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National Treatment

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Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)

Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 15))

Abstract

The National Treatment (NT) obligation, a key standard of protection in international trade and investment law, requires that the contracting parties to investment agreements provide to foreign investors and their investments treatment no less favourable than that accorded to their own investors and investments. This obligation not to discriminate on the basis of nationality is provided in the vast majority of international investment agreements and the CETA is no exception. The CETA’s NT provision, found in Article 8.6 of the Investment Chapter, does not differ significantly from NT provisions in other international investment agreements. Thus, the interpretation and application of the standard under the CETA will likely still entail a three-step analysis to identify whether the investor is in “like circumstances” with respect to domestic investors, whether it suffered nationality-based discriminatory treatment, and whether the discriminatory treatment was justified. However, the CETA’s NT provision nevertheless presents some specific characteristics. The CETA contains numerous exception clauses, both general and specific, which is consistent with a more general trend in recently concluded investment and trade agreements. Second, because the CETA imposes slightly different obligations on sub-federal (and sub-national) government units, the way that its obligations will be interpreted when an EU Member State is implementing an EU regulation or directive raises some interesting interpretive questions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    UNCTAD (1999), pp. 15–24.

  2. 2.

    Reinisch (2015), pp. 846–869; Baetens (2010), pp. 279–315; Bjorklund (2008), pp. 29–58; Bjorklund (2010), pp. 411–444; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (2008), pp. 48–89; Grierson-Weiler and Laird (2008), pp. 259–304; Heiskanen (2008), pp. 87–110; Howse and Chalamish (2010), pp. 1087–1094; Kinnear et al. (2009), pp. 1102-1–1102-61; Kurtz (2007), pp. 311–352; Kurtz (2010), pp. 243–278; Kurtz (2009), pp. 749–771; McLachlan et al. (2017), pp. 336–343; Newcombe and Paradell (2009), pp. 147–191; Ortino (2009), pp. 344–366; Sabahi (2008), pp. 269–297; Tabet (2007), pp. 353–390; Tabet (2008), pp. 299–313; UNCTAD (1999); Wallace and Bailey (1998), pp. 615–630; Weiler (2005a), pp. 903–921; Weiler (2005b), pp. 557–595.

  3. 3.

    See e.g. Kurtz (2007), p. 330.

  4. 4.

    See e.g. Bjorklund (2010), p. 411; Newcombe and Paradell (2009), p. 148; UNCTAD (1999), p. 7.

  5. 5.

    Grierson-Weiler and Laird (2008), p. 261.

  6. 6.

    See UNCTAD (1999), pp. 7–8 and VerLoren van Themaat (1981), pp. 19–21.

  7. 7.

    See Bjorklund (2010), p. 413 and Schwarzenberger (1966), p. 67. National treatment clauses have not only been included in agreements regulating international trade but also in intellectual property conventions even outside the aegis of the WTO. See e.g. Art. 2 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883, 828 UNTS 306) and Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886, 828 UNTS 222).

  8. 8.

    See Montt (2009). See also Bjorklund (2010), pp. 413–414 and Reinisch (2015), pp. 848–849.

  9. 9.

    See e.g. Art. 4(4) of the USA-Belgium Friendship, Establishment and Navigation Treaty of 1961; Art. V of the US-Costa Rica Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty of 1851; Art. V(1) of the US-Denmark Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty of 1951 and Art. 2 of the US-United Kingdom Friendship and Commerce Treaty of 1815. See also UNCTAD (1999), p. 8.

  10. 10.

    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, signed 30 October 2016, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ L 11, 14 January 2017, pp. 23–1079.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, November 21, 2007 [hereinafter ADM Award], para. 193; Pope & Talbot Inc. v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, April 10, 2001 [hereinafter Pope & Talbot Award], para. 43; ADF Group Inc. v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, January 9, 2003 [hereinafter ADF Award], para. 157; Alpha Projektholding GMBH v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, November 8, 2010 [hereinafter Alpha Award], para. 426; Marvin Feldman v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, December 16, 2002 [hereinafter Feldman Award], paras. 173–183; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, August 27, 2009 [hereinafter Bayindir Award], para. 390.

  12. 12.

    See e.g. Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed November 14, 1991, entered into force October 20, 1994, Art. II(2)(b); Treaty with the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed October 22, 1991, entered into force December 19, 1992, Art. II(2)(b); Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed May 28, 1992, entered into force January 15, 1994, Art. II(2)(b).

  13. 13.

    See Bjorklund (2005).

  14. 14.

    Bjorklund (2010), pp. 434–436.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., p. 418.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., p. 419.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., p. 419. See also Newcombe and Paradell (2009), p. 162 and McLachlan et al. (2017), pp. 342–343.

