Abstract
This chapter explores Pufendorf’s treatment of the desire for esteem, its role in social interaction, and its function as a source of motivation for the promotion of sociability. By the desire for esteem I mean a basic emotional need to maintain one’s esteem as well as to be positively recognized by others. It is crucial to note that the desire for esteem cannot be straightforwardly identified with a desire for self-preservation. It is also the resentment and shame prompted by insults as well as the joy at other people’s appreciation as such, inbuilt into our emotional nature. The role of the desire for esteem in Pufendorf’s moral psychology has received very little attention in the existing scholarship. In what follows, I claim that there is no indispensable conflict between the desire for esteem and the duties of sociability. Indeed, I argue, Pufendorf regards the desire for esteem as a central constituent of social experience, conceiving it to be a motor for the development of sociability.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See Muldrew , Craig. 1989. The Economy of Obligation : The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 123–125.
- 3.
Hont, Istvan. 2005. Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 175–179.<?spieprPar6?>
- 4.
Hont 2005, 181–182.
- 5.
It has been argued that this marks a shift between classical natural law theory and the so-called “modern natural law” tradition originated by Grotius . See, for instance, Darwall , Stephen. 1995. The British Moralist and the Internal ‘Ought’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4–7. Richard Tuck has put forward the influential claim that early modern natural law theorists posited the desire for self-preservation as a universal trait of humanity in order to overcome neo-scepticism and relativism. Tuck, Richard. 1987. The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law. In The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 113–115. Thomas Mautner has (to my mind, convincingly) denied that the intention to encounter neo-scepticism had a significant role in the writings of early modern natural law thinkers. Mautner, Thomas. 2005. “Grotius and the Skeptics.” Journal of the History of Ideas 66: 577–601.
- 6.
JNG 1.2.7/LNNO 31–32. Translation modified. Scilicet ambitiosum est animal homo, suaeque praestantiae cumprimis jactabundum, quodque maximam animi voluptatem in eo repositam habet, si talia in se deprehendat, quibus se prae aliis efferre, ac gloriari queat. De cujus praestantiea opinione, ubi quid alios sibi decessurum metuit, penitissimam animo concipit tristitiam; cujus signum in propria velut humanae dignitatis sede adparet, dum cor repente sanguinem versus faciem propellit.
- 7.
JNG 2.1.5/PWSP 138. The other basic features, again in contrast to other animals , that define the natural state of men are viciousness (pravitas), diversity of mental dispositions (varietas ingeniorum) and weakness and natural impoliteness (imbecillitas ac naturalis incultus). JNG 2.1.3–8. These basic features of human nature conjointly explain why “it does not suit man’s nature to live without the law”, as the title of the first chapter in the second book of De jure indicates.
- 8.
JNG 2.1.5/PWSP 138.
- 9.
Schneewind 2010, 76.
- 10.
OHC 219.
- 11.
JNG 5.2.2/LNNO 675–676.
- 12.
JNG 8.4.13/LNNO 1245–1246. Inde necessum est dari aliquam quantitatem praeter physicam & mathematicam, circa quam solam hactenus Philosophi videntur soliciti fuisse. Id quod clarius adparebit, si attendamus, quantatis universim sumtae rationem formalem consistere non in extensione substantiae, sed ut ita dicam, in aestimativitate; seu ideo primὀ res dicuntur quantae, quatenus aestimari possunt, & consequenter inter se comparari, utrum aequales sint, an inaequales. Cum autem res aestimari queant non solum secundum substantiam suam physicam, sed etiam secundum considerationem quandam moralem; consequitur, preater quantitatem physicam dari etiam quantitatem moralem, secundum quam scilicet res aestimantur moraliter.
- 13.
Hobbes, Thomas. 2012. Leviathan. Ed. Noel Malcolm . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 136.
- 14.
For dignity as a rank and expectation of respect, see Waldron , Jeremy. 2015. Dignity, Rank, and Rights. Ed. Meir Dan-Cohen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13–46.
- 15.
For the varying historical usages of the concept of dignity, see Rosen , Michael. 2012. Dignity: Its History and Meaning. Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press, 11–62.
- 16.
According to the Latin version of Leviathan, “Dignitas significat interdum Valorem sive pretium hominis, nempe tantum, quanti Potentiae ejus usum aliquis emere vellet”. Hobbes 2012, 135.
