, and Ellis’ theory of laws as essences of natural kinds. It is argued that none of these conceptions can provide a suitable explanation of the existence of ideal laws.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySun Yat-Sen UniversityZhuhaiChina

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