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Strong Truth Pluralism

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Pluralisms in Truth and Logic

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

Alethic pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being true. Propositions about riverbanks might be true because they correspond with reality whereas propositions about the law might be true because they cohere with the body of law. According to strong alethic pluralists there is no such thing as truthassuch, that is, no single truth property applicable across all truthapt domains of discourse. Truth is many, not one. Moderate alethic pluralists, on the other hand, endorse a generic truth property applicable across all truthapt discourse. However, propositions belonging to different domains may possess this generic truth property in virtue of having distinct properties such as correspondence or coherence. Truth is both one and many. This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to present and develop a version of strong alethic pluralism in some detail. This task has been somewhat neglected in the literature, as strong pluralism is widely regarded as a nonstarter due to a battery of seemingly devastating objections. The problem of mixed compounds has been regarded as being particularly pressing—and difficult—for the strong pluralist to deal with. The second aim of the chapter, then, is to give a strongly pluralist response to the problem of mixed compounds

Earlier versions—or parts of this chapter—have been presented by Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen at the University of St. Andrews (January 2009); University College Dublin (October 2010); University of Tokyo (October 2012); Sungkyunkwan University (December 2012); Northern Institute of Philosophy (July 2013); Truth & Pluralism (Pacific APA 2014); University of Barcelona (LOGOS, July 2014); Yonsei University (December 2014); University of Toronto (April 2015); University of Connecticut (April 2015); Nanyang Technical University (August 2015); and Lingnan University (February 2016). An earlier version of the chapter was presented by both authors at the 1st Pluralisms Global Research Network Workshop at Yonsei University (January 2014). Thanks to the following people for helpful discussion: Dorit Bar-On, Jc Beall, Mandel Cabrera, Ben Caplan, Colin Caret, Roy Cook, Aaron Cotnoir, Doug Edwards, Filippo Ferrari, Tim Fuller, Sungil Han, Joe Hwang, Lina Jansson, Jinho Kang, Junyeol Kim, Sungsu Kim, Max Kölbel, Michael Lynch, Adam Murray, Franklin Perkins, Graham Priest, Gurpreet Rattan, Sven Rosenkranz, Stewart Shapiro, Gila Sher, Keith Simmons, Cory Wright, Crispin Wright, Jeremy Wyatt, Byeong-Uk Yi, Andy Yu, and Elia Zardini. Research for this chapter was supported by grant no. 2013S1A2A2035514 (Pedersen and Kim) and grant no. 2016S1A2A2911800 (Pedersen) from the National Research Foundation of Korea. We gratefully acknowledge this support.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Correspondence theorists include David 1994, Devitt 1984, Newman 2007, Rasmussen 2014, Russell 1912, Vision 2004, and Wittgenstein 1921. Coherence theorists include Bradley 1914, Rescher 1973, Walker 1989, and Young 2001. Pragmatists or neo-pragmatists include James 1907, 1909, Peirce 1878, and Putnam 1981.

  2. 2.

    For example, Beall 2000, 2013; Cook 2011; Cotnoir 2009, 2013a, b; Cotnoir and Edwards 2015; Edwards 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2018; Gamester forthcoming; Kölbel 2008, 2013; Pedersen 2006, 2010, 2012a, b, 2014, ms-a, ms-b, ms-c; Pedersen and Edwards 2011; Pedersen and Wright 2013a, b, 2016; Wyatt 2013; Yu 2017. Gila Sher and Terence Horgan and various collaborators have developed a pluralist version of the correspondence theory that incorporates different ways of corresponding. See Sher 2005, 2013, 2016 and Horgan 2001; Barnard and Horgan 2006, 2013. Works by Lynch and Wright include Lynch 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2013 and Wright 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2013.

  3. 3.

    Versions of strong pluralism are presented in Cotnoir 2009, 2013a; Gamester forthcoming; Pedersen 2006, ms-a, ms-b, ms-c, Pedersen and Lynch 2018 (Sect. 20.6, due to Pedersen).

  4. 4.

    See, for example, Lynch 2009. For surveys that provide a systematic presentation of objections to pluralism, see Pedersen 2012b, Pedersen and Lynch 2018, Pedersen and Wright 2016.

  5. 5.

    The problem of mixed compounds is raised by Tappolet 2000, Sainsbury 1996, and Williamson 1994. Various pluralist options are discussed by Cook 2011, Cotnoir 2009, Edwards 2008, 2009, 2018, Gamester forthcoming, Lynch 2004, 2006, 2009, 2013, Pedersen 2012 b, Pedersen and Lynch 2018, Sher 2005, 2013, and Wright 2013.

  6. 6.