  18. 18.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 419. See also Dean Cass’s dissent in UPS (United Parcel Service of America Inc. v Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass, May 24, 2007, paras. 49–50 and the discussion in Sect. 3infra.

  19. 19.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 419.

  20. 20.

    For instance, in UPS, the Majority rejected the Claimant’s NT claim on the basis of the distinction between postal imports and courier imports and on the different characteristics of each that warranted different customs treatment (United Parcel Service of America Inc. v Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, May 24, 2007, para. 99). See also GAMI Investments Inc. v The Government of the United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, November 15, 2004 [hereinafter GAMI Final Award], para. 114.

  21. 21.

    However, in Loewen, the Tribunal dismissed an arguably de jure case when it found no appropriate comparator (The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, June 26, 2003, para. 140). This might have been the way the claim was framed. The Loewen Claimants argued that they were treated deficiently because of their Canadian nationality; there was no law discriminatory on its face and no inherently negative connotation to the characterization of the Claimants as “Canadian” by counsel in the case, though the repetition of the description was alleged to perpetuate an atmosphere of “outsiders” who were trying to take advantage of “locals”. The Tribunal thus treated the claim as one of a de facto NT violation that could not be sustained for lack of a domestic comparator that had received more favourable treatment.

  22. 22.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 420.

  23. 23.

    See e.g. S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, November 13, 2000 [hereinafter S.D. Myers Partial Award], paras. 172, 244 and 252–255 and ADF Award (n. 11), paras. 150 et seq. See also Bjorklund (2010), pp. 420–421.

  24. 24.

    See e.g. Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, July 1, 2004 [hereinafter Occidental Final Award], para. 170; Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v Latvia, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, December 16, 2004, para. 34; Consortium RFCC v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award, December 22, 2013 [hereinafter Consortium Award], para. 53.

  25. 25.

    The appropriate comparison in the context of a NT claim will often be between like-circumstanced treatment rather than between like-circumstanced investments or investors. See Bjorklund (2010), p. 422.

  26. 26.

    See Pope & Talbot Award (n. 11), para. 75 and S.D. Myers Partial Award (n. 23), para. 244.

  27. 27.

    S.D. Myers Partial Award (n. 23), para. 251.

  28. 28.

    Pope & Talbot Award (n. 11), para. 78.

  29. 29.

    See e.g. ADM Award (n. 11), paras. 198 and 201.

  30. 30.

    Champion Trading Company Ameritrade International Inc. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award, October 27, 2006.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., para. 154.

  32. 32.

    Occidental Final Award (n. 24).

  33. 33.

    Ibid., paras. 173 and 177. On this case, see generally Franck (2005a).

  34. 34.

    Methanex Corporation v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, August 3, 2005 [hereinafter Methanex Final Award], Part IV, Ch. B, para. 17.

  35. 35.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 429.

  36. 36.

    See Bjorklund (2010), pp. 436–438; Bjorklund (2008), pp. 48–66; McLachlan et al. (2017), pp. 341–342; Dugan et al. (2008), pp. 408–411.

  37. 37.

    See e.g. Methanex Final Award (n. 34), Part IV, Ch. B, paras. 19–21; ADF Award (n.11), paras. 155–156; AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü KFT v The republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, September 23, 2010, paras. 10.3.47, 10.3.50 and 10.3.53.

  38. 38.

    See Sabahi (2008), pp. 269–297; Dugan et al. (2008), pp. 411–413; Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), pp. 183–184. See Tabet (2008), pp. 299–313.

  39. 39.

    Reinisch (2015), p. 861.

  40. 40.

    Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, September 11, 2007 [hereinafter Parkerings-Compagniet Award], para. 368.

  41. 41.

    See e.g. Siemens A.G. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/08, Award, February 6, 2007, para. 321; S.D. Myers Partial Award (n. 23), para. 254; Consortium Award (n. 24), para. 74; Occidental Final Award (n. 24), para. 177; Alpha Award (n. 11), para. 427; International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Arbitral Award, January 26, 2006, para. 177.

  42. 42.

    Feldman Award (n. 11), para. 183. See also Bayindir Award (n. 11), para. 390.

  43. 43.

    Feldman Award (n. 11), para. 181.

  44. 44.

    See e.g. Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, June 25, 2001, paras. 368–369 and Methanex Final Award (n. 34), Part IV, Ch. B, para. 12.

  45. 45.

    LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, October 3, 2006, para. 146 [footnote omitted, emphasis added].

  46. 46.

    Ibid., para. 267(b). See also para. 147.

  47. 47.

    Kinnear et al. (2009), pp. 1102-40c et seq.

  48. 48.

    S.D. Myers Partial Award (n. 23), para. 254.

  49. 49.

    See e.g. Pope & Talbot Award (n. 11), para. 78 and S.D. Myers Partial Award (n. 23), para. 250.

  50. 50.

