Skip to main content

Empirical Progress and Nomic Truth Approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method’

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Nomic Truth Approximation Revisited

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 399))

  • 175 Accesses

Abstract

Three related intuitions are explicated in this chapter. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three cases, the guiding idea is to explicate these intuitions by explicating the crucial notions as appropriate ‘concretizations’ of their basic or deductive analogues, being ‘idealizations’.

It turns out that the comparative version of the proposed HP-method amounts to a sophisticated likelihood ratio success (SLRS-) method applied to the cumulated evidence. This method turns out to be not only functional for probabilistic empirical progress but also for probabilistic truth approximation. The latter is based on a probabilistic threshold theorem constituting for this reason the analogue of the deductive success theorem.

This chapter is in fact a supplement to Chap. 5. Despite some terminological deviation, there is substantial partial overlap to enable independent reading.

Strongly revised version of: “Empirical progress and Truth Approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method’”, Erkenntnis, 70.3, 2009, 313–330. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank for all the comments I got before and after writing in 2005 the preliminary paper (2007a) when presenting the ideas in Bielefeld (2003), Rotterdam (2004), Konstanz (2004), Trieste (2007), Amsterdam (2007), Leusden (2007) and in the PCCP research group in Groningen (2004, 2007). In particular I want to thank Igor Douven , Dale Jacquette , Jacek Malinowski , Elliott Sober , Ilkka Niiniluoto , Jan-Willem Romeijn , Jeanne Peijnenburg , and David Atkinson . I also like to thank the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Research (NIAS) in Wassenaar for the opportunity to spend in 2005 and 2007 two weeks on this and another paper. Finally, I like to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive questions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For both versions it is interesting for various formal reasons to study the set of Pr-consequences of a statement: PCn(A) = def {B/p(B/A) ≥ p(B)}, {B/p(B/A) ≥ p(¬B/A)}, respectively. In our HP-paper we have made a start.

  2. 2.

    See (Kuipers 2001, 7.1.2) for an analysis of probabilistic (dis-)confirmation.

  3. 3.

    Surprisingly enough, this explication also generates as a side product probabilistic explications of explanation and prediction, also presented in the HP-paper.

  4. 4.

    Note also that the truth-content of P captures the rightly excluded possibilities and the falsity-content the wrongly excluded possibilities. See further Chap. 4.

  5. 5.

    A ‘strongly-false’ consequence is not just not a consequence of T, but even a consequence of cT. For the consequence and the mixed versions see further (Kuipers 2000, Section 8.1). It should be noted that the versions given there assume maximal theories.

  6. 6.

    In Sect. 5.2.3 a more general, two-sided, version of the theorem is presented. The exemplary proof given there deals with the M-side version of the clause dealing with R. Here we only deal with the P-side, and choose for the clause dealing with S. The proof for the clause dealing with R is essentially similar to the indicated proof in Sect. 5.2.3.

References

  • Forster, M. (2006). Counterexamples to a likelihood theory of evidence. Minds and Machines, 16(3), 319–338.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2000). From instrumentalism to constructive realism. On some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation, Synthese Library 287. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2001). Structures in science. Heuristic patterns based on cognitive structures. An advanced textbook in neo-classical philosophy of science, Synthese Library 301. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2004). Inference to the best theory, rather than inference to the best explanation. Kinds of abduction and induction. In F. Stadler (Ed.), Induction and deduction in the sciences. Proceedings of the ESF-workshop induction and deduction in the sciences, Vienna, July, 2002 (pp. 25–51). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2006). Inductive aspects of confirmation, information, and content. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (Eds.), The philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, The Library of Living Philosophers (pp. 855–883). Chicago/La Salle: Open Courts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2007a). The hypothetico-probabilistic (HP-) method as a concretization of the HD-method. In M. Sintonen, S. Pihlström, & P. Raatikainen (Eds.), Festschrift in honor of Ilkka Niiniluoto (pp. 179–307). London: King’s College.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2007b). Introduction. Explication in philosophy of science. In T. Kuipers (Ed.), General philosophy of science: Focal issues. Handbook of the philosophy of science (Vol. 1, pp. vii–xxiii). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2007c). Empirical and conceptual idealization and concretization. The case of truth approximation. In J. Brzezinski et al. (Eds.), The courage of doing philosophy. Essays presented to Leszek Nowak (pp. 75–101). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2007d). Laws, theories and research programmes. In T. Kuipers (Ed.), General philosophy of science: Focal issues. Handbook of the philosophy of science (Vol. 1, pp. 1–95). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2009). Empirical progress and truth approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method. Erkenntnis, 70, 313–330.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Truthlikeness, Synthese Library 185. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I., & Tuomela, R. (1973). Theoretical concepts and hypothetico-inductive inference, Synthese Library (Vol. 53). Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Kuipers, T.A.F. (2019). Empirical Progress and Nomic Truth Approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method’. In: Nomic Truth Approximation Revisited. Synthese Library, vol 399. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98388-2_13

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics