Abstract
Assuming that the target of theory oriented empirical science in general and of nomic truth approximation in particular is to characterize the boundary or demarcation between nomic possibilities and nomic impossibilities, I have presented in Chap. 4 (“Models, postulates, and generalized nomic truth approximation”) the ‘basic’ version of generalized nomic truth approximation, starting from ‘two-sided’ theories. Its main claim is that nomic truth approximation can perfectly be achieved by combining two prima facie opposing views on theories: (1) the traditional (Popperian) view: theories are (sets of models of) postulates that exclude certain possibilities from being realizable, enabling explanation and prediction and (2) the model view: theories are sets of models that claim to (approximately) represent certain realizable possibilities. Nomic truth approximation, i.e., increasing truth-content and decreasing falsity-content, becomes in this way revising theories by revising their models and/or their postulates in the face of increasing evidence.
The basic version of generalized nomic truth approximation is in many respects as simple as possible. Among other things, it is qualitative in the sense that it is purely based on set-theoretic relations. The present chapter presents the straightforward quantitative concretization of it. According to the ‘expected success theorem’, based on some probabilistic experimental conditions, greater truthlikeness, or verisimilitude, leads to greater expected empirical success. This enables tentative nomic truth approximation conclusions by abductive reasoning.
Adapted version appeared as: “Quantitative nomic truth approximation by revising models and postulates , European Studies in Philosophy of Science, EPSA15 Selected papers, Eds. M. Massimi, J.W. Romeijn & G. Schurz, Dordrecht, Springer 2017, pp. 309–320. Acknowledgement: I like to thank an anonymous referee for some requests for clarification.
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Notes
- 1.
The term ‘combined’ will always refer to some combination of sidewise notions and ‘separated clauses’ of the same kind, not necessarily as a strict conjunction. Separated clauses deal with truth- and falsity-content , respectively, and with accepted- and rejected-content, respectively. The term ‘united’ will refer to the union of such separated clauses and clause-wise notions of both relevant kinds.
- 2.
A∆B = def (A−B)∪(B−A).
- 3.
‘p1vp2’ is short for (p1vp2)&¬(p1&p2), so-called exclusive ‘or’.
- 4.
Note that superscript ‘s’ refers to a success condition, not to sidewise!
- 5.
Note that the proof of the claim (Sect. 5.2.2) that a theory which is closer to the truth than another in the basic sense will become more successful in the long run is a very special case of the present proof.
- 6.
To be sure, by making the weights (strictly) dependent on m(T) and m(cT), it becomes impossible to calculate the increase of verisimilitude of a revised theory (see below) in the standard situation in which we don’t know T.
References
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Kuipers, T.A.F. (2019). Quantitative Nomic Truth Approximation. In: Nomic Truth Approximation Revisited. Synthese Library, vol 399. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98388-2_5
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