- 17.
JNG 1.1.22.
- 18.
Darwall 2012, 224.
- 19.
Darwall 2012, 225.
- 20.
JNG 8.4.1/PWSP 253.
- 21.
JNG 8.4.1/PWSP 253.
- 22.
JNG 3.1.1. For various early modern definitions of things that are one’s own (suum), all of which include reputation, see Heydt 2018, 184–185.
- 23.
JNG 8.4.2/PWSP 253. …ut quis talem se ferat, & pro tali habeatur, quicum agi queat tanquam cum viro bono, & ad socialitatis humanae leges sese accomodare prono, quique adeo legem naturalem adversus alios, quantum in se, observare sit paratus.
- 24.
JNG 2.5.6/LNNO 273.
- 25.
JNG 2.2.12/LNNO 177.
- 26.
JNG 8.4.2/PWSP 253.
- 27.
On this kind of interpretation, see Hruschka , Joachim. 2000. Existimatio: Unbescholtenheit und Achtung vor dem Nebenmenschen bei Kant und in der Kant vorangehende Naturrechtslehre. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Ethics 8:191–193. Hruschka’s article importantly shows that Pufendorf was the first author in the seventeenth century who treated the concept of existimatio substantially.
- 28.
See Haakonssen 2011 8–9.
- 29.
JNG 2.4.9/LNNO 242.
- 30.
JNG 2.4.9/LNNO 242. Est quoque illa culturae pars maxime necessaria, ut quis justum pretium rebus, quae adpetitum humanum praecipue stimulant, ponere norit. Ex hoc quippe dependet, quantum circa quamque earum conniti deceat. Inter eas igitur judicatur vel splendissima, & quae erectoris hominis indolis praecipue idonea sit, opinion praestantiae & excellentiae, unde honor & gloria progignitur. Circa hanc animus ita est formandus, ut omni quidem studio existimationem simplicem, seu opinionem boni viri conservare laboret; quippe quae regulariter ex legis naturalis & officii observantiae promanat, & cujus defectus ad multa incommoda adversus nos occasionem pandere potest. Et si ea per calumnias & mendacia improborum imperatur, ut eadem nitori suo restituatur, opera danda est. Quando tamen penes nos non est calumnias, & falso de nobis conceptas opiniones discutere, conscientiae nos rectitudo solabitur, & quod Deo de innocentia nostra constet.
- 31.
JNG 8.4.5/LNNO 1232–1233.
- 32.
JNG 3.6.11/LNNO 420.
- 33.
JNG 8.4.5.
- 34.
JNG 8.4.11.
- 35.
JNG 8.4.17/LNNO 1252.
- 36.
JNG 1.1.18/LNNO 17.
- 37.
JNG 1.1.22/PWSP 108. Adparet enim in vita communi personas & res aestimari non tantum secundum extensionem substantiae physicae, aut intensionem motus, & qualitatum physicarum, prout considerantur tanquam aliquid ex principiis naturalibus resultans: sed & secundum aliud quantitatis genus, & diversum á quantitate tam physica quam mathemathica; quae quantitas ex impositione, & determinatione potentiae rationalis oritur.
- 38.
JNG 1.1.18/LNNO 17. Quae heic spectantur non tam in se, quatenus sunt notiones alterius intellectui statum & officium alicujus personae repraesentantes; quam quatenus ex impositione hominum jura, potestatem, ac munus denotant ejus, cui tribuuntur.
- 39.
JNG 1.1.23/PWSP 108. See also JNG 8.4.26.
- 40.
JNG 7.2.1.
- 41.
JNG 1.2.10/LNNO 35.
- 42.
JNG 1.1.21/PWSP 108. Dantur etiam qualitates morales patibiles, quae certo modo judicium hominum afficere intelligentur; sicut inter qualitates physicas eo nomine vocantur, quibus facultas sensitiva afficitur; ut est honor, ignominia, auctoritas, gravitas, claritas, obscuritas, & similia.
- 43.
JNG 1.2.10/LNNO 35. Translation modified.
- 44.
JNG 7.1.4/PWSP 204.
- 45.
JNG 7.2.4/LNNO 969.
- 46.
JNG 7.1.4/LNNO 955.
