Abstract
EU–Russia energy geopolitical antagonism has been raging in South-Eastern Europe (Greece and Turkey) at least since Putin’s rise to power at the beginning of the current millennium and Moscow’s endeavours to re-establish itself in the new global order as a great power. To that end, Moscow has adhered to a strategy of both weakening regional players’ economic and defence ties with the West, that is, NATO and EU, and promoting some vital geo-economic and geopolitical aspirations. The fact that both countries are heavily dependent on Russia as energy provider but at the same time are also potential energy hubs and producers ascribes supreme importance to them in the EU–Russian antagonistic complex. The chapter, based on secondary and primary sources (interviews), is trying to shed light on the background of this multilayered and convoluted constellation of power.
The materialisation of this study was made possible thanks to the scholarship granted by the Azerbaijan Development Agency in the framework of which the author was Visiting Research Fellow at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA University) in July-September 2017. The author also would like to thank Professor Fariz Ismailzade for his precious help as well as all the persons who gave interview to the author. He is also indebted to the anonymous reader for his comments.
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Notes
- 1.
The 2006 energy dispute caused a temporary 30 per cent decline in gas flows to European Union states.
- 2.
European Union: Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC, September 2003.
- 3.
Norway is regarded as an indigenous (EU) producer, as its gas pipeline exports are seen as ‘must flow’ volumes.
- 4.
According the EU-official announcement the Third Energy Package covers five main areas: unbundling energy suppliers from network operators, strengthening the independence of regulators, establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), cross-border cooperation between transmission system operators and the creation of European Networks for Transmission System Operators, increased transparency in retail markets to benefit consumers.
- 5.
Interview with Alexander Sotnichenko, Former Russian Diplomat in Israel and currently Associate Professor at the Saint Petersburg State University, School of International Relations (Jerusalem July 2013) and Yuri Kvashnin (Head of Section of the EU Studies of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences).
- 6.
The Russian domestic energy industry is organized in two legal regimes. Unlike the oil-companies that should be private, gas companies (Gazprom) should be state-run companies for two reasons: first, in order to control gas prices on which so many people depend (Gazprom controls about 90% of the Russian market), and second, Gazprom’s activities are fully intertwined with Russia’s foreign policy. Interview with Alexander Sotnichenko, Former Russian diplomat in Israel and currently Associate Professor at the Saint Petersburg State University, School of International Relations, personal communication, Jerusalem, July 2013 and Yuri Kvashnin, Head of Section of the EU Studies of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow 4 September 2015.
- 7.
TANAP and TAP are different legal entities. TANAP ends in the territory of Turkey and TAP begins in the territory of Greece and ends in Italy. According a mutual agreement commercially the connecting point of TANAP-TAP is in the middle of Evros river.
- 8.
Interview with Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli, Vice President of the BP Azerbaijan (Baku, August 2017).
- 9.
Web-Portal of Ukrainian Government, “Ukraine to participate in tenders for construction of Nabucco gas pipeline, as alternative to Russian gas suppliers”, 18 January 2007: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=63077434.
- 10.
Interview with Canus Abushov, Russia-Expert and Professor at the ADA University (Baku, August 2017).
- 11.
Interview with Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli, Vice President of the BP Azerbaijan and Vitaliy Baylarbayov, Deputy Vice-president of SOCAR (Baku, August 2017).
- 12.
Gazprom has devised a strategy aimed at hindering Caspian and Central Asian gas export to Europe by routes other than through Russia. Gazprom has its own network of pipelines in Central Asian countries (the Central Asia Centre gas pipeline system), which allows it from time to time to import Central Asian gas and then re-export it further to Europe. Although the strategy itself is not as profitable as Gazprom producing the gas itself in Russia, due to its near-monopolistic position in a large part of the European gas market, Gazprom can make up for this loss by charging its European consumers higher prices than they would pay if they had direct access to Central Asian gas supplies (Cohen 2014: 9).
- 13.
PJSC LUKOIL has been operating in the Azerbaijani oil-and-gas industry since 1994, when the Company joined its first international development project for the Azeri-Chirag-Gyuneshli oil field, one of the largest in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea. LUKOIL was the first among Russian major business enterprises to start operations in Azerbaijan.
- 14.
- 15.
In 2007, Greece became the first EU-country to receive directly through a pipeline Azerbaijani gas. The Turkey–Greece pipeline is a 296 kilometres long pipeline connecting Turkish and Greek gas grids. The pipeline begins in Karacabey in Turkey and runs to Komotini in Greece. The length of Turkish section is 210 kilometres, of which 17 kilometres are under the Sea of Marmara. The length of Greek section is 86 kilometres. The diameter of pipeline is 36 inches (910 mm) and the capacity is 7 billion cubic meters (250 billion cubic feet) of natural gas per year.
- 16.
Interview with Vitaliy Baylarbayov, Deputy Vice-president of SOCAR (Baku, August 2017).
- 17.
Interview with Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli, Vice President of the BP Azerbaijan and an anonymous diplomat of the Azeri Foreign Ministry (Baku, August 2017).
- 18.
China, however, pays only a part of the gas it receives and it considers the rest as credit for the pipeline it is constructing in Turkmenistan. Iran also does not provide any cash but only some chemical products in return.
- 19.
Interview with Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli Vice President of the BP Azerbaijan and Vitaliy Baylarbayov, Deputy Vice-president of SOCAR (Baku August 2017).
- 20.
Interview with international diplomat involved in the development accredited to Greece, (Athens, May 2017) and diplomatic source of the Greek Foreign Ministry (Athens, July 2017).
- 21.
The development of the Absheron field, however, is currently expected to extract 1.5 billion cubic meters of gas a year, which will fully flow to the domestic market of Azerbaijan (Camal 2017).
- 22.
Interview with Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli Vice President of the BP Azerbaijan (Baku, August 2017).
- 23.
Former US President Obama’s final foreign trip to Greece in November 2016 apparently served to demonstrate, somewhat belatedly, American engagement in Greece in the face of Russian meddling in the region. Jason Horowitz and Liz Aldermanaug, ‘‘Chastised by E.U., a Resentful Greece Embraces China’s Cash and Interests’’, New York Times 26 August, 2017. Retrieved 27 August 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/europe/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-tsipras.html.
- 24.
The Vertical Corridor concept is not a single pipeline project but a gas system consisted of national grids, underground gas storage facilities, interconnectors (Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector), LNG terminals that will connect existing national gas grids and other gas infrastructure in order to secure easy gas transiting from South to North.
- 25.
Vitaliy Baylarbayov, Deputy Vice-president of SOCAR (Baku August 2017).
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Interviews
Alexander Sotnichenko. Former Russian Diplomat in Israel and currently Associate Professor at the Saint Petersburg State University, School of International Relations (Jerusalem, July 2013).
Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli, Vice President of the BP Azerbaijan (Baku August 2017).
Diplomatic Source of the Azeri Foreign Ministry (Baku August 2017).
Diplomatic Source of the Greek Foreign Ministry (Athens, July 2017).
International diplomat accredited to Greece (Athens, May 2017).
Kavus Abushov, Professor at the ADA University: Russia-Expert (Baku August 2017).
Vitaliy Baylarbayov, Deputy Vice-president of SOCAR (Baku August 2017).
Yuri Kvashnin (Head of Section of the EU Studies of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) (Moscow, September 2015).
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Stergiou, A. (2018). EU–Russia Antagonism in South-Eastern Europe: The Energy Factor. In: Vliamos, S., Zouboulakis, M. (eds) Institutionalist Perspectives on Development. Palgrave Studies in Democracy, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship for Growth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98494-0_12
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