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Laws of Nature and the Problem of Exceptions

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Idealization and the Laws of Nature

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Abstract

Chapter 1 traces the development of the discussion around exceptions to scientific laws and the different solutions previous philosophers of science have taken on this issue. It is argued that a case can be made for separating exception-ridden laws into a least two groups: ceteris paribus laws and ideal laws. The former make true but indefinite claims about the world, whereas the latter make false but definite claims. Each comes with distinctive epistemological and metaphysical problems.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-Sen University, Zhuhai, Guangdong, China

    Billy Wheeler

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Correspondence to Billy Wheeler .

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Wheeler, B. (2018). Laws of Nature and the Problem of Exceptions. In: Idealization and the Laws of Nature. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99564-9_1

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