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Co-Engineering-in-the-Loop

  • Thomas Gruber
  • Christoph Schmittner
  • Martin Matschnig
  • Bernhard Fischer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11094)

Abstract

System safety standards have been available for two decades. Remarkably, none of the functional safety standards gave detailed guidance on how to treat potential security risks; security was – if at all – only mentioned in a small remark. However, the way how systems are built has changed; today’s safety-critical systems are more and more integrated in networks and, thus, the old paradigm of isolated systems is not any more valid. It has been recognized that safety and security, and since recently also performance, need to be treated in combination: Co-engineering is required. After a short glance at the state of the art in co-engineering methods and in respective standardization, the paper describes the approach of co-engineering with interaction points taken in the ECSEL project AQUAS, which has been running since May 2017. The methodology is illustrated with first details on how the co-engineering approach for the concept phase is realized in the industrial drive use case provided by Siemens AG Austria.

Keywords

Co-engineering Product lifecycle Industrial drives Safety Security Performance Interaction point 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The work published here is based on research in the AQUAS project that has been funded by the ECSEL Joint Undertaking and the Austrian Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT) in the program “ICT of the Future” and the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) under Grant Agreement number 737475.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Gruber
    • 1
  • Christoph Schmittner
    • 1
  • Martin Matschnig
    • 2
  • Bernhard Fischer
    • 2
  1. 1.AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbHViennaAustria
  2. 2.Siemens Aktiengesellschaft ÖsterreichViennaAustria

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