- 47.
JNG 7.1.7/LNNO 960.
- 48.
JNG 2.3.18/PWSP 154.
- 49.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1972. De Homine in Man and Citizen . Trans. Charles T. Wood, T.S.K. Scott-Craig, and Bernard Gert , Ed. Bernard Gert. Indianapolis: Hackett, 58.
- 50.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1997. On the Citizen. Trans. and Ed. Richard Tuck , and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23.
- 51.
Slomp , Gabrielle. 2007. Hobbes on Glory and Civil Strife. In The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 129–147.
- 52.
Skinner , Quentin. 2016. Hobbes and the Social Control of Unsociability. In The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes, eds. Aloysius P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 431–451.
- 53.
For the fullest analysis of Hobbes’s theory of glory , see Slomp, Gabrielle. 2000. Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 54.
JNG 2.2.6/LNNO 167.
- 55.
JNG 2.2.7/LNNO 168.
- 56.
JNG 2.2.6/LNNO 167.
- 57.
JNG 7.2.4/LNNO 970.
- 58.
Habitu § 49/NQRRCS 105–106.
- 59.
Habitu § 49/NQRRCS 105–106.
- 60.
Jus feciale § 2/Divine Feudal Law 12–13. Pufendorf did not, however, promote the idea of unlimited religious liberty but conceived of toleration as a means to maintain peaceable sociability and political stability.
- 61.
Rousseau , Jean-Jacques. 1997. Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men. In Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings. Trans. and Ed. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 166–167.
- 62.
JNG 3.4.6.
- 63.
JNG 3.2.6/LNNO 339.
- 64.
See Alanen , Lilli. 2012. Spinoza on Passion and Self-knowledge: The Case of Pride . In Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval & Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244–246.
- 65.
JNG 3.2.6/LNNO 339. Translation modified. Eos autem, qui hoc de se norunt & sentiunt, facile sibi persuadere, singulos alios homines idem seipsis sentire; quoniam in eo nihil est, quod ab alio pendeat. Et idcirco eosdem neminem unquam contemnere, ac ad excusanda aliorum peccata esse pronos, quasi magis ex errore, quam malitia sint profecta.
- 66.
JNG 3.2.6/LNNO 339.
- 67.
JNG 3.2.6.
- 68.
See Cooper , Julia. 2010. Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency in the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. The Review of Politics 72: 250–258.
- 69.
JNG 3.2.2/LNNO 331–332.
- 70.
JNG 6.1.3/LNNO 841.
- 71.
JNG 8.4.14/PWSP 256.
- 72.
JNG 3.2.1/PWSP 159. Praeter illum amorem, quo homo suam vitam, corpusque ac res prosequitur, & per quem non potest non omnia, ad eorundem destructionem tendentia, repellere aut refugere; deprehenditur quoque ipsius animo insita tenerrima quaedam sui aestimatio: cui si quis aliquod detractum eat, non minus fere, imo saepe magis solet is commoveri, quam si corpori ac rebus noxa inferatur. Quae aestimatio licet ex variis causis intendatur; primum tamen ejus fundamentum videtur ipsa humana natura. In ipso quippe hominis vocabulo judicatur inesse aliqua dignatio; & ultimum simul atque efficacissimum argumentum, quo aliorum insolens insultatio retunditur, isthoc habetur; utique non canis aut bestia, sed aeque homo sum atque tu.
- 73.
Peter Strawson has famously argued that to treat someone as morally responsible is to be disposed to respond to that person within the context of varying emotional responses, which he calls “natural reactive attitudes”. Strawson, Peter. 1962. Freedom and Resentment . Proceedings of the British Academy, 48: 1–25.
- 74.
JNG 6.3.10/LNNO 945.
- 75.
This is not to deny that humanity as a moral status involves certain moral limitations about the treatment of slaves. See Zurbuchen , Simone. Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory. In Natural Law and Politics: Studies in Honour of Knud Haakonssen , eds. T.J. Hochstrasser Ian Hunter and Richard Whatmore. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (Forthcoming).
- 76.
JNG 3.2.8/LNNO 343.
- 77.
JNG 8.4.20
- 78.
JNG 8.4.21.
- 79.
See Hoekstra , Kinch. 2013. Hobbesian Equality. In Hobbes Today: Insights for the twenty-first Century, ed. S. A. Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 106–108.
