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The OECD Convention and Beyond: State-Powered Coalition Building in a Broken World

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The Social Construction of Global Corruption

Part of the book series: Political Corruption and Governance ((PCG))

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Abstract

In the period 1994–1997 the foundations of the global anti-corruption governance were laid out. As this chapter shows, the success of the anti-corruption endeavor was to a large extent determined by a systematic approach of state-sponsored coalition building. Non-state actors contributed to the process of coalition-building, but much of what they achieved was shaped by previous efforts of state actors, in particular the United States. The instrumental use of venues and publicity contributed to the success of the OECD anti-bribery initiative. The advancement of talks at the OECD led member states to introduce the topic of corrupt practices in the OAS, the CoE and the EU. The formal agreements reached at other organizations then provided the legal and discursive underpinnings for the re-introduction of the subject at the UN. Building on Chapter 6, the first part of this chapter zooms in on the talks at the OECD, while the second part zoom out to show the bigger picture of how, in relation to progress at the OECD, the subject of corruption was introduced in regional organizations. In this way the chapter strikes a balance between showing how the social construction of problems is negotiated within and between organizations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    During a meeting on the June 13–14, 1991, the Ad Hoc Group members re-elected Mark Pieth as Chairman. Pieth had been instrumental for the successful outcome of the discussions on money-laundering (DAFFE/IME/PI(91)3).

  2. 2.

    The list of the members of the Ad Hoc Group revealed an increased interest in the issue of corrupt practices with a more extensive national representation from Ministries of Finance and the Economy, Departments of States, National Banks from almost all OECD member states (DAFFE/IME/PI(91)3).

  3. 3.

    Basing the recommendations on the provided matrix, the Report stated that a number of such highly controversial elements had been individuated: ‘such elements may include a definition of illicit payments which would cover payments other than traditional bribes, including sales requiring government approval, the reaching of payments through intermediaries, and the issue of jurisdiction absent a sufficient territorial nexus’ (DAFFE/IME/PI(91)5).

  4. 4.

    This search for optimal solutions in the context of what is deemed to be in the realm of the politically feasible was concerned with questions such as: ‘Is there an inverse [relationship] proportionality between the controversial elements and the type of instrument? For example, does the controversy diminish as one gets further away from the more legally constraining type of instrument?’ (DAFFE/IME/PI(91)5, 3).

  5. 5.

    Economists or sociologists, for example, would have provided different type of expertise, but might have also given rise to more controversy, because more claims might have centered around the relationship of the putative condition to the definition of the problem, as they did in the UN .

  6. 6.

    The definition of the offender covered natural and legal persons and the recipient could be a public/governmental official or a private party. The definition of public official was broad enough to include all persons with public decision-making or implementing roles. Relevant was also the inclusion of a private person with the ability to influence public policy whether this person works in a firm or NGO. The definition of who makes an offer included ‘any corporation, partnership, association, joint stock company, business, trust, unincorporated organization or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business (or center of activity related to the commercial transaction in question) in the member country’ (DAFFE/IME/PI(92)3/REV3, 5). It is noteworthy that there did not occur at any point a discussion of the offeror being a public or governmental agent in their official capacity, while a private recipient remained an albeit contested option.

  7. 7.

    The questionnaire was filled by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France . Germany , Italy , Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom , the United States and included information about Denmark, Greece and Luxemburg from a previous study (C(90)87).

  8. 8.

    The ‘non-deductibility’ of illicit payments meant that they were not considered as legitimate business expense, and their deductibility meant that governments were implicitly subsidizing illicit payments by making them tax free as business expenditure.

  9. 9.

    Namely, in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France , Luxemburg, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom such prohibition was underway (DAFFE/IME/PI(93)6).

  10. 10.

    In the Draft Report to CIME, ‘illicit payments’ were already substituted with ‘bribery’ and a more forceful language was employed. The Report highlighted, however, that consensus has not been reached in a number of areas despite the fact that the feasibility of cooperation among OECD members has been developed since July 1990 (DAFFE/IME/PI (93)11).

  11. 11.

    The definition of bribery was set in the draft as: ‘[such bribery can involve an intentional offer, promise, or giving of any undue pecuniary or other advantages to or for the benefit of a foreign public official (including members of a law-making body, candidates for a law-making body or public office and officials of political parties) whether or not solicited by the official, in violation of the official’s legal duties, whether directly or indirectly through an intermediary, in order to obtain or retain business]’ (DAFFE/IME/PI(93)10, 4). The bracketed text indicated that consensus had not yet been reached on the particular definition.

  12. 12.

    The controversies over the definition were settled temporary with a ‘working definition of bribery for practical purposes,’ but the controversy over the list of measures was not so easily dissuaded (DAFFE/IME/PI(93)11, 7).

  13. 13.

    Dahik himself had to leave Ecuador in 1995 on corruption charges, an incident that according to Galtung and Pope (1999) made TI realize that politicians should not be included in TI ’s higher management.

  14. 14.

    This is how the support of the President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, and the Vice President of Ecuador , Alberto Dahik, was secured (Vogl 2012).

  15. 15.

    When work advanced at the UN, coordination was necessary in 4 organizations and this was reflected in the Coordinated Position for the UN , adopted by the Council of the EU on February 28, 2001 (Szarek-Mason 2010).

  16. 16.

    The ‘re-discovery’ of the 1906 Prevention of Corruption Act and the repercussions of the ‘cash for questions’ controversy had a definitive impact on the UK position and the new government (formed in May 1997) wanted to take a strong stance against corruption (Alldridge 2012; Bean 2012).

  17. 17.

    As discussed in Chapter 4, Senate Resolution 265 of 1975 specified GATT as the institutional forum for negotiations, but representatives of the US executive did not concur with this strategy, as they judged it would have been highly unlikely to reach consensus at GATT.

  18. 18.

    The United States did raise the issue of transparency in procurement at the WTO , but after the adoption of the OECD Convention (International Trade Commission 1997).

  19. 19.

    As it was noted earlier, the RBIBT of 1994 which led to the resurgence of the negotiations at the OECD was paralleled by the recommendations of the 19th Conference of European Ministers of Justice in Valletta in 1994 that prepared the ground for the ‘Programme of Action against Corruption’ adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the CoE in November 1996. Resolution 1, adopted by the European Ministers of Justice at their 21st Conference in Prague in 1997, followed the adoption of the revised OECD Recommendation and urged for the implementation of the Program. In the EU , the Common Position 97/661/JHA from October 6, 1997, defined by the Council on negotiations in the CoE and the OECD relating to corruption, also established a formal link between the adoption of the RBIBT , the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the subsequent Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption adopted in 1999.

  20. 20.

    This line of work was carried out in accordance with the UN Crime Prevention Congresses and was discussed in Chapter 6.

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    Elitza Katzarova

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Katzarova, E. (2019). The OECD Convention and Beyond: State-Powered Coalition Building in a Broken World. In: The Social Construction of Global Corruption . Political Corruption and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98569-5_7

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