Conclusion

Abstract

By drawing attention to Pufendorf’s scattered remarks and observations on human psychology, this study has offered a novel interpretation of the importance of moral psychology in his theory of sociability. Pufendorf firmly believes that the normative precepts of natural law can be scientifically established by reason; yet he tends to be pessimistic about the degree to which most humans rationally acknowledge their moral obligations to natural law, or manage to comply even when they do acknowledge their natural law obligations. This is the critical difference between Pufendorf’s prescriptive moral science and his descriptive account of sociability. While his description of how most people are motivated to act in accordance with moral laws owes little to individual rationality, the question of how people are effectively moved to act sociably cannot be resolved by focusing merely on political coercion either. I have paid close attention to his remarks on how people are habituated to accept social and civil life with ease, arguing that sociability is largely a socialized product of particular societies. When showing how communal and institutional life habituated people to the norms of sociability, Pufendorf was not merely a moral philosopher but also a “sociologist” and a “psychologist”.