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Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 15))

Abstract

The drafters of the CETA expropriation provision seem to have learnt lessons from the past. Expropriation in investment law has indeed been a controversial provision, accused of creating a regulatory chill for host States. Article 8.12 then includes many precisions on aspects that were not well-settled in case law. Even it is a classical expropriation clause in some respect, it also introduces several innovations, such as: a precise list of the criteria that should be taken into account by adjudicators to identify an indirect expropriation; an implicit reference to the proportionality test; several precise rules about compensation. It also prevents conflicts of norms with intellectual property (IP) rules by excluding some IP State measures from the field of expropriation. On the whole, it can be said that this provision shows a great deference vis-à-vis States’ right to regulate and should not render possible any international responsibility of the Parties on the ground of expropriation for legitimate regulation measures. It then participates to a general evolution of international investment law towards a better consideration for States legitimate interests.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Wortley (1959); see also Friedmann and Pughs (1959).

  2. 2.

    Weston (1983), pp. 89–148.

  3. 3.

    White (1961), p. 32 et seq.

  4. 4.

    OECD (2004), p. 6. Among the approximately 3.000 BITs that are in force at this moment, only a small minority does not include any expropriation provision.

  5. 5.

    See Art. 1110 NAFTA, for instance.

  6. 6.

    On the slight differences between indirect, de facto and creeping expropriation, see de Nanteuil (2014), pp. 9–13.

  7. 7.

    Stern (2008), pp. 29–51, p. 32.

  8. 8.

    Dolzer (2002).

  9. 9.

    AAPL v. Sri Lanka, 27 June 1990, ICSID Rep. 4:246.

  10. 10.

    Metalclad Corp v. Mexico, ICSID Award, No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 30 August 2000, ICSID Rep. 5:212, para.103 et seq.

  11. 11.

    See Dolzer (2002), pp. 79–80.

  12. 12.

    On the ‘police power’ doctrine, see for example Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), p. 109. This doctrine has been applied in cases related to indirect expropriation, such as Chemtura corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, 2 August 2010, para. 266; or EDF (Services) Ltd v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13, 8 October 2009, para. 308. See also infra, Sect. 5.

  13. 13.

    UNCTAD (2015), p. 82.

  14. 14.

    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, signed 30 October 2016, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ L 11, 14 January 2017, pp. 23–1079.

  15. 15.

    Schill (2009), p. 84.

  16. 16.

    For example Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Hungary, ICSID case No. ARB/04/15, 13 September 2006, ICSID Review – F.I.L.J. 21:603, para, 63; Middle East Cement Shipping and Handdling Co. S.A. v. Egypt, ICSID case No. ARB/99/6, 12 April 2002, ICSID Review – F.I.L.J., 18:602, para. 107.

  17. 17.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), p. 92.

  18. 18.

    See the 1961 Harvard draft Convention on the international responsibility of States for injuries to Aliens, Art. 10, in Sohn and Baxter (1961), p. 545; See also the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Draft convention on the protection of foreign property, ILM 1968(I), 7:117. See also de Nanteuil (2014), p. 136.

  19. 19.

    Vigotop Limited v. Hungary, ICSID case No. ARB/11/12, 1 October 2014, para. 275.

  20. 20.

    Philip Morris Brands SARL, Philip Morris Products SA v. Uruguay, ICSID case No. ARB/10/7, 8 July 2016, para. 300; Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Venezuela, ICSID case No. ARB/12/13, 30 December 2016, para. 489.

  21. 21.

    Azurix corp. v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/01/12, 14 July 2006, ICSID Rep. 14:374, para. 309.

  22. 22.

    Fortier and Drymer (2004).

  23. 23.

    For example CMS gas transmission v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, ICSID Rep. 14:158, para. 262; Gami investments, inc. v. Mexico, 5 November 2004, ICSID Rep. 13:147, para. 126. The requirement of a substantial deprivation seems to be firmly rooted in international law, see Christie (1962), p. 309.

  24. 24.

    Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Jahangir Mohtadi and Jila Mohtadi v. Iran, 3rd Chamber No. 71, 2 December 1996, Iran-U.S.C.T. Reports vol. 32, p. 124, para. 103.

  25. 25.

    Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 26 June 2000, ICSID Rep. 7: 69, para. 100.

  26. 26.

    Revere Copper and Brass v. OPIC, 24 August 1978, ILR 56:258, p. 291.

  27. 27.

    Pope & Talbot (n. 25), para. 100. In this case, however, it the absence of such consequences led the tribunal to reject the expropriation claim.

