Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Free Will & Action pp 89–101Cite as

Psychopathy, Identification and Mental Time Travel

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 329 Accesses

Part of the book series: Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action ((HSNA,volume 6))

Abstract

Recently some have argued that psychopaths might suffer generalised cognitive impairments that affect their capacity for mental time travel. In relation to the past, mental time travel is the capacity to have memories of past episodes in which the agent was personally involved. In relation to the future, mental time travel involves prospection, the capacity to imagine future situations where the agent might be involved. The authors argue that certain studies on the instrumental learning of psychopaths show that, in relation to certain specific situations, these subjects might be impaired in certain capacities for mental time travel. Following Harry Frankfurt, they maintain that moral responsibility requires a capacity to identify with certain desires. This process of identification involves accepting desires in virtue of an evaluation that is sensitive to commitments that stem from previously formed mental states. Therefore, identification relies on some basic capacities of mental time travel. The authors argue that a process of “detachment” from current operative desires is of central importance in the process of identification. They claim that certain experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths show that, in certain cases, they are incapable to register changes in their situation that determine a lack of detachment from certain current operative motivational states. However, other experiments show that psychopaths, in other circumstances, are capable of “detaching” from certain of their motivational states. These empirical findings allow the authors to argue that the process of identification in psychopathic offenders in certain specific circumstances might be impaired.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For surveys, see Blair et al. 2005; and Patrick 2006.

  2. 2.

    Kennett and Matthews 2009; Levy 2014; Vierra 2016. On the successful psychopaths, see Varga 2015.

  3. 3.

    For a survey of alterative diagnostic tools to the PCL-R, see Fowler and Lilienfeld 2013.

  4. 4.

    Blair et al. 1995, but see Aharoni et al. 2012 for a criticism of Blair’s results. For further philosophical reflection on the issues, see also Shoemaker 2011. For a survey, see Schaich Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013.

  5. 5.

    For a description of the different capacities that fall under this notion, see Kennett and Matthews 2009, pp. 329–342.

  6. 6.

    For a detailed discussion of this point, as it relates to criminal responsibility, see Jurjako and Malatesti 2017.

  7. 7.

    Many thanks to Marko Jurjako for reading and commenting on a previous version of this chapter. We thank the organisers and participants of the following events where parts and precedent versions of this paper were discussed: Agency, Causality, and Free Will, 25 January 2016, Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb; Third UK Conference on Philosophy and Psychiatry: Moral and legal responsibility in the age of neuroscience, 24 September 2015, Royal College of Psychiatrists, London; Gap. 9: Philosophy between Armchair and Lab, 17 September 2015, University of Osnabrück; “Re-member” – Self-narratives, memory and identity, 11 April 2015, Paris. The Croatian Science Foundation (HRZZ) funded our research as part of the CEASCRO project, grant n. 8071.

References

  • Adshead, G. (2014). The words but not the music: Empathy, language deficits, and psychopathy. In Schramme (Ed.), Being amoral: Psychopathy and moral incapacity (pp. 115–136). London: MIT Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Aharoni, E., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Can psychopathic offenders discern moral wrongs? A new look at the moral/conventional distinction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121(2), 484–497.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, N. E., & Kiehl, K. A. (2013). Functional neuroimaging and psychopathy. In Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), Oxford series in neuroscience, law, and philosophy. Handbook on psychopathy and law (pp. 131–149). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bechara, A., Damasio, A., & Anderson, S. (1994). Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50, 7–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blair, R. J. R. (2013). Psychopathy: Cognitive and neural dysfunction. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 15(2), 181–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blair, R. J. R., Jones, L., Clark, F., & Smith, M. (1995). Is the psychopath morally insane? Personality and Individual Differences, 19(5), 741–752.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blair, R. J. R., Colledge, E., & Mitchell, D. (2001). Somatic markers and response reversal: Is there orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in boys with psychopathic tendencies. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 29, 491–498.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D., & Blair, K. (2005). The psychopath: Emotion and the brain. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brazil, I., Maes, J. H. R., Scheper, I., Bulten, B. H., Kessels, R. P. C., Verkes, R. J., & de Bruijn, E. R. A. (2013). Reversal deficits in individuals with psychopathy in explicit but not implicit learning conditions. Journal of Psychiatric Neuroscience, 38, E13–E20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brzović, Z., Hodak, J., Malatesti, L., Šendula-Jengic, V., & Šustar, P. (2016). Problem klasifikacije u filozofiji psihijatrije: slučaj psihopatije (eng. The problem of classification in philosophy of psychiatry: The case of psychopathy). Prolegomena, 15(1), 21–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. S. J. (1993). Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fowler, K. A., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2013). Alternatives to psychopathy checklist-revised. In Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), Handbook on psychopathy and law (pp. 34–57). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20. Reprinted in Free will (G. Watson, Ed., pp. 81–95). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1988a). Identification and wholeheartedness. In Frankfurt (Ed.), The importance of what we care about (pp. 159–176). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1988b). The importance of what we care about. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Glover, J. (2014). Alien landscapes? Interpreting disordered minds. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hare, R. (2003). Hare psychopathy checklist-revised (PCL-R) (2nd ed.). Toronto: Multi-Health System.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jalava, J., Griffiths, S., & Maraun, M. (2015). The myth of the born criminal: Psychopathy, neurobiology, and the creation of the modern degenerate. Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jurjako, M., & Malatesti, L. (2016). Instrumental rationality in psychopathy: Implications from learning tasks. Philosophical Psychology, 29(5), 717–731.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jurjako, M., & Malatesti, L. (2017). Neuropsychology and the criminal responsibility of psychopaths: Reconsidering the evidence. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9924-0.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennett, J., & Matthews, S. (2009). Mental time travel, agency, and responsibility. In M. R. Broome & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives (pp. 327–349). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiehl, K. A., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. P. (2013). Handbook on psychopathy and law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koenigs, M., & Newman, J. P. (2013). The decision-making impairment in psychopathy: Psychological and neurobiological mechanisms. In Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), Oxford series in neuroscience, law, and philosophy. Handbook on psychopathy and law (pp. 93–106). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Levy, N. (2014). Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content. Philosophical Psychology, 27(3), 351–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loveless, J. (2012). Criminal law: Text, cases, materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lykken, D. T. (1957). A study of anxiety in the sociopathic personality. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55, 6–10.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maes, J. H. R., & Brazil, I. A. (2013). No clear evidence for a positive association between the interpersonal-affective aspects of psychopathy and executive functioning. Psychiatry Research, 210, 1265–1274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maibom, H. L. (2005). Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy. Mind and Language, 20(2), 237–257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maibom, H. (2014). Without fellow feeling. In Schramme (Ed.), Being amoral: Psychopathy and moral incapacity (pp. 91–114). London: MIT Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Malatesti, L., & McMillan, J. (Eds.). (2010a). Responsibility and psychopathy: Interfacing law, psychiatry and philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malatesti, L., & McMillan, J. (2010). Conclusions: Psychopathy and responsibility, a rejoinder. In Malatesti & McMillan 2010a, (pp. 319–323).

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Malatesti, L., & McMillan, J. (2014). Defending psychopathy: An argument from values and moral responsibility. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 35, 7–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, D. G. V., Colledge, E., Leonard, A., & Blair, R. J. R. (2002). Risky decisions and response reversal: Is there evidence of orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in psychopathic individuals? Neuropsychologia, 40, 2013–2022.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mullen, P. E. (2007). On building arguments on shifting sands. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 14(2), 143–147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Patrick, C. J. (Ed.). (2006). Handbook of psychopathy. New York/London: Guildford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaich Borg, J., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. P. (2013). Do psychopaths make moral judgements? In Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), Handbook on psychopathy and law (pp. 107–128). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmauk, P. J. (1990). Punishment, arousal, and avoidance learning in psychopaths. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 18, 451–463.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schramme, T. (Ed.). (2014). Being amoral. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, D. W. (2011). Psychopathy, responsibility, and the moral/conventional distinction. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(1), 99–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Varga, S. (2015). Identifications, volitions and the case of successful psychopaths. Dialectica, 69(1), 87–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Velleman, J. D. (1989). Practical reflection. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Velleman, J. D. (2006). Self to self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Viding, E., Fontaine, N. M. G., & Larsson, H. (2013). Quantitative genetic studies of psychopathic traits in minors: Review and implications for the law. In Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), Handbook of psychopathy and law (pp. 161–179). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vierra, A. (2016). Psychopathy, mental time travel, and legal responsibility. Neuroethics, 9(2), 129–136.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watson, G. (2013). Psychopathic agency and prudential deficits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113(3), 269–292.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia

    Luca Malatesti & Filip Čeč

Authors
  1. Luca Malatesti
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Filip Čeč
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

    Filip Grgić

  2. Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

    Davor Pećnjak

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Malatesti, L., Čeč, F. (2018). Psychopathy, Identification and Mental Time Travel. In: Grgić, F., Pećnjak, D. (eds) Free Will & Action. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99295-2_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation