Ukraine Under Kuchma—An Illustration of the Link Between the Extended Parentela and Consolidated Oligarchy

  • Mihail Petkov


The previous chapter focused on the development of the extended parentela as a model of oligarchic dynamics in Bulgaria. It ended with the hypothesis that if the extended parentela dynamic is left unchecked and in combination with parliamentary elections, the internal state-group dynamics can transform into a consolidated oligarchy. What is meant with this term is not that the Bulgarian state will formally become an oligarchy. Rather, that the competition among elites will cease and they will solidify into a single, coherent elitist community: either because there will be only one party, or because all parties will decide to govern together. In any case, there is the question whether all of the above is valid because it was developed on a high level of abstraction. Is it applicable to a case outside Bulgaria, or is it purely a Bulgarian phenomenon? To answer this question, the present chapter focuses on the secondary literature produced by area experts on Ukraine specifically under President Kuchma’s tenure. The objective is to find traces of the extended parentela model and the hypothesized causal dynamic: the extended parentela, suppression of political competition and evidence of oligarchic consolidation. The present chapter argues that we can find all of these elements in the Ukrainian case and therefore the extended parentela model is at least tentatively validated.


Parentela President Kuchma PartySocial Democratic Party insiderInsider oppositionOpposition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mihail Petkov
    • 1
  1. 1.NaplesUSA

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