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Introduction

Chapter
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Part of the Critical Criminological Perspectives book series (CCRP)

Abstract

The aim of the first chapter is to introduce the reader to the main scope of the book; namely, a critical understanding of the reasons why occupational health and safety (OHS) crimes are under-criminalised in both Britain and Italy. The book uses Pearce (1976) Crimes of the Powerful as a theoretical framework to make sense of the under-criminalisation of these crimes. The chapter explains the rationale for comparing these two jurisdictions. It explores how basic political and legal principles, such as the separation of powers doctrine, due-process, crime-control, adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice system traditions, might affect the everyday practices of occupational health and safety enforcement institutions and officers and cause the under-criminalisation of OHS crimes.

Keywords

Enforcement Institutions Incidentsincidents discretionDiscretion Comparative analysisComparative Analysis Duty Holders 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Social SciencesUniversity of RoehamptonLondonUK

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