- 80.
JNG 3.2.1/PWSP 159. Translation modified.
- 81.
Saastamoinen 2010, 55–62.
- 82.
JNG 2.3.16/LNNO 212.
- 83.
JNG 3.2.2/PWSP 161.
- 84.
OHC 1.3.4/DMC 34–35. Translation modified.
- 85.
OHC 1.7.6/DMC 63.
- 86.
OHC 1.7.6/DMC 63. Quod peccatum eo deterius est censendum, quo asperius aliorum animi in iras ac ulciscendi libidinem concitantur. Adeo ut multi deprehendantur, qui vitam malint praesenti periculo exponere, multo magis pacem adversus alios abrumpere, quam contumeliam inultam pati. Quippe cum per hanc violetur gloria & existimatio, cujus integritate & vigore omnis animi voluptas constat.
- 87.
For the role of language in Pufendorf’s theory of sociability, see Aarsleff , Hans. 2011. Pufendorf and Condillac on Law and Language. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5: 308–321.
- 88.
JNG 7.1.4/LNNO 955.
- 89.
JNG 2.3.15/LNNO 208.
- 90.
JNG 2.5.12/LNNO 281.
- 91.
JNG 8.4.8.
- 92.
JNG 2.5.12/LNNO 281–282.
- 93.
OHC 2.1.11/DMC 119.
- 94.
JNG 8.4.6/LNNO 1233.
- 95.
In civil societies , slaves can be treated as property . However, because a slave is a human being, he cannot be treated not “like other property, which we may use, abuse and destroy at our pleasure ”. OHC 2.4.3/DMC 130.
- 96.
JNG 8.4.6
- 97.
JNG 8.4.9/PWSP 255.
- 98.
JNG 8.4.9/LNNO 1240.
- 99.
JNG 8.4.10/LNNO 1240.
- 100.
JNG 7.6.2/PWSP 230.
- 101.
See Seidler , Michael. 2002. Pufendorf and the Politics of Recognition. In Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty : Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political Thought, eds. Ian Hunter and David Saunders . New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 245–248.
- 102.
JNG 7.8.4/LNNO 1106.
- 103.
JNG 5.1.8/LNNO 686.
- 104.
JNG 5.1.9.
- 105.
JNG 5.1.11.
- 106.
JNG 5.1.14.
- 107.
Seidler 2003, 241.
- 108.
JNG 8.4.13.
- 109.
JNG 8.4.11/LNNO 1241.
- 110.
EJU 1.9.2/TBEJU 96. Existimatio intensiva est, secundum quam personae civiliter aeque honestae sibi invicem praeferuntur, prout uni prae altero adsunt, quieis aliorum animi ad exhibendum honorem permoveri solent.
- 111.
JNG 8.4.13/LNNO 1246.
- 112.
JNG 8.4.13/LNNO 1246. Enimvero etiamsi concedere possimus, fundamenta honoris hactenus ad potentiam recte revocari, quod effecum aliquem in vita humana producere apta sint. Note that in this context power (potentia) means natural power, not moral power (potestas).
- 113.
Honorem in solius potentiae existimatione consistere. JNG 8.4.13/LNNO 1245. According to Hobbes, “The POWER of Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good”. Hobbes 2012, 132.
- 114.
JNG 8.4.13/LNNO 1245.
- 115.
JNG 8.4.13/LNNO 1246. Per opinionem alinae potentiae conjuctae cum bonitae. Inde honorem necessario tres affectus consequi: amorem, qui ad bonitatem, spem & timorem, qui ad potentiam referuntur. Pufendorf cites De cive 15.9 here.
- 116.
For instance, Hobbes’s definition of honour as “an opinion of Power” was attacked in numerous late seventeenth-century English sermons. Jenkinson , Mathew. 2010. Culture and Politics in the Court of Charles II, 1660–1685. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 95.
- 117.
OHC 2.14.14/DMC 165.
- 118.
JNG 8.4.14/PWSP 256.
- 119.
JNG 8.4.23.
- 120.
JNG 8.4.14/LNNO 1249.
- 121.
JNG 8.4.18/LNNO 1253.
- 122.
JNG 8.4.13.
- 123.
JNG 8.4.14/LNNO 1249.