    Parkerings-Compagniet Award (n. 40), para. 363. The claimant also alleged a breach of FET due to discriminatory treatment (paras. 281–291). The Tribunal did not analyse this claim in the context of the FET argument but rather referred to its analysis of the claimant’s MFN argument (para. 291).

  51. 51.

    Ibid., para. 368.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., para. 385.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., para. 392.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., para. 396. See also Kläger (2011), pp. 257–258.

  55. 55.

    Ortino (2009), p. 360.

  56. 56.

    See e.g. S.D. Myers Partial Award (n. 23), para. 250 and Pope & Talbot Award (n. 11), para. 78. See also Bjorklund (2008), p. 41.

  57. 57.

    S.D. Myers Partial Award (n. 23), para. 250.

  58. 58.

    This is also the approach that was adopted in the US 2012 Model BIT and the Canadian 2004 Model FIPA which, in similar terms, provide that

    1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 3. The treatment to be accorded by a Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means, with respect to a regional level of government, treatment no less favorable than the treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that regional level of government to natural persons resident in and enterprises constituted under the laws of other regional levels of government of the Party of which it forms a part, and to their respective investments.

    See Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment, 2012 [hereinafter 2012 US Model BIT], Article 3. See also A greement between Canada and __________ for the promotion and protection of investments, 2004 [hereinafter 2004 Canadian Model FIPA], Article 3

  59. 59.

    See infra.

  60. 60.

    Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), concluded December 17, 1994, entered into force March 16, 1998, 1080 UNTS 95, Art. 10(7).

  61. 61.

    See e.g. Art. 10(7) of the ECT (n. 60) and Article 3(1) of the 2008 UK Model BIT ([Draft] Agreement [] between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of [] for the promotion and protection of investments, 2008 [hereinafter 2008 UK Model BIT]). See also generally UNCTAD (1999), pp. 42 et seq.

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Art. 10(7) of the ECT (n. 60); Art. II(2)(a) of the US-Egypt BIT (Treaty between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning the Reciprocal encouragement and protection of investments, signed March 11, 1986, entered into force June 27, 1992); Article II(2) of the Pakistan-Turkey BIT (Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan concerning the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments, signed May 22, 2012, not yet entered into force).

  63. 63.

    See Bjorklund (2010), pp. 434–436; Heiskanen (2008), pp. 87–110; Kriebaum (2015), pp. 790–806.

  64. 64.

    Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment, signed November 14, 1991, entered into force October 20, 1994, Art. II(1)–(2)(b):

    1. Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol to this Treaty […]. 2. a) […] b) Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments. For the purposes of dispute resolution under Articles VII and VIII, a measure may be arbitrary or discriminatory notwithstanding the opportunity to review such measure in the courts or administrative tribunals of a Party.

  65. 65.

    Bjorklund (2010), pp. 434–436.

  66. 66.

    See Bjorklund (2005).

  67. 67.

    Reinisch (2015), p. 851. See also Newcombe and Paradell (2009), p. 158.

  68. 68.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 416. Although this distinction is often made, it is not impossible for an investor’s post-entry interests to be covered; the extent of the coverage depends on the language of the treaty.

  69. 69.

    CETA, Art. 8.6(1). This provision must be read together with Article 8.1 which, similarly to the 2004 Canadian Model FIPA and the 2012 US Model BIT, defines “investor” as “a Party, a natural person or an enterprise of a Party, other than a branch or a representative office, that seeks to make, is making or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party” [emphasis added].

  70. 70.

    UK Model BIT (2008) (n. 61), Art. 3(2).

  71. 71.

    North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), concluded December 17, 1992, entered into force January 1, 1994, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993), Art. 1102(1)–(2). See also 2012 US Model BIT (n. 58), Art. 3 and 2004 Canadian Model FIPA (n. 58), Art. 3.

  72. 72.

    ECT (n. 60), Art. 10(7) [emphasis added].

  73. 73.

    CETA, Art. 8.6(1).

  74. 74.

    See de Mestral and Vanhonnaeker (2017), Chapter 5.

  75. 75.

    See Alvarez and Topalian (2012), pp. 491–544; Behn (2015), pp. 363–415; Franck (2005b), pp. 1521–1625; Wu (2014), pp. 178 et seq.; Sornarajah (2008), pp. 39–79; Waibel et al. (2010).

  76. 76.

    See e.g. Sinclair and Trew (2016), Patterson (2015) and Harris (2014).

  77. 77.

    See Alvarez and Topalian (2012), pp. 491–544; Behn (2015), pp. 365–370.

  78. 78.

    See de Mestral and Vanhonnaeker (2017), Chapter 5.

  79. 79.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 439.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., p. 440.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., p. 416. See also UNCTAD (1999), pp. 47–50; Henckels (2013), pp. 197–215; Tienhaara (2011), pp. 606–627.

