Abstract
Animals, at least mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and even certain invertebrates like octopuses, qualify as “moral subjects” and as deserving of respect and consideration equal, albeit not necessarily identical, to that of human moral subjects. A review non-anthropocentric accounts that—in principle—accommodate animals in the requisite fashion indicates why reverence for life, sympathy, and the principle of utility fail either as compelling moral theories or as efficient action guides, or both.
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Notes
- 1.
Nozick, as we saw in the previous chapter, uses the term “moral individualism” to describe the view “that looks only at a particular organism’s characteristics and deems irrelevant anything as fundamental and essential as species membership” (Nozick 1983: 29). I prefer to call the view developed here ‘ethical individualism’. It is perhaps useful, for reasons of conceptual clarity, to distinguish between morality and ethics. Ethics has been characterised as moral philosophy, that is, philosophical inquiry concerned with morality and its problems and judgements. The terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’, and ‘unethical’ and ‘immoral’, are often, and certainly not illegitimately, used interchangeably. Maintaining a conceptual distinction between ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ may, however, be both useful and instructive, and I will employ this distinction on specific occasions in the course of my argument.
- 2.
Karma sees every action as having an effect, good or bad. This implies an elaborate system of retribution and reward (whether in the present or future lives), a system that is facilitated by the idea of reincarnation.
- 3.
See also Singer (1979a: 101, 102; 1980a: 23, 25).
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Horsthemke, K. (2018). Non-Anthropocentric Views, Animals as Moral Subjects, and Equality. In: Animal Rights Education. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98593-0_3
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