Abstract
In May 2010 European leaders agreed on the creation of a € 500 bn mechanism to provide assistance to euro area countries facing financial stability risks. The establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), later turned into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), was a critical juncture in the constitution of a European fiscal centre. Its financial capacity is unprecedented. The mechanisms’ lending power amounts to more than three times the size of the annual EU budget. This chapter retraces the negotiation that led to the creation of these mechanisms and of the smaller and often forgotten facilities that preceded their existence. The chapter argues that the creation of these financial mechanisms has converted the Eurogroup and the Euro Working Group (EWG) into executive bodies.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Interviewee 50 – European Stability Mechanism official.
- 2.
Interviewee 4 – European Commission official.
- 3.
Financial provision to non-euro area members was already a fact of life in the EU since 2002 through the Balance of Payments Facility (BoP).
- 4.
Interviewee 38 – European Central Bank official.
- 5.
Interviewee 4 – European Commission official.
- 6.
Interviewee 38 – European Central Bank official.
- 7.
Interviewee 38 – European Central Bank official.
- 8.
The Guardian, 11 April 2010.
- 9.
Interviewee 12 – European Commission official.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
- 12.
Interviewee 27 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.
- 13.
Interviewee 12 – European Commission official.
- 14.
Interviewee 4 – European Commission official.
- 15.
Interviewee 9 – EU Council official.
- 16.
Interviewee 49 – European Stability Mechanism official.
- 17.
Financial Times, 9 February 2012, ‘Germany and Europe: A very federal formula’.
- 18.
EWG Chairman.
- 19.
German Interior Minister, representing German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble who was ill upon arrival in Brussels and unable to negotiate for Germany.
- 20.
Interviewee 1 – EU Council official.
- 21.
Interviewee 4 – European Commission official.
- 22.
Yet it retained a key administrative role in terms of preparing the Memorandum of Understanding and monitoring the compliance of ‘conditionality’.
- 23.
Financial Times, 12 May 2010, ‘Paris seen as trumping Berlin at the EU table’.
- 24.
Ibid.
- 25.
Interviewee 27 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.
- 26.
Interviewee 1 – EU Council official.
- 27.
The EFC president and the EWG president are the same persons.
- 28.
Questions & Answers section of the EFSF website, consulted on 31 January 2016.
- 29.
Financial Times, 27 September 2010, ‘Eurozone Needs a permanent bail-out fund’, by Peter Bofinger, Henrik Enderlein, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and André Sapir.
- 30.
Interviewee 34 – European Central Bank official.
- 31.
Interviewee 34 – European Central Bank official.
- 32.
Interviewee 34 – European Central Bank official.
- 33.
Interviewee 27 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.
- 34.
Interviewee 50 – European Stability Mechanism official.
- 35.
Interviewee 4 – European Commission official.
- 36.
Interviewee 27 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.
- 37.
Interviewee 43 – European Central Bank official.
- 38.
Interviewee 43 – European Central Bank official.
- 39.
Interviewee 32 – European Central Bank official.
- 40.
Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.
- 41.
Interviewee 1 – EU Council official.
- 42.
Interviewee 12 – European Commission official.
- 43.
Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.
- 44.
Interviewee 43 – European Central Bank official.
- 45.
Interviewee 50 – European Stability Mechanism official.
- 46.
Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.
- 47.
Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.
- 48.
- 49.
Also called at times ‘Eurogroup Working Group’.
- 50.
In truth the Eurogroup disposes of two secretariats, one located in the Council’s Secretariat General and another one located in the Commission’s DG ECFIN.
- 51.
Interviewee 43 – European Central Bank official.
- 52.
Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 53.
Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 54.
Interviewee 10 – EU Council official.
- 55.
Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 56.
Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 57.
Interviewee 22 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 58.
Interviewee 27 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.
- 59.
Interviewee 10 – EU Council official.
- 60.
Interviewee 20 – Independent analyst.
- 61.
Interviewee 1 – EU Council official.
- 62.
Interviewee 13 – European Parliament official.
- 63.
Interviewee 10 – EU Council official.
- 64.
Interviewee 10 – EU Council official.
- 65.
Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.
- 66.
Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 67.
Interviewee 22 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 68.
Interviewee 22 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 69.
Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 70.
Interviewee 22 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 71.
Interviewee 32 – European Central Bank official.
- 72.
Interviewee 30 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.
- 73.
Interviewee 32 – European Central Bank official.
- 74.
Interviewee 22 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 75.
Interviewee 22 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 76.
Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 77.
Interviewee 50 – European Stability Mechanism official.
- 78.
Interviewee 10 – EU Council official.
- 79.
Interviewee 22 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.
- 80.