    It is quite tedious always to use formulations that make our endorsement of a token-token version of the identity theory explicit and distinguish it from its type-type counterparts. Sometimes we use formulations that are compatible with the type-type identity theory. However, in those cases it should be borne in mind that our reductionism kicks in at the level of tokens. One reason to opt for token identity is that it seems to integrate quite naturally with our account of truth grounding, that is the other component of our proposed metaphysics of truth. Grounding is usually regarded as a relation that obtains between particular facts or states of affairs rather than types of facts or states of affairs.

  7. 7.

    Wyatt (2013) and Edwards (2018), (this volume) are among the few sources that offer a systematic discussion of domains. Lynch (2009) talks about domains but only in passing. The formal aspects of what we say about domains here align with Yu (2017). For a more comprehensive treatment of domains and their relation to subject matter, see Pedersen (ms-e).

  8. 8.

    The idea that atomics belong to a unique domain has been debated in the literature. Discussion of this issue is often tied to the so-called problem of mixed atomics . Following Sher (2005), it is not clear, for example, which unique domain 〈Causing pain is bad〉 would belong to. It involves a mental concept (pain), a physical concept (causation), and a moral concept (badness). Our view is that 〈Causing pain is bad〉 belongs to the ethical domain. This is because the property figuring in an atomic proposition determines its domain membership. Since the property of being bad is an ethical property, 〈Causing pain is bad〉 belongs to the ethical domain. This kind of approach is suggested in Pedersen and Wright (2016, Sect. 4.5.1) and spelled out in more detail in Pedersen (ms-d). Edwards (2018) favors the same approach. Wyatt (2013) develops an account of domains according to which atomics can belong to more than one domain. He supplements this proposal with a story about how to determine a single truth-relevant property for propositions belonging to more than one domain. This is not the place to pursue an in-depth discussion of different approaches to mixed atomics and domains. For present purposes, we rest content with simply having noted some key differences.

  9. 9.

    Lewis 1986.

  10. 10.

    Thanks to Tim Fuller for raising the issue of hyperintensionality. Thanks to Jeremy Wyatt for extensive comments also. Substitutability salva veritate is often employed as a test for hyperintensionality. A notion or operator N on sentences is said to be hyperintensional if it does not allow intensionally equivalent sentences to be substituted salva veritate. The notion “propositional content of” is hyperintensional in this sense. To see this consider sentences “p” and “p ∧ p” whose propositional content is respectively the proposition 〈p〉 and the proposition 〈p ∧ p〉. Although “p” and “p ∧ p” are intensionally equivalent, “p ∧ p” cannot be substituted salva veritate for “p” in “The propositional content of ‘p’ is 〈p〉”. This would clash with (p1), (p2), (p ∧ p1), and (p ∧ p2). Similarly, “p” cannot be substituted salva veritate for “p ∧ p” in “The propositional content of ‘p ∧ p’ is 〈p ∧ p〉”.

  11. 11.

    Rosen 2010.

  12. 12.

    The kind of grounding-theoretic account just provided is available to both strong and moderate pluralists. It should be noted, however, that there are significant differences with respect to the specifics of truth grounding within the frameworks of respectively strong and moderate pluralism. Crucially, within the framework of strong pluralism there is no grounding relationship between an atomic proposition’s corresponding (cohering, etc.) and its being true. For, remember an atomic proposition’s being true simply is its corresponding (cohering, etc.). Given this identity taking a proposition’s corresponding (etc.) to ground its own truth would violate irreflexitivity. However, grounding relations do obtain between atomic propositions’ having their base-level truth properties and instances of disjunction-truth and conjunction-truth. For details of a grounding-theoretic metaphysics for moderate pluralism, see Pedersen ms-a, ms-b, ms-c and Kim and Pedersen (ms).

  13. 13.

    We said, “if pure disjunctions have separate sufficient grounds for their (disjunction-)truth, these grounds always pertain to the same domain”. Strictly speaking, this claim needs to be qualified. It is only correct if we restrict attention to pure disjunctions with atomic constituents. To see this, note that 〈(Bob’s drunk driving is legal or Mt. Everest is extended in space) or (Bob’s drunk driving is illegal or there are no trees)〉 is a pure disjunction. Its disjuncts concern the same domain—namely, the legal-empirical domain. However, (by transitivity) the pure disjunction in question has separate grounds for its truth in 〈Mt. Everest is extended in space〉’s corresponding to reality and in 〈Bob’s drunk driving is illegal〉’s cohering with the body of law. These grounds pertain to different domains.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Scranton College, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea

    Seahwa Kim

  2. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, South Korea

    Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

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  1. Seahwa Kim
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Correspondence to Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen .

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  1. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Jeremy Wyatt

  2. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

  3. University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

    Nathan Kellen

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Kim, S., Pedersen, N.J.L.L. (2018). Strong Truth Pluralism. In: Wyatt, J., Pedersen, N., Kellen, N. (eds) Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_5

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