  82. 82.

    See e.g. Arts. 1106(6) and 1114(1)(2) of the NAFTA (n. 71) and Art. 24(2)(b)(i) of the ECT (n. 60).

  83. 83.

    See NAFTA (n. 71), Art. 2106 and Annex 2106; Canadian Model FIPA (n. 58), Art. 10(6).

  84. 84.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 416. See also UNCTAD (1999), pp. 45–46.

  85. 85.

    UNCTAD (1999), pp. 47–51. See also Bjorklund (2010), pp. 416–417.

  86. 86.

    CETA, Art. 8.7(3) provides that “Paragraph 1 [i.e. the MFN principle] does not apply to treatment accorded by a Party providing for recognition, including through an arrangement or agreement with a third country that recognises the accreditation of testing and analysis services and service suppliers, the accreditation of repair and maintenance services and service suppliers, as well as the certification of the qualifications of or the results of or work done by those accredited services and service suppliers.”

  87. 87.

    CETA, Art. 8.15(4).

  88. 88.

    See Vanhonnaeker (2015), pp. 184–190.

  89. 89.

    CETA, Art. 8.15(1–3).

  90. 90.

    Ibid., Art. 8.15(5).

  91. 91.

    Ibid., Schedule of Canada—Federal: Reservations applicable in Canada (applicable in all Provinces and Territories)—Reservation I-C-1.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., Art. 28.3(2) (Chapter 28). The general exceptions clause provides that

    2. For the purposes of Chapters Nine (CrossBorder Trade in Services), Ten (Temporary Entry and Stay of Natural Persons for Business Purposes), Twelve (Domestic Regulations), Thirteen (Financial Services), Fourteen (International Maritime Transport Services), Fifteen (Telecommunications), Sixteen (Electronic Commerce), and Sections B (Establishment of investments) and C (Nondiscriminatory treatment) of Chapter Eight (Investment), subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between the Parties where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by a Party of measures necessary: (a) to protect public security or public morals or to maintain public order; (b) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or (c) to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to: (i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects of a default on contracts; (ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts; or (iii) safety.

  93. 93.

    See e.g. CETA, Arts. 28.4, 28.5, and 28.7.

  94. 94.

    See e.g. CETA, Art. 28.6.

  95. 95.

    See e.g. CETA, Art. 28.8.

  96. 96.

    See e.g. CETA, Arts. 8.2(3), 8.9(1), and 28.9. See also the Agreement’s Preamble. Cultural industries are thus protected both specifically and generally.

  97. 97.

    In particular, CETA exempts from its scope of application measures that are taken in conformity with a waiver decision adopted by the WTO. CETA, Art. 28.10, for example, provides that “If a right or obligation in this Agreement duplicates one under the WTO Agreement, the Parties agree that a measure in conformity with a waiver decision adopted by the WTO pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreement is deemed to be also in conformity with the duplicated provision in this Agreement.”

  98. 98.

    See also CETA, Art. 8.4(2)(d) and the Agreement’s Preamble.

  99. 99.

    CETA, Art. 28.3(2).

  100. 100.

    Bjorklund (2010), p. 440.

  101. 101.

    Ibid.

  102. 102.

    See Bjorklund (2010), pp. 440–441.

  103. 103.

    2004 Canadian Model FIPA (n. 58), Art. 3(3). See also 2012 US Model BIT (n. 58), Art. 3(3).

  104. 104.

    With Brexit and the negotiations of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, this number is expected to fall to 27.

  105. 105.

    CETA contains an explicit provision on the “Determination of the respondent for disputes with the European Union or its Member States”. See CETA (n. 10), Art. 8.21.

  106. 106.

    The European Union saw its competence extended to encompass for the first time under the common commercial policy foreign direct investments after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ C 306/01, December 17, 2007). See Art. 207(1) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C 326, October 26, 2012.

  107. 107.

    In this regard, the European Court of Justice found that as far as FDI is concerned, the European Union does not enjoy exclusive competence with respect to non-direct investment and investor-state dispute settlement, which fall instead within a competence shared between the European Union and the Member States. See European Court of Justice, Opinion 2/15 of the Court of 16 May 2017, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CV0002(01)&from=FR, paras. 78–110, 225–256, 285–293 and 305 and Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 52/17 of 16 May 2017, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170052en.pdf.

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  1. McGill University, Faculty of Law, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Andrea K. Bjorklund & Lukas Vanhonnaeker

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    Makane Moïse Mbengue  & Stefanie Schacherer  & 

  2. Science Po Paris, School of Law, Paris, France

    Makane Moïse Mbengue

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Bjorklund, A.K., Vanhonnaeker, L. (2019). National Treatment. In: Mbengue, M.M., Schacherer, S. (eds) Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98361-5_3

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