- 124.
JNG 8.4.11/LNNO 1241.
- 125.
JNG 8.4.14/LNNO 1248.
- 126.
JNG 8.4.23.
- 127.
OHC 1.4.6.
- 128.
OHC 2.3.12/DMC 128.
- 129.
Hobbes, Leviathan 2.18/276.
- 130.
JNG 8.4.24/LNNO 1261. Translation modified. Scilicet existimationis exteriora signa valorem determinatum habent ex impositione singularum civitatum; etsi fundamenta existimationis intensivae in se, & prout sapientibus aestimentur, valorem ubique suum obtineant. Unde nullibi non virtuti, & eximiis artibus, aut functionibus suus est honos.
- 131.
JNG 2.4.9/LNNO 242.
- 132.
JNG 8.4.12/LNNO 1243.
- 133.
JNG 2.3.10/LNNO 196. (2nd edition) Translation modified.
- 134.
JNG 2.3.21/LNNO 223.
- 135.
JNG 2.3.15/LNNO 209.
- 136.
JNG 2.3.15.
- 137.
OHC 1.9.2/DMC 68. Quanquam enim officia huminitatis late sese per vitam humanam diffundant: hautquidquam tamen ex eo solo fonte deduci omnia possunt, quae hominibus ab se invicem utiliter percipere licebat. Nam neque quibusvis ea est ingenii bonitas, ut omnia quibus aliis prodesse possunt, ex sola humanitate velint praestare citra exploratam spem paria recipiendi. Et frequenter illa, quae ab aliis in nos profisci queunt, ejusmodi sunt, ut gratis eadem nobis exhiberi salva fronte postulare nequeamus. Saepe quoque nostram fortunam aut personam non decet, alteri tale beneficium debere. Adeoque ut plurimum alter dare non potest, saepe nos accipere nolumus, nisi iste paria ὰ nobis recipiat. Non raro denique alios latet, qua ratione commodis nostris inservire queant.
- 138.
JNG 5.3.1/LNNO 708.
- 139.
JNG 3.3.1/PWSP 164–165. Enimvero parum est, alterum non laesisse, aut aestimationem debitam ei non detraxisse; per quae justa duntaxat odii causa removetur. Boni quoque aliquid in alterum est conferendum, siquidem arctiore adhuc vinculo animi hominum sunt conjungendi. Nec socialitatis debitum exhausit, qui infesto aliquo, aut ingrato facto me abs sese non protelavit; sed aliquid proficui praestari debet, ut alios quoque naturae meae participes in hisce terris degere gaudeam. Simulque necessitudo & cognatio, á natura inter homines constituta, mutuis officiis exercenda.
- 140.
JNG 1.1.19–20.
- 141.
Grotius , Hugo. 1925. De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres. Volume 2: The Translation. Trans. Francis W. Kelsey, and Ed. James Brown Scott. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1.1.8/37.
- 142.
For Grotius’s usage of natural law as a principle to distinquish morally required from morally optional actions , see Olsthoorn , Johan. Grotius on Natural Law and Supererogation. Journal of the History of Philosophy (Forthcoming).
- 143.
OHC 1.7.3/DMC 62.
- 144.
JNG 3.3.2.
- 145.
JNG 3.3.3.
- 146.
JNG 3.3.9.
- 147.
Schneewind , Jerome B. 2010. Essays in the History of Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 185.
- 148.
JNG 2.3.14/LNNO 206. Translation modified.
- 149.
JNG 3.4.1/PWSP 166.
- 150.
OHC 1.4.9/DMC 44.
- 151.
OHC 1.8.5/DMC 65. Translation modified.
- 152.
The view that the duties of humanity must be done “from an appropriate loving motive” is supported by Jerome B. Schneewind . Schneewind, Jerome B. 1996. Philosophical Ideas of Charity : Some Philosophical Reflections. In Giving: Western Ideas of Philanthropy, ed. Jerome B. Schneewind. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 60. See also Schneewind 1998, 133–134.
- 153.
