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Informational Lobbying in the EU: Mechanisms of Probity, Dissembling, and Transparency

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Lobbying in the European Union

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Abstract

This chapter examines questions of dissembling and probity in informational lobbying in the EU. Scholars have long acknowledged that information is at the very heart of EU lobbying. Information is used as a form of lobbying currency that not only grants interest groups access to decision-making processes but also the opportunity to shape policy outcomes in their favor. But to what extent do interest groups provide inaccurate, incomplete, and even erroneous information? What incentives do they have to be honest, and what safeguards can policymakers implement to ensure the receipt of accurate information? This chapter explores these questions from both an interest group and policymaker perspective.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An alternative view is related to theories of “associational democracy” and sees interest groups as being essential to democratic decision-making processes. See Maloney (2009), Salgado (2014), and Saurugger (2008).

  2. 2.

    Plans are now underway to make the register mandatory. See European Commission (2016). Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory Transparency Register. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0627. Accessed 18 June 2017.

  3. 3.

    European Commission (2014). Code of Conduct.http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage.do?locale=en&reference=CODE_OF_CONDUCT. Accessed 16 December 2016

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, London, UK

    Adam William Chalmers

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  1. Adam William Chalmers
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Correspondence to Adam William Chalmers .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Doris Dialer

  2. European Parliament, Bruxelles, Belgium

    Margarethe Richter

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Chalmers, A.W. (2019). Informational Lobbying in the EU: Mechanisms of Probity, Dissembling, and Transparency. In: Dialer, D., Richter, M. (eds) Lobbying in the European Union. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9_5

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