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Assurance Benefits of ISO 26262 Compliant Microcontrollers for Safety-Critical Avionics

  • Andreas SchwierzEmail author
  • Håkan Forsberg
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11093)

Abstract

The usage of complex Microcontroller Units (MCUs) in avionics systems constitutes a challenge in assuring their safety. They are not always developed according to the assurance requirements accepted by the aerospace industry. These Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware components usually target other domains like the telecommunication branch, because of the volume of sales and reduced liability. In the last years MCUs developed in compliance to the ISO 26262 have been released on the market for safety-related automotive applications. The avionics market could profit taking credit for some of the activities conducted in developing these MCUs. In this paper we present evaluation results based on comparing assurance activities from ISO 26262 that could be considered for compliance to relevant assurance guidance for COTS MCU in avionics.

Keywords

Microcontroller DO-254 Assurance Reuse Avionics ISO 26262 COTS 

Notes

Acknowledgment

This paper is sponsored by the Airbus Defense and Space endowed professorship “System Technology for safety-related Applications” supported by “Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft e.V.”. MDHs work in this paper is supported by the Swedish Knowledge Foundation within the project DPAC.

Disclaimer. Although this paper contributes to a reuse argumentation aligned to the regulatory position of CAs, it does not represent them. Only one way to formulate a reuse argument is suggested which has to be finalized in a project context by specific considerations of safety risks and an evaluation of functional or performance requirements in respect to the required integrity level of the avionics systems.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Research Center: Competence Field AviationTechnische Hochschule IngolstadtIngolstadtGermany
  2. 2.School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Division of Intelligent Future TechnologiesMälardalen UniversityVästeråsSweden

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