The Case for a Limited Use of Dignity as a Legal Principle

Feuillet-Liger, Brigitte

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99112-2_22

Brigitte Feuillet-Liger⁵

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 71))

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Abstract

This international study reveals that, although it is not legally recognized by all countries, the concept of dignity attracts universal interest. Nevertheless, in those states which do recognize dignity, it is a tool which can be used not only for strengthening and increasing rights and freedoms but also for restricting them. This in-depth examination of these different uses of dignity thereby supports a limited use of the concept in law. Although express reference to dignity in fundamental texts may be legitimate insofar as it recognizes the rights of every person, it should not be used to limit other rights and most importantly, it should not obscure the major issue of the scope of rights and freedoms and their limits.

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Notes

1.
Baertschi, B. 2005. Enquête philosophique sur la dignité. Anthropologie et éthique des biotechnologies. Genève: Labor et Fides, coll. ‘Le champ éthique’; Brownsword, R. and Beyleveld, D. 2001. Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hottois, G. 2009. Dignité et diversité des hommes. Paris: Vrin, coll. ‘Pour demain’; Durand, M. Die Würde des Menschen im Recht des Europaïschen Union. Von des Entstheung bis zu den Funktionen des Begriffs, typewritten thesis (French), University of Saarland - University Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, July 2011; Delmas-Marty, M. (ed.). Criminalité économique et atteintes à la dignité de la personne, vol. 1 to 7. Paris: éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’Homme; Hennette-Vauchez, S. and Girard, C. (eds.). 2005. La dignité de la personne humaine: recherche sur un processus de judiciarisation. Paris: PUF, coll. ‘Droit et justice’; Dillens, A.-M. and Van Meenen, B. 2007. La dignité aujourd’hui. Perspectives philosophiques et théologie. Brussels: Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis; La dignité de la personne humaine, 7th conference-debate of the Centre de Droit Public Comparé, University Panthéon-Assas Paris II, 30 October 2014, Revue générale du droit, no. 18334: www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/blog/2014/11/06. See in each article in this book, the specific references to each country.
2.
Ricoeur, P. 2004. ‘Éthique’ in Canto-Sperber, M. (dir.), Dictionnaire d’éthique et de philosophie morale, vol. 1, Paris, PUF, 689
3.
Pic De La Mirandole, J. 1993. De la dignité de l’homme [De hominis dignatate, 1504], trans. Hersant, Y. éd. de l’éclat. On the history of dignity, see Gogorza, A. 2013 ‘La dignité humaine’ in Saint-Pau J.-C., Droit de la personnalité, LexisNexis, coll. ‘Traités’, 98
4.
This study, originally covering twenty countries, was published in French by Éditions Bruylant, see Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (dir). 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Préface de M. Delmas-Marty, Bruylant. Our book covers sixteen of these countries. We allude sometimes to the other four countries in this article. They can be consulted in the French version.
5.
Maurer, B. 1999. Le principe de respect de la dignité humaine et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Paris, La Documentation française
6.
Rota, M. 2013. “L’interprétation des Conventions américaine et européenne des droits de l’homme. Analyse comparée de la jurisprudence des deux Cours de protection des droits de l’homme”, typewritten thesis University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, University of Caen
7.
See also Gimeno-Cabrera, V. 2005. Le traitement jurisprudentiel du principe de dignité de la personne humaine dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel français et du Tribunal constitutionnel espagnol, Paris, LGDJ; Burgogue-Larsen, L. (dir). 2010. La dignité saisie par les juges en Europe, Brussels, Bruylant
8.
See the conclusions of G. Hottois. (above, “The ‘Reality’ of the Principle of Human Dignity: A Critical Philosophical Approach”) following his participation in numerous research projects on this concept. See also the work of this author, Dignité et diversité des hommes, op. cit.
9.
Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and the USA. For four other countries (Chile, Japan, Senegal, Taiwan,) included in this study published in French, see Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (dir). 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant.
10.
Delmas-Marty, M. 2011. Les Forces imaginantes du droit, vol. IV, Vers une communauté de valeurs, Paris, Seuil, coll. “La couleur des idées”.
11.
Traditionally, a distinction is made between ontological dignity and meaningful dignity.
12.
Therefore, polysemy is itself questionable since dignity does not really seem to have different meanings, but rather different purposes. See below.
13.
For Swiss law, see above Manai, D. “Human Dignity: Conceptual Unity and Plurality of Content in Swiss Law”. See also above Sandor, J. “The Concept of Human Dignity as the Foundation of Rights in the Hungarian Biomedical Law” and Mazzoni, C-M. “Dignité et droits humains” in Feuillet-Liger, B. and Orfali, K. (editors), 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 171.
14.
The law therefore draws legal implications from this indignity. It is referred to in particular with regard to successions (art. 726 French Civil Code, see also for Italy, C-M. Mazzoni, op. cit) or nationality issues (art. 21-4 French Civil Code). Some countries, such as the USA, do not even conceive of this pivotal concept of dignity (see above Orfali, K. “Putting the Principle of Human Dignity to the Test: a ‘Useless’ Concept from an American Perspective?”).
15.
Beignier, B. 1995. L’honneur et le droit, Paris, LGDJ, coll. “Bibliothèque, droit privé”, vol. 234, 76.
16.
Girard, CH., Hennette-Vauchez, S. (dir.), “La dignité de la personne. Recherche sur un processus de judiciarisation”, op. cit.: the authors recognise three meanings of dignity, including “dignity of office” which ensures the protection of the dignity of office, not that of the individual. Hennette-Vauchez, S. 2008. “Une dignitas humaine? Vieilles outres, vin nouveau”, Droits, vol. 2, n° 48, 59.
17.
See above, Zhang, L. “The emergence of human dignity in China: from a private right to a constitutional principle”.
18.
On the difficulty of differentiating between the expressions used in different texts in Taiwan, see. Hsu, Y-M., “La dignité humaine à Taïwan: perspectives du droit positif et de la doctrine” in Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (dir). 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 379.
19.
Nevertheless, some countries contest or, at least, have difficulties in grasping the transcendent dimension of human beings which would lead to the recognition of a human dignity attributed in this respect to all human beings (USA, Asian countries), see above.
20.
Even if countries do not agree on the actual basis of these moral and religious considerations (on this point, see above San Julian Puig, “Human dignity as a fundamental principle in biomedicine: a Spanish perspective”.
21.
The philosophy of Kant has been particularly influential in the countries having adopted the principle of dignity, in particular in Germany. See above.
22.
Sometimes even leading to an opposite meaning of the term “dignity”; see above Sotis, C. “Practical reason and enantiosemy of human dignity: the reality of the principle in Italy”.
23.
America, Europe, Africa, Asia.
24.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948.
25.
See Ida, R. “La vague insertion de la dignité au Japon” in Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (eds.), 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 407.
26.
It is not legally binding.
27.
See above Le Breton, D. “From Dignity to Responsibility”: it is not earned, it exists. “It is therefore inherent to all members of the human condition, even criminals and torturers”.
28.
This perception of dignity is used in many countries.
29.
Some religions and philosophical trends share this idea, even if the basis of the higher dimension of mankind varies (see above V. San Julian Puig). In Egypt, human beings do not draw their dignity from their participation in humanity, but from their participation in the absolute dignity of God. See above Abdelhamid, H. “The Reality of the Human Dignity Principle in the Framework of the Egyptian Legal System”. But Swiss law recognises, alongside the dignity of the person, that of animals and, more broadly, of living organisms (see above D. Manaï).
30.
See above K. Orfali.
31.
See above D. Le Breton.
32.
See above D. Le Breton who refers to Peter Singer and to Engelhardt (for whom belonging to humanity is linked to having a conscience and reasoning).
33.
On these points, see above D. Le Breton and G. Hottois referring to N. Bostrom and J. Hugues.
34.
See above G. Hottois.
35.
Man must never be considered as a means, but always as an end in himself: Kant, E. 1985. Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs, translation V. Delbos, Delagrave, 160. See Binet, J.-R. “Dignité et Comité consultatif national d’éthique” in Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (eds.), 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 129.
36.
On this “patched-together” which does not recognise itself as such, see above G. Hottois.
37.
For Kant, belief in the existence of God and the soul, or even in a finalised plan of Nature are legitimate and reasonable assumptions; on these points see above G. Hottois.
38.
Such as spiritualism, essentialism, dogmatism, anti-evolutionism, etc.; see above G. Hottois.
39.
See above K. Orfali.
40.
See Ida R., op. cit and see above L. Zhang. Although in Taiwan, the Chinese tradition which is based on the importance of the group (and not on the individual) continues to play an important role, a number of laws refer to dignity (see Y-M Hsu., op. cit).
41.
Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Italy (indirect), Senegal, Switzerland, Turkey, Tunisia. France (recognised by Constitutional Court of 27 July 1994, 94-343/344 DC). Some American States (Illinois, Louisiana and Montana) also refer to it (see above K. Orfali).
42.
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Hungary, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Tunisia. In biomedicine laws, a number of countries refer to dignity (Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Spain, France, Senegal, Switzerland and Turkey).
43.
Germany frequently refers to it in the opinions pronounced by ethical bodies and in the preamble to draft laws. On the reference to dignity in the opinions of the French National Ethics Advisory Committee, see Binet, J-R. “Dignité et Comité consultatif national d’éthique”, op. cit.
44.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966, International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989. In the area of biomedicine: Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 11 November 1997 (articles 1 and 2), Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 19 October 2005 (articles 2, 3, 10 to 12 and 28).
45.
European Social Charter of 18 October 1961; Helsinki Conference of 1 August 1975; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 18 December 2000 (which attaches significant importance to dignity). In the area of biomedicine: Declaration on the Promotion of Patients’ Rights in Europe (28–30 March 1994), Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 4 April 1997.
46.
American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969 (articles 5-2, 11); African Charter of Human Rights of 27 June 1981; Declaration of Human Rights in Islam of 5 August 1990 (article 1).
47.
See above K. Orfali: “The concept of dignity is absent from the fundamental texts of American law – Declaration of Independence (1776), Constitution (1787) and the Bill of Rights (1790)”. It is nevertheless legally recognised in some States (above footnote no. 41).
48.
In Taiwan for example, although the concept of dignity remains equally difficult to understand because of the importance of Chinese tradition, Western influence has led to the introduction of a concept of dignity in a number of laws. See Hsu Y-M, see Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (dir). 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 379.
49.
See above L. Zhang.
50.
See above K. Orfali.
51.
On the idea of dignity as an axiom, see Fabre-Magnan, M. 2007. “La dignité en droit: un axiome”. Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques, 58(1):1.
52.
See above footnote no. 7.
53.
The Court of Justice of the European Union also refers to it (see in particular CJEC, 14 October 2004, case Oméga versus Mayor of the City of Born).
54.
On the implicit recognition of this principle, in particular via articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, see above J. Sándor.
55.
For the ECHR (case S.W. versus United Kingdom, 22 November 1995, application no. 20166/92, § 44): “The very essence [of the Convention] is respect for human dignity and freedom”. See above Marguenaud, J-P. “The principle of dignity and the European Court of Human Rights”.
56.
See above T. Callus, “Towards a libertarian application of dignity in English law: a case law analysis”.
57.
Some authors consider that human dignity is an implicit reference in the Constitution. See above K. Orfali.
58.
Whitman, J. Q. 2004. “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty”, Yale Law Journal, 113:1151 and s. See also above K. Orfali.
59.
Neuman, G. L. 2000. “Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law”, in Zure Autonomie des Individuums, Liber Amicorum Spiros Simitis, eds. S. Dieter and W. Manfred. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft; Jackson, V. C. 2004. Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse. Montana Law Review, 65:15 and s.; Goodman, M. D. 2006. Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence. Nebraska Law Review, 84:740 and s.
60.
Zoller, E. 2014. “La dignité de la personne humaine dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême des États-Unis”, Revue générale du droit, Études et réflexion, 3: http://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/. The courts mainly invoke it in criminal prosecutions.
61.
See above K. Orfali.
62.
After having been invoked in an ethical case that received very wide media coverage (The Ashley case), dignity has prompted growing interest in debates in the USA. See above K. Orfali.
63.
Concept which could be cited in legal proceedings, other than in cases of offences against a person’s honour, which is currently recognised by Chinese law. See above L. Zhang.
64.
See above L. Zhang.
65.
See R. Ida., see Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (dir). 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 407.
66.
See R. Ida, op. cit.
67.
This principle was proposed in particular by all the Asian and Arab countries. See above J. Sándor.
68.
Germany, Brazil, Chile, Canada, Spain, France (Sargos, F. quoted by Kernaleguen, F. “The reality of the principle of human dignity in French case law: a dominant or dominating principle?”), Hungary (see above J. Sándor.). In Belgium, it is a general principle of law (see above Schamps, G. “The Concept of Human Dignity in Belgian Law: A Variety of Approaches”.
69.
Germany, Brazil, Canada, Egypt (see above H. Abdelhamid), Spain (According to the Constitutional Court human dignity is “the spinal cord of all fundamental rights”), France (Constitutional Court 27 July 1994), Greece, Senegal, Switzerland, Turkey and in Tunisia (even if for this country it is implicit). In these countries, it always ranks at the top of the hierarchy of principles and/or rights. The explanatory report of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 states that: “The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself, but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights” (OJEC, 14 December 2002, C 303/17).
70.
Concept proposed in France (Mathieu, B. 1995. Pour une reconnaissance de “principe matriciels” en matière de protection constitutionnelle des droits de l’homme. D., chron., 211). On the other hand, the opinions of the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH) do not refer to this idea of a framework principle (see Teitgen-Colly, C. “La dignité humaine dans les travaux de la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme” in Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (eds.) 2016, La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 109). Germany does not use this expression but accepts it in practice, as the principle of dignity always underlies the interpretations of other fundamental rights (see above Furkel, F. “The Principle of Dignity in Germany and its Irradiating Effect with regard to Biomedicine”). Same in Hungary, see above J. Sándor.
71.
Even if this phenomenon also concerns freedom and equality.
72.
The basis of this transcendence may also vary (religious? secularized? or linked to human nature?), see above.
73.
Fabre-Magnan, M. “La dignité en droit: un axiome”, op. cit. 18.
74.
Nevertheless, on the link between dignity and the subjective rights of human beings, see above.
75.
See above, Ogien, R. “Human Dignity: A Notion that Provides More Confusion than Clarity”. On the link between law and values, see Fabre-Magnan, M. Introduction générale au droit. Paris: PUF, 141; Helmons, S. M. (ed.) 1999. Dignité humaine et hiérarchie des valeurs, Les limites irréductibles. Brussels: Academia-Bruylant.
76.
For the French CCNE, see J-R. Binet., op. cit. In addition, a number of contributions refer to the opinions of national ethics committees.
77.
See C. Teitgen-Colly. op. cit. (on the limited reference to the concept of dignity in CNCDH opinions).
78.
Some contributions refer to the opinion of national medical bodies that are important in their country.
79.
See above J.P. Marguénaud.
80.
See above Feuillet-Liger, B., Lobato, A. “Human Dignity in the Case Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”.
81.
This was in particular the case recently in Egypt (see above H. Abdelhamid) and Tunisia (see above Aouij-Mrad A. “The Principle of Human Dignity in Tunisia: between Political Recuperation and Low Practical Recognition”). But, as regards to the manipulation of this instrument during the social movement in Tunisia at the time of the revolution of January 11, 2011.
82.
Dignity is a cardinal principle of democracy (Häberle, P. 2004. L’État constitutionnel. Paris: Economica, translation M. Roffi, 141), hence its inclusion in many constitutions.
83.
See below.
84.
See above footnote no. 41.
85.
The wish of an individual to be the property of a State or to give up rights is inconceivable. See below.
86.
See above A. Aouij Mrad.
87.
From a philosophical point of view this is similar to meaningful dignity.
88.
See above D. Le Breton (“Dignity is then the measure of how an individual is perceived by others, it is a relationship-based dignity which is related to social and cultural conditions, since it results in individuals being given the privilege of choosing what is worthy or unworthy in their existence”) and D. Goubau, “Dignity in Canadian law, a popular but ambiguous notion”.
89.
See above R. Ogien.
90.
See above D. Le Breton.
91.
The CNCDH is more likely to consider using dignity as a means of tackling common challenges (social exclusion, immigration, etc.) than as a means of protecting categories of the population (see C. Teitgen-Colly, op. cit.).
92.
Germany, Belgium, Canada,, Spain, Egypt, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, United Kingdom, Turkey, Tunisia, Switzerland and to some degree, USA. It is interesting to note that in the USA, where dignity is still rarely used as a reference, it is mainly in criminal proceedings that the courts refer to the concept of dignity (unreasonable searches and seizures by the police, non-compliance with procedures in the event of imprisonment, see above K. Orfali). Similarly, the ECHR, the ICHR and the CNCDH.
93.
Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Spain, Italy, Greece, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Turkey, Tunisia.
94.
Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, Switzerland.
95.
Germany, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Turkey.
96.
In the area of bioethics and healthcare: Brazil, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Turkey.
97.
Germany (the German Federal Constitutional Court has created the concept of “fundamental right to basic necessities in accordance with human dignity”), Belgium, Canada, Egypt.
98.
Belgium, Canada, Spain, Egypt, Greece, Switzerland, Tunisia.
99.
Brazil. See also above B. Feuillet-Liger, A. Lobato.
100.
In Germany, the surgery imposed on transsexuals in order to be able to change gender has been ruled contrary to human dignity.
101.
In Germany, the anonymity of sperm donors prohibiting children from knowing their genitors is considered as violating the child’s dignity. In Tunisia, “the child’s rights to dignity, health, healthcare, education and schooling are guaranteed by their parents and the State” (article 47 of the Tunisian Constitution). Egypt, Turkey.
102.
In Germany, surrogacy is considered as a violation of the dignity of women, see above F. Furkel.
103.
Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Spain, Greece, Italy, Turkey, Tunisia, Switzerland. In this context, dignity is also a way of protecting individuals against the use of their personal data (see above Agallopoulou, P. “Applying the Overarching Principle of Human Dignity in Greek Law”). For Internet data see Dominguez Hidalgo, C. “Le principe de dignité humaine dans le droit chilien: une valeur ‘synthèse’” in Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K. (dir) 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 339. On the importance of dignity in incapacity law, see above G. Schamps.
104.
In Spain, it is grounds for the invalidity of a clause contrary to public morality or public order; see above V. San Julián Puig. Here dignity is treated as being part of accepted principles of morality, see below. It is the same in Switzerland.
105.
A testamentary disposition requiring an heir not to get married, or to marry a particular person, may be ruled invalid on the grounds of dignity; see above V. San Julián Puig.
106.
Switzerland.
107.
Greece, Turkey.
108.
Brazil, Greece, Turkey.
109.
Italy.
110.
Switzerland, Turkey.
111.
Lagarde, X. 2009. Foreword. In Les personnes vulnérables dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de cassation, Court of Cassation 2009 Annual Report, 3rd part. Paris: La Documentation française.
112.
Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Switzerland.
113.
Germany, Egypt, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey. For the ECHR, see above J-P. Marguénaud.
114.
On the dignity attached to human material (see above D. Manaï. and J. Sándor) or to groups of individuals (see B. Feuillet-Liger and A. Lobato).
115.
Inhumane treatment suffered by individuals whereas, initially, it was a case of treatment inflicted on populations. Belgium, Canada, Switzerland. In the United Kingdom, this concept is referred to in end-of-life cases, see above T. Callus.
116.
Germany, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Switzerland. On the importance of this protection by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR) based on the right to life, see above B. Feuillet-Liger and A. Lobato.
117.
Dignity ensures respect for life (right to life), the human body (principles of inviolability, inalienability and non-ownership of the human body).
118.
In the event of violations of the general right of the personality, see F. Furkel and J. Sándor.
119.
See above D. Goubau.
120.
See C. Dominguez Hidalgo, op. cit.
121.
See above P. Agallopoulou.
122.
Some countries frequently use this principle in legal proceedings (Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Switzerland, Turkey) while others, despite the importance attached to this principle in their country (or precisely because of its importance?), do not use it, such as Senegal (see Badji, M. “L’ambivalence du principe de dignité en droit sénégalais” in Feuillet-Liger, B. et Orfali, K.(dir) 2016. La dignité de la personne: quelles réalités? Panorama international, Bruylant, 267) and Tunisia (see above A. Aouij Mrad).
123.
Germany (in particular before the Constitutional Court), Brazil (before the Federal Supreme Court), Canada, Spain, France (even before the Constitutional Court), Greece, etc.
124.
Habermas, J. 2012. La conception de la dignité de la personne humaine et l’utopie réaliste des droits de l’homme. In La constitution de l’Europe, trans. C. Bouchindome, 133–158. Paris: Gallimard.
125.
German jurisdictions commonly use the principle of dignity to confirm a solution that other articles of the Fundamental Law would have been sufficient to justify (see above F. Furkel).
126.
See above K. Orfali and see R. Ida. op. cit.
127.
See above T. Callus.
128.
See below.
129.
See above.
130.
Except for the rights inherent in dignity itself, namely freedom and equality. The link between dignity and freedom results in particular from Kantian philosophy (Kant, E. Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs, op. cit.). On the importance of this link between dignity and freedom in Germany, see above F. Furkel (whenever the right to self-determination is mentioned in case law, the principle of dignity is implicit). It is the same in Switzerland (see above D. Manaï). This link between dignity and freedom also explains why this second application of dignity is one of the only applications found in the USA.
131.
On the gulf between human rights in the Western world and the Muslim world, Gannagé, L. 2001. “Le relativisme des droits de l’homme dans l’espace méditerranéen”, RIDC, 1:101 and Lequette, Y. “Des juges littéralement irresponsables”, in Mélanges dédiés à la mémoire du doyen Jacques Héron, Liber amicorum, Paris: LGDJ, 309.
132.
On dignity leading to the recognition of new rights, see below.
133.
On this point, see the interesting article by C. Teitgen-Colly (op. cit.) on the CNCDH which explains this idea.
134.
See above G. Schamps.
135.
On the idea of social dignity, see above B. Feuillet-Liger and A. Lobato as well as G. Schamps.
136.
See above B. Feuillet-Liger and A. Lobato.
137.
See above J-P. Marguénaud.
138.
And therefore the patient’s right to be informed. See above F. Kernaleguen, P. Agallopoulou and H. Abdelhamid.
139.
See above D. Goubau.
140.
Canada, Spain, United Kingdom.
141.
See above A. Aouij Mrad and D. Goubau.
142.
Cossalter, P. 2014. “La dignité humaine en droit public français: l’ultime recours”, Revue générale du droit, Études et réflexions, 4:19: “It is not so much […] at the level of violation of rights that the concept (of dignity) plays its role, but by the recognition of the harm that the court considers exists in the case of a violation of human dignity”.
143.
See above D. Goubau.
144.
See above D. Goubau.
145.
In Brazil, the principle of dignity has facilitated the recognition of a number of fundamental rights (in labour laws, housing laws, healthcare and family law, etc.).
146.
Then applied as a constitutional principle; see above F. Furkel.
147.
In the name of dignity, the State must guarantee minimum subsistence conditions to certain people (see above D. Manaï, P. Agallopoulou and D. Goubau). For example, in Germany, the State must guarantee a replacement income to poor people and provide shelter for homeless people (see above F. Furkel). For Belgium, see above G. Schamps.
148.
Same-sex marriages are not authorised under the law, but the Federal Supreme Court has accepted them. See above Crespo-Brauner, M-C, “Human Dignity in Brazilian Law: A Founding Principle of Laws and Court Judgements”.
149.
Although the Criminal Code prohibits abortions, two exceptions are permitted (in the event of rape and where there is a proven risk to the unborn child). Alongside this, the courts have also opened a new possibility (see above M-C. Crespo Brauner).
150.
See above M-C. Crespo Brauner (adoption by gay couples, embryo research).
151.
See above V. San Julián Puig.
152.
See above T. Callus.
153.
Alongside official adoptions, a parallel market (involving organisations offering for re-adoption, by mail order or on their website, for a fee, adopted children whose parents no longer want them) is developing; see Rousseau, C. 2016. “Cède enfants de seconde main”, Le Monde, April 12, 2016, http://www.lemonde.fr/televisions-radio/article/2016/04/12/cede-enfants-de-seconde-main_4900289_1655027.html.
154.
It is interesting to note that in the USA, it is the principle of the individual’s autonomy (and not dignity) that leads to individuals being granted more freedoms.
155.
Canada, Egypt, France, Switzerland (restriction of the freedom of expression to protect the individual’s external honour).
156.
But the courts do not necessarily adopt identical solutions regarding this restriction on the freedom of the press in the case of photos of identifiable people, wounded or deceased, lying in a public place. See above F. Kernaleguen.
157.
After having taken an opposite stance, the Turkish courts now consider that satires of politicians infringe their dignity and accordingly restrict press freedom. See above Oktay-Özdemir, S., Sinem Tek, G. “Ambivalence of the Relationships between Dignity and Freedoms in Turkish Law”.
158.
CS (ref.) 9, 10 and 11 January 2014, case of Dieudonné cited by F. Kernaleguen.
159.
See above S. Oktay-Özdemir and G-S. Tek.
160.
CS ass. 27 October 1995, Municipality of Morsang-sur-Orge, JCP, 1996, II, 22630, note F. Hamon. See above F. Kernaleguen.
161.
In Canada, numerous prohibitions in law (cloning, commercialisation of surrogacy, assisted suicide) are based on the principle of dignity (see above D. Goubau.). In Germany, cloning, genetic manipulation, the artificial alteration of human germ cells and the formation of hybrids or chimera are prohibited on the basis of the principle of dignity combined with the right to life (see above F. Furkel).
162.
See above C. Sotis, S. Oktay-Özdemir and G-S. Tek and H. Abdelhamid. By contrast, under Swiss law, a violation of self-determination is a violation of dignity.
163.
See above F. Furkel.
164.
On criticism of this idea, see Fabre-Magnan, M. op. cit., 23.
165.
The French CNCDH seems to tend towards this second viewpoint (see Teitgen-Colly, C. op. cit.).
166.
On the debate that followed the ECHR ruling of February 17, 2005 on very violent sado-masochistic practices and recognising a broad interpretation of individual autonomy: see Fabre-Magnan, M. 2005. “Le sadisme n’est pas un droit de l’homme”, D., 2973 and Fabre-Magnan, M. 2008. “Le domaine de l’autonomie personnelle, indisponibilité du corps humain et justice sociale”, D., 31; Roman, D. 2007. “À corps défendant. La protection de l’individu contre lui-même”, D., 1284.
167.
See Ogien, R. 2007. L’éthique aujourd’hui. Maximalistes et minimalistes. Paris: Gallimard.
168.
See above R. Ogien. and K. Orfali.
169.
“In the name of personal dignity, we can condemn combat sports, paintball and piercing, cryopreservation of bodies, sadomasochism or prostitution, abortion and contraception”, see Roman, D., op. cit., 1292.
170.
Pinker, S. 2008. “The stupidity of dignity”, The New Republic, 28 May 2008. On the fact that the ECHR ensures that dignity does not become the basis of morality and the guardian of tradition, see above J-P. Marguénaud.
171.
Pech, T. 2001. “La dignité humaine: du droit à l’éthique de la relation”. Justices, special edition “Le corps humain saisi par la justice”, 90.
172.
The frequent reference to dignity, as an effective instrument for ensuring subjective rights, in some countries, suggests an important use of this concept. See above.
173.
Rivero, J. 1951. “Apologie pour les ‘faiseurs de systèmes’”, D., chron., 99.
174.
See above applications 1, 2 and 3.
175.
See above application 4.
176.
This refers to the use of dignity in law, and not the philosophical concept of dignity.
177.
Some substantive laws suggest this autonomy by describing dignity as a supplementary law (see above D. Manaï, J. Sándor.).
178.
Feeling that is the basis, from a philosophical point of view, of meaningful dignity. A feeling of a lack of respect, a lack of human consideration by others; see above.
179.
As is well known, family law does not provide for any representation of love, while it is the basis of family relationships. This feeling nevertheless plays a part in the development of law. Law can also take account of affection with regard to compensation, but the violation of a right must be established beforehand.
180.
See above the first application of dignity.
181.
This right is enshrined in numerous international and national texts.
182.
Callewaert, J. K. 1996. “L’article 3 de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme: une norme relativement absolue ou absolument relative?”, in Liber amicorum Marc André Eissen, 14. Brussels: Bruylant, Paris: LGDJ: “Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment is the provision of the convention that is the closest to the fundamentals of the human condition and civilisation, in that it seeks through such a prohibition to protect civilisations from what is ultimately its total negation: torture, inhuman and degrading punishment and treatment”.
183.
ICHR, Yean and Bosico versus Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, series C, note no. 437, § 179. See also ICHR, 25 November 2000, Bàmaca Velàsquez versus Guatemala, series C no. 70, § 179. See above B. Feuillet-Liger and A. Lobato.
184.
This inhumane treatment consisting of failing to recognise a person’s subjective rights that protect individuals, of torture and degrading treatment, even if the last two concepts can give rise to different perceptions.
185.
See above.
186.
A flexible model since although it is assessed by the courts, it focuses on the humanisation of law. See Delmas-Marty, M. 2013. Résister, responsabiliser, anticiper ou comment humaniser la mondialisation. Paris: Le Seuil.
187.
On the barbarism and risks of de-humanisation, see Edelman, B. 1992. “L’ennemi dans les déclarations sur les droits de l’homme”, Droits, 16:119–130; Fabre-Magnan, M. 2008. “Dignité humaine”, in Dictionnaire des droits de l’homme, eds. Rials, S. and Sudre, F, Paris: PUF, note no. 2175, 287.
188.
All forms of trafficking (work, prostitution, etc.).
189.
On this right, see however Bioy, X. 2012. “Le droit à la personnalité juridique”. Revue des droits et libertés fondamentaux, 12:1–23, available on: http://rdlf.upmf-grenoble.fr/. Unlike the ICHR, the ECHR has not recognised this right to legal personality on the basis of dignity despite having had the opportunity to do so, in particular in the case of Kurić and others versus Slovenia (26 June 2012, application no. 26828/06, § 356). However, in this case, the Montenegrin Judge Nebojša Vučinić, in his partially dissenting opinion, had considered, in the case in point, that “this runs counter to the applicants’ inherent human personality and dignity”, the latter having “ceased to exist as ‘legal subjects’, that is, as ‘natural persons’ in the Slovenian legal system”.
190.
See article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965, article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 18 December 1979, article 24 of the International Convention of the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 18 December 1990.
191.
Articles 5 of the African Charter on Human Rights and 22 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 22 May 2004.
192.
Article 3 of the Convention.
193.
By this statement, René Cassin wanted to show that the withdrawal of legal personality was tantamount to depriving individuals of their human status (Commission on Human Rights, Editorial Committee, Second session, Summary record of the thirty-seventh session, held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 18 May 1948, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.l/SR.37, 26 May 1948, 7).
194.
See above “The limited objectives of this application”.
195.
But also legislators that need to be encouraged to introduce them into their country’s substantive law.
196.
See above: 2.3 “Dignity: an instrument for societal transformation”.
197.
See above: 2.4 “Dignity: an instrument for restricting freedom”.
198.
But even in this situation, the relevance of dignity is questionable since the recognition of new rights may be based on concepts other than dignity. For example, although in Germany, the right to know one’s origins has been recognised thanks to dignity, in Canada the same right is based on the principle of respect for moral integrity.
199.
Marguénaud, J-P. Fabre-Magnan, M. Levinet, M. and Tulkens, F. 2008. “Controverse sur l’autonomie personnelle et la liberté du consentement avec”, Droits, 48:53: “Where dignity can demonstrate its full worth is in helping to improve the situation of those at the lower end of the social hierarchy. […] Dignity can be an extremely relevant concept to justify more positive obligations within the meaning of European case law, social rights and creditor’s rights”.
200.
Macklin, R. 2003. “Dignity is a useless concept”, BMJ - British Medical Journal, 327:1419. In addition, dignity “is too vulnerable to value judgements” (see above D. Le Breton).
201.
For Turkey, see above S. Oktay-Özdemir and G-S. Tek. There is an undeniable link between the use of dignity and the socio-economic context.
202.
Since not treating a person as an object means recognising that the person has a sphere of freedom.
203.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the French CNDCH, whose role is to defend personal rights and freedoms, refuses to recognise an objective perception of dignity permitting restrictions on freedoms; see C. Teitgen-Colly. op. cit.
204.
The public policy standard refers to a rule expressing an essential or fundamental social value from which it is impossible to derogate. Public policy has emerged as an obstacle to the application of other competing rules, pursuant to a prioritisation of pre-determined social values.
205.
Cornu, G. 2016. “Public policy, definition”, in Vocabulaire juridique. Paris: PUF. “A mandatory standard which […] corresponds to all the fundamental requirements (social, political, etc.) regarded as essential […] for the maintenance of safety and morality […] or even for the protection of some essential specific interests (public policy for individual protection, etc.)”.
206.
See above V. San Julián Puig and M-C.Crespo Brauner.
207.
On the question of the weakening, even abandonment of the concept of public decency which would lead to it being replaced by that of dignity, see above Lavaud-Legendre, B. 2005. Où sont passées les bonnes mœurs?. Paris: PUF; Fragu, E. 2015. Des bonnes mœurs à l’autonomie personnelle. Essai critique sur le rôle de la dignité humaine. University thesis Paris II Panthéon-Assas.
208.
Which would inevitably lead to misunderstandings between countries depending on their perception of this dignity.
209.
This concept has developed mainly in France. See D. Roman, op. cit., 1292.
210.
In ensuring in particular the choice of one group does not affect the freedom of others, see above D. Le Breton.
211.
With behind it, the recurring question of the choice between minimalist or maximalist ethics. See above R. Ogien.
212.
See opposite E. Fragu. op. cit., 44.
213.
Fabre-Magnan, M. 2008. Le domaine de l’autonomie personnelle, indisponibilité du corps humain et justice sociale, op. cit. D., 31; Roman, D., op. cit. See above D. Le Breton.
214.
International or regional texts relating to human rights, constitutions.
215.
This is a strong symbol since it marks the determination to impose legal recognition of persons and will require States to introduce, in their substantive law, the right to recognition of legal personality.
216.
As things currently stand regarding applications of dignity, it seems important that those that use it do not lose sight of the fact that it is perhaps partial in order to continue to think critically. See along these lines, above G. Hottois.
217.
Mainly the courts since, when they are asked to pronounce on matters relating to dignity, their own individual values inevitably come into play. Regarding this observation when, in private international law, the courts are called upon to assess the concept of public policy exceptions, see Remy, B. 2008. Exception d’ordre public et mécanisme des lois de police en droit international privé. Paris: Dalloz, 189, and more generally, Bredin, J-D. 1982. “La loi du juge” in Mélanges B. Goldman, 20. Paris: Litec.
218.
Because of the importance of the use of the concept of dignity in bioethics.

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Brigitte Feuillet-Liger

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Brigitte Feuillet-Liger
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Kristina Orfali

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Feuillet-Liger, B. (2018). The Case for a Limited Use of Dignity as a Legal Principle. In: Feuillet-Liger, B., Orfali, K. (eds) The Reality of Human Dignity in Law and Bioethics. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 71. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99112-2_22

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