  28. 28.

    See Kriebaum (2007).

  29. 29.

    See for instance Link Trading Joint Stock Company v. Moldova, 18 April 2002, para. 91; Waste management, inc. v. Mexico, ICSID case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 30 April 2004, ILM 43:967, para. 160 et seq.; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, ILM 44:1205, para. 263; PSEG Global inc. et al. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID case No. ARB/02/5, 19 January 2007, para. 279. See also de Nanteuil (2014), p. 406.

  30. 30.

    SD Myers inc v. Canada, UNCITRAL, 13 November 2000, para. 283.

  31. 31.

    Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, 8 June 2009, para. 356.

  32. 32.

    See LG&E Energy corp. LG&E Capital corp. LG&E International inc. v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006, ICSID Review – FILJ 21:155, para. 193; Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle ingredients America, inc. v. Mexico, ICSID case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, 21 November 2007, para. 243.

  33. 33.

    Fireman’s fund insurance company v. Mexico, ICSID case No. ARB(AF)/02/01, 17 July 2006, para. 176. See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010, para. 134.

  34. 34.

    Plama consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID case No. ARB/03/24, 27 August 2008, para. 193.

  35. 35.

    See: R.S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, 3 September 2001, ICSID Rep. 9:66, para. 200: “expropriation means the coercive appropriation by the State of private property, usually by means of individual administrative measures”.

  36. 36.

    The Algiers Declarations and related instruments, which are together designated as the ‘Algiers Agreements’ are reproduced in ILM (1981) 20. See pp. 230–231.

  37. 37.

    On legitimate expectations in general, see for example Dupuy and Dupuy (2015).

  38. 38.

    Orrego Vicuña (2003).

  39. 39.

    US Department of State, 2012 Model US Bilateral Investment Treaty https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf, Annex B.

  40. 40.

    See for example Shenkman (2002).

  41. 41.

    Penn Central Transp. Co. V. City of New York, 26 June 1978, 438 U.S. 104, p. 124.

  42. 42.

    Eureko v. Poland, 19 August 2005, para. 242; Tecnicas medioambiantales tecmed S.A. (Tecmed) v. Mexico, ICSID case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003, ICSID Review – FILJ 19:158, para. 122.

  43. 43.

    Dupuy and Dupuy (2015), p. 274.

  44. 44.

    See Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/03/9, 5 September 2008, para. 261.

  45. 45.

    El Paso Energy international company v. Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/03/15, 31 October 2011, para. 394.

  46. 46.

    International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, 26 January 2006, para. 147.

  47. 47.

    See Azurix corp. v. Argentina (n. 21), para. 318.

  48. 48.

    Compaña del dessarollo de Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, 17 February 2000, ICSID Rep. 5:172, para. 76. See also Schreuer (2005) and Aldrich (1994).

  49. 49.

    These criteria relate, first of all, to the neutralization of benefits to an extent that the investment would become meaningless and, secondly, to the character of the State action since the measure could be plainly justified, see infra, Sect. 3.4.

  50. 50.

    See Hochtief AG v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/07/31, 19 December 2016, paras. 21–22.

  51. 51.

    That was the case of Goetz v. Burundi, ICSID case No. ARB/95/3, 10 February 1999, ICSID Rep. 6:5, para. 124.

  52. 52.

    See National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentina, 3 November 2008, para. 147. See also Sacerdoti (1997), p. 383.

  53. 53.

    See Crawford (2002), pt 10 of the commentary of Article 2.

  54. 54.

    See Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID case No. ARB/05/7, 30 June 2009, para. 134. See also Introduction.

  55. 55.

    See Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID case No ARB/07/16, 8 November 2010, paras. 409–410; Gemplus S.A. and Talsud S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID cases No ARB(AF)/04/3 and ARB(AF)/04/4, 16 June 2010, paras. 8–23.

  56. 56.

    See Adel a Hamadi Al-Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID case No. ARB/11/33, 3 November 2015, para. 439.

  57. 57.

    Compaña del dessarollo de Santa Elena v. Costa Rica (n. 48), para. 72.

  58. 58.

    Marion and Reinhard Unglaube v. Costa Rica, ICSID case No. ARB/08/1 and ARB/09/20, 16 May 2012, para. 217.

  59. 59.

    As it would be the case in “creeping” expropriations, see Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, ICSID case No. ARB/05/16, 29 July 2008, para. 684.

  60. 60.

    Azurix corp. v. Argentina (n. 21), para. 310.

  61. 61.

    PCIJ, Oscar Chinn, Series A/B No 63, ind. Op. Anzilotti, p. 112. See also Pope & Talbot v. Canada (n. 25), para. 99.

  62. 62.

    On the relevance of the proportionality test developed by the ECHR for indirect expropriation claims, see Wälde and Kolo (2000), p. 10 et seq.; Sampliner (2003), p. 15 et seq.

  63. 63.

    See European Court of Human Rights, Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 19 December 1989, 48, p. 24; Pressos Compañía Naviera and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, 38, p. 19.

  64. 64.

    Coe and Rubins (2005), pp. 664–665.

  65. 65.

    Tecmed v. Mexico (n. 42), para. 122.

  66. 66.

    LG&E Energy corp. v. Argentina (n. 32), para.195.

  67. 67.

    Getma International, NCT Necotrans, Getma International Investments, NCT Infrastructure & Logistique v. Guinea, ICSID case No. ARB/11/29, 6 August 2016, para. 386.

  68. 68.

    See Sect. 5.

  69. 69.

    See Sect. 2.

  70. 70.

    The text of the letter sent by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the Mexican Ambassador on 22 august 1938 in which he used the formulae is reproduced in “Mexico-United States: Expropriation by Mexico of Agrarian Properties Owned by American Citizens”, AJIL 32, Spec. Supp. p. 181 (1938).

  71. 71.

    Jiménez de Aréchaga (1978), p. 184; Reinisch (2008), p. 194 et seq.; Schachter (1984).

  72. 72.

    UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962; UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.

  73. 73.

    See Juillard (1994), p. 86 et seq.

  74. 74.

    Antoine Biloune v. Ghana, 27 October 1989, Intl L Rep. 95:184, pp. 210–211.

  75. 75.

    CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 14 March 2003, ICSID Rep. 9:412, para. 497.

  76. 76.

    UNCTAD (2012), p. 40.

  77. 77.

    The repetition of a same treaty provision can indeed be considered as the sign of an emerging customary rule, see ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, 20 February 1969, ICJ Rep. p. 3, para. 71.

  78. 78.

    See for example Argentina’s argument against the application of the “Hull formula” in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/02/8, 6 February 2007, ICSID Rep. 14:518, para. 331 et seq.

  79. 79.

    Crystallex International Corporation v. Venezuela, ICSID case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, 4 April 2016, para. 853; Murphy Exploration & Production Company – International v. Equateur, ICSID case No. ARB/08/4, 6 May 2016, para. 482.

  80. 80.

    See Adem Dogan v. Turkmenistan, ICSID case No. ARB/09/9, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on annulment, 15 January 2016, para. 164.

  81. 81.

    Permanent Court of International Justice Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 13 September 1928, No 13, Series A No 17, p. 47.

  82. 82.

    This has been admitted even by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the famous Chorzów case, ibid. p. 47. In this case, the Court considered that applying to an unlawful expropriation the standard of compensation that had been stated for an lawful one “would not only be unjust, but also and above al1 incompatible with the aim of Article 6 and following articles of the Convention – that is to say, the prohibition, in principle, of the liquidation of the property, rights and interests of German nationals and of companies controlled by German nationals in Upper Silesia – since it would be tantamount to rendering lawful liquidation and unlawful dispossession indistinguishable in so far as their financial results are concerned”.

  83. 83.

    See for example Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/97/3, 20 August 2007, para. 8.2.5; Bernardus Funekotter et al. v. Zimbabwe, ICSID case No. ARB/05/6, 22 April 2009, ILM 48(4):764, paras. 110–111; ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V., ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. and ConocoPhillips company v. Venezuela, ICSID case No. ARB/07/30, 3 September 2013, para. 342. This principle has also been admitted by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, see Amoco international finance corporation v. Iran, 14 July 1987, Iran-USCTR 15:189, para. 191 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Tenaris SA et Talta – Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda. v. Venezuela, ICSID case No. ARB/12/23, 12 November 2016, para. 397.

  85. 85.

    See e.g., Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Egypt, ICSID case No. ARB/99/6, 12 April 2002, ICSID Rep. 7:178, para. 107; British Caribbean Bank Limited (Turks & Caicos) v. Belize, PCA case No. 2010–2018, 19 December 2014, para. 260 et seq; Antoine Abou Lahoud and Leila Bounafeh-Abou Lahoud v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID case No. ARB/10/4, 7 February 2014, para. 555 et seq.

  86. 86.

    Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Investment SRL, Tidewater Caribe, CA, et al. v. Venezuela, ICSID case No. ARB/10/5, 13 March 2015, para.138.

