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A Security Analysis of the ETSI ITS Vehicular Communications

  • Alexandru Constantin SerbanEmail author
  • Erik Poll
  • Joost Visser
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11094)

Abstract

This paper analyses security aspects of the ETSI ITS standard for co-operative transport systems, where cars communicate with each other (V2V) and with the roadside (V2I) to improve traffic safety and make more efficient use of the road system. We focus on the initial information exchange between vehicles and the road side infrastructure responsible for authentication and authorisation, because all the security aspects for these interactions are regulated in the ETSI ITS standards. Other services running in vehicular networks are open to choose application-specific security requirements and implement them using features from the ETSI ITS standard. We note some possibilities for replay attacks that, although they have limited impact, could be prevented using simple techniques, some of which are directly available in the ETSI ITS standard.

Keywords

Intelligent vehicles Security Access control 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexandru Constantin Serban
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Erik Poll
    • 1
  • Joost Visser
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Radboud UniversityNijmegenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Software Improvement GroupAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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