Interviewee 12 – European Commission official.
References
Beukers, T., & De Witte, B. (2013). The Court of Justice Approves the Creation of the European Stability Mechanism Outside the EU Legal Order: Pringle. Common Market Law Review, 50(3), 805–848.
Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The New Intergovernmentalism: States, Supranational Actors, and European Politics in the Post-Maastricht Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buti, M., & Carnot, N. (2012). The EMU Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(6), 899–911.
De Gregorio, A. M. (2012). Legal Developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance. Common Market Law Review, 49(5), 1613–1645.
Dutch Court of Auditors. (2016). Dedicated webpage of the Dutch Court of Auditor on Financial Assistance Mechanisms. http://www.rekenkamer.nl/english/Publications/Topics/EU_governance_to_combat_the_economic_and_financial_crisis/Financial_stability_instruments/Financial_instruments/Greek_loan_facility. Visited on 31 Jan 2016.
Enderlein, H., & Haas, J. (2015, October). What Would a European Finance Minister Do? A Proposal (Policy Paper N°145). Jacques Delors Institut Berlin.
ESM. (2018, March). European Financial Stability Facility and European Stability Mechanism. Investor Presentation.
ESM Treaty. (2012). Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism.
EU Council. (2010, May 9/10). Extraordinary Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs. Press Release. Brussels.
Euro Area Statement. (2010, May 7). Statement by the Heads of State and Government of the Euro Area. Brussels.
Eurogroup. (2015, December 7). Work Programme for the Eurogroup for the First Half of 2016.
European Central Bank. (2011, September). Beyond the Economics of the Euro: Analysing the Institutional Evolution of EMU 1999–2010 (ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 127).
European Commission. (2010, May 9). Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a European Financial Stabilization Mechanism.
Eurostat. (2011, January 27). New Decision of Eurostat on Deficit and Debt: The Statistical Recording of Operations Undertaken by the European Financial Stability Facility. Eurostat News Release.
Gocaj, L., & Meunier, S. (2013). Time Will Tell: The EFSF, the ESM and the Euro Crisis. Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 239–253.
Gros, D., & Mayer, T. (2010, February). How to Deal with Sovereign Default in Europe: Create the European Monetary Fund Now! (CEPS Policy Brief No. 202).
Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35.
Hodson, D. (2013). The Little Engine that Wouldn’t: Supranational Entrepreneurship and the Barroso Commission. Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 301–314.
Jansen, R. (2011). The European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism: A Legal Overview. European Banking and Financial Law Journal EUREDIA, 4, 417–423.
Joerges, C., & Neyer, J. (1997). From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology. European Law Journal, 3(3), 273–299.
Kasel, A. (2012). La présidence de l’Eurogroupe et la gouvernance économique de la zone euro. In V. Charlety (Ed.), Le Système présidentiel de l’Union Européenne après Lisbonne. Paris: ENA.
Lisbon Treaty. (2009). Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version).
Louis, J. V. (2011). Guest Editorial: The No Bail-Out Clause and Rescue Packages. Common Market Law Review, 47(4), 971–986.
Micossi, S., Carmassi, J., & Peirce, F. (2011, March 8). On the Tasks of the European Stability Mechanism (CEPS Policy Brief No 235). Brussels.
Olivares-Caminal, R. (2011). The European Stability Mechanism: Some Notes on a New EU Institution Designed to Avert Financial Crises. In J. La Brosse, R. Olivares-Caminal, & D. Singh (Eds.), Financial Crisis Containment and Government Guarantees. Edward Edgar: Cheltenham/Northampton.
Puetter, U. (2014). The European Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salines, M., Glöckler, G., & Truchlewski, Z. (2012). Existential Crisis, Incremental Response: The Eurozone’s Dual Institutional Evolution 2007–2011. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5), 665–681.
Streeck, W., & Thelen, k. (Eds.). (2005). Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tuori, K. (2012). The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and Implications (EUI Working Papers). Department of Law, 2012/28.
Van Rompuy, H. (2012, May 4). Speech by Hermann Van Rompuy, President of the European Council at the Stockholm School of Economics. Stockholm.
Verdun, A. (Ed.). (2002). The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Verdun, A. (2015). A Historical Institutionalist Explanation of the EU’s Responses to the Euro Area Financial Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(2), 219–237.
Yiangou, J., O’keeffe, M., & Glöckler, G. (2013). ‘Tough Love’: How the ECB’s Monetary Financing Prohibition Pushes Deeper Euro Area Integration. Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 223–237.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schlosser, P. (2019). Building Central Financial Assistance Capacities. In: Europe's New Fiscal Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98636-4_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98636-4_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-98635-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-98636-4
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)