  87. 87.

    Ibid. See also ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V., ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. and ConocoPhillips company v. Venezuela, (n. 83), para. 342.

  88. 88.

    World Bank Guidelines on Foreign Investment, Art. IV, 5°.

  89. 89.

    For example Guaracachi America, Inc. et Rurelec PLC v. Bolivia, PCA case No. 2011–2017, 31 January 2014, para. 451 et seq. While using the DCF method, the Tribunal also applies the “willing-buyer standard” when calculating future profits.

  90. 90.

    In that sense, the DCF method, which is the one most frequently applied by arbitral tribunals, should be given priority in the context of the CETA, see Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) v. Tanzania, ICSID case No. ARB/05/22, 24 July 2008, para. 793.

  91. 91.

    See for example the Indonesian Model BIT (UNCTAD, Compendium 5:292), the Jamaican model BIT (UNCTAD, Compendium 5:300) or the Malaysian model BIT (UNCTAD, Compendium 5:309).

  92. 92.

    Conoco Philipps v. Venezuela (n. 83), para. 342. See also ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Hungary ICSID case No. ARB/03/16, 2 October 2006, para. 497.

  93. 93.

    ADC v. Hungary, ibid., para. 497.

  94. 94.

    On this matter, see Lauterpacht and Nevill (2010), pp. 613–622. Inclusion of interests is also stated by Art. 38 of the ILC Articles on State responsibility.

  95. 95.

    Continental casualty company v. Argentina (n. 44), para 310.

  96. 96.

    Lauterpacht and Nevill (2010), p. 620.

  97. 97.

    Lundin Tunisia BV v. Tunisia, ICSID case No. ARB/12/30, 22 December 2015, para. 386.

  98. 98.

    Hrvatska Elektroprivreda DD v. Slovenia, ICSID case No. ARB/05/24, 17 December 2015, para. 553.

  99. 99.

    For example Flemingo Dutyfree Shop Private Ltd v. Poland, 12 August 2016, para. 941.

  100. 100.

    See Reinisch (2017).

  101. 101.

    The police power doctrine seems to be as old as the international law rules on expropriation themselves, see Fisher Williams (1928). See also Introduction and Sect. 3.5.

  102. 102.

    More specifically, the wording of the ‘police power’ exception in Annex 8-A 3° is similar to the one used in the Model BIT of the United States of 2004 and 2012.

  103. 103.

    Moving further than international investment law and the specific issue of expropriation, a significant number of scholars admit the existence of a ‘police power’ exception in general international law. For an example, see Brownlie (1995), p. 146.

  104. 104.

    Philipp Morris v. Uruguay (n. 20), para. 300.

  105. 105.

    On the principle of non-discrimination in general, see Lowe (2016); see also Reinisch (2016), pp. 389–397.

  106. 106.

    See Azurix v. Argentina (n. 21), para. 311.

  107. 107.

    See Compaña del dessarollo de Santa Elena v. Costa Rica (n. 48).

  108. 108.

    See Methanex corporation v. United States, 3 August 2005, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 15.

  109. 109.

    Philipp Morris v. Uruguay, (n. 20), para. 307.

  110. 110.

    Methanex v. United States, (n. 108).

  111. 111.

    Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 17 March 2006, paras. 271–272.

  112. 112.

    EDF (Services) Ltd v. Romania, (n. 12), para. 308.

  113. 113.

    See Orrego Vicuña (2003).

  114. 114.

    On the two conceptions of the ‘police power’ exception, see Newcombe (2005), p. 26. See also Stern (2008), pp. 45–47.

  115. 115.

    Emphasis added.

  116. 116.

    See Sect. 3.5.

  117. 117.

    Coe and Rubins (2005), pp. 664–665. See also Pellet (2016), p. 458 et seq.

  118. 118.

    In addition to the Philipp Morris v. Uruguay (n. 19), claims grounded on IP law include Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia, PCA case No. 2012-12; Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada, ICSID case No. UNCT/14/2; Erbil Serter v. France, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/22.

  119. 119.

    Gibson (2010).

  120. 120.

    Correa (2004), pp. 348–351.

  121. 121.

    See, Sect. 5.1.

  122. 122.

    Muchlinski (2007), p. 429.

  123. 123.

    On performance requirement, see Legum and Petculescu (2016).

  124. 124.

    Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID case No. ARB/07/19, 30 November 2012, para. 4.130.

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de Nanteuil, A. (2019). Expropriation. In: Mbengue, M.M., Schacherer, S. (eds) Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98361-5_6

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