JNG 3.4.1/PWSP 166. Accedit, quod in conventionibus cum altero quicquod egi, non tam propter alterum, quom propter meum commodum feci; cum in officiis humanitatis contrarium accidat. Nam licet horum exercitium in genere sit necessarium, ut homines commode inter se degere possint, adeoque in ejus quoque commodum redundet, qui ista exercuerit, dum paria ab aliis sibi potest polliceri; heic & nunc tamen quis humanitatem exercet non propter seipsum, sed in gratiam illius, qui beneficium accipit. Nam quoties privatum commodum ex beneficio quaeritur, illico id nomen & indolem suam amittit.
- 154.
JNG 1.8.3/LNNO 132.
- 155.
De habitu § 25.
- 156.
JNG 1.9.5/LNNO 139.
- 157.
OHC 1.8.8./DMC 66–67. Et eam ipsam ob causam beneficium dedi, i.e. ejus quod dedi refusionem mihi stipulatus non sum, ut & alteri foret occasio ostendendi, se honesti amore, non ex metu poenae humanae aut coactionis gratiam retulissse; utque ipse non spe lucri, sed ob humanitatem exercendam videar erogasse, de quo recipiendo mihi caveri noluerim. Enimvero qui non solum beneficium non rependit, sed & benefactori insuper malum reponit, ille ob hocce factum eo graviore poena est afficiendus, quo faediorem animi malignitatem sibi inesse ostendit.
- 158.
OHC 1.8.5/DMC 65.
- 159.
Harpman , Edward J. 2004. Gratitude in the History of Ideas. In The Psychology of Gratitude, eds. Robert A. Emmons and Michael E. McCullough. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 26.
- 160.
JNG 3.4.6/LNNO 386.
- 161.
JNG 1.3.9.
- 162.
OHC 1.8.6.
- 163.
OHC 1.8.8.
- 164.
OHC 1.8.8/DMC 66. Translation modified. See also JNG 3.3.17.
- 165.
JNG 1.2.6/LNNO 31.
- 166.
JNG 3.3.16/LNNO 374.
- 167.
See the discussion on self-love in Sect. 3.5 of this study.
- 168.
JNG 3.3.16/LNNO 375.
- 169.
JNG 2.4.9/LNNO 242. Intensiva autem existimatio, honor & gloria, eatenus adpetenda, quatenus ex praeclaris factis, rationi congruentibus, & ad bonum societatis humanae spectantibus redundat, aut ad talia patranda latiorem campum aperit. Quantacunque tamen etiam solidis ex causis obtigit, cavendum, ne animus arrogantia & insolentia infletur.
- 170.
Locke , John. 1975. Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Ed. Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 357.
- 171.
For an important analysis of the constructive role of the desire for esteem in Locke’s philosophy, see Stuart-Buttle , Tim. 2017.
- 172.
Pufendorf (like Locke) recognized that most people consider duties of sociability to be obligatory precisely because of their realization that social esteem is essential to their well-being, see Haara , Heikki, and Stuart-Buttle, Tim. Beyond Justice : Pufendorf and Locke on the Desire for Esteem . Political Theory. (forthcoming).
- 173.
For the notable similarities between Pufendorf’s and Smith ’s treatment of the desire for esteem, see Haara, Heikki and Lahdenranta, Aino. 2018. Smithian Sentimentalism Anticipated: Pufendorf on the Desire for Esteem and Moral Conduct. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16: 19–37.
- 174.
For the importance of esteem as a social force and the connection between esteem and civil society , see especially Brennan , Geoffrey, and Pettit , Philip. 2004. The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 175.
According to the two leading theorists of recognition, Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor , the modern concept of esteem as a normative criterion emerged after the dissolution of pre-modern estate-status-based hierarchical order. Taylor emphasizes the central role of Jean-Jacques Rousseau ’s republican model in which “all virtuous citizens are to be equally honored” as an initiator of the modern concept of esteem. Taylor, Charles. 1992. The Politics of Recognition. In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton NJ. Princeton University Press, 49–51. In turn, Honneth highlights the transformation that occurred “with the transition to bourgeois-capitalistic society,” when “‘the individual achievement principle’ emerged as a leading cultural idea under the influence of the religious valorization of paid work.” Honneth, Axel. 2003. Redistribution as Recognition. In Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, eds. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. London & New York: Verso, 147.
- 176.
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Haara, H. (2018). The Desire for Esteem. In: Pufendorf’s Theory of Sociability: Passions, Habits and Social Order . The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 77. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99325-6_4
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