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The present study is inspired by the fact that supranationality is no longer the objective of most regional organizations. In reality, states have refused to cede sovereignty in all regions except for Europe. Nevertheless, regional integration scholars keep discussing the phenomenon of regional integration processes given the existence or non-existence of supranational structures. Inspired by the European Union, functionalist and neofunctionalists established the study of regional integration as a scholarly field (Haas 1964; Mitrany 1975). Leading theories and concepts of the field, accordingly, are bound to the empirical phenomenon of the European integration process.

Also, intergovernmentalists relied on the example of the European Union and rejected functional concepts instead of taking into account the broad variety of intergovernmental regional organizations worldwide. Scholars around Moravcsik (1998) argued that integration depends on the willingness of states to cooperate. Supranationality, to them, does not exist. Although making legitimate claims, intergovernmentalists have not offered explanations for regional cooperation beyond the level of the nation-state. Additionally, both functionalist and intergovernmentalist explanations have not developed a comparative perspective on regions. On the contrary, they developed criteria in the context of the European integration process and assigned them to other regions.

The Latin American case, in this sense, is emblematic. Even constructors of regional organizations attempted to design supranational structures, in reference to the European Union, as we have seen in the case of CAN and, to a certain extent, Mercosur. In view of the failure of these organizations, the intergovernmental critique has been translated to the concept of “ interpresidentialism” (Malamud 2005, 2008), which defends a strong position of presidents in regional integration and indicates that progress is only possible when presidents agree on a collective position. Yet, also interpresidentialism disregards processes of regional governance, which do not necessarily depend on the engagement of presidents or even strong national positions. The empirical analysis of regional processes at the policy-making level has shown that regional governance is a multidimensional process, depending on a variety of factors. Sectoral integration does require neither presidential involvement nor supranationality.

While intergovernmentalists based their arguments on the perspective of a unitary state, the empirical analysis revealed that a variety of actors constitutes governments. In fact, intergovernmental regional organizations provide the institutional flexibility for a variety of actor groups to develop independently from each other. As the study has shown for South America, the region is constituted by parallel transnational processes, which materialize in policy fields and which can only unfold in the ambit of flexible, intergovernmental regional organizations.

In academic debates, policy fields or, in other words, sectoral integration has not been captured yet. Only recently, scholars developed the concept of comparative regionalism with the intention of focusing on the region as an object of study and by this means on the empirical phenomena we find in regions. Comparative regionalism can be understood as a reaction to the over-theorization of regions and the missing conceptual understanding of regional processes. In particular, New Regionalism approaches made a case for regions as constructed spaces. However, they have caused conceptual confusion instead of contributing useful concepts for the analysis of regions. Constructivist theories of regionalism to some extent outplayed the regional space by connecting it to the global level. As such, the emphasis was drawn away from the region, and a pattern of global politics was projected upon it instead.

In that view, Acharya and Johnston express their concern with the institutional design of regional organizations. They point out that “like the overall literature on globalization, the literature on new regionalism might have underestimated the resilience of the state, or have been too quick to predict its demise” (Acharya and Johnston 2007, 10). Although they are considering the macro-level and institutional structures, the claim is equally valid for the micro-level of regional cooperation. Hence, “design issues are important and should not be neglected” (Acharya and Johnston 2007, 10) in the analysis of regional public policy-making. The focus on macro-structures of regional institutions needs to be broadened and take the integration in different policy fields into account. The analysis of sectoral integration illustrates the variety of regional processes co-occurring. The institutional design of regional organizations obstructs or facilitates the development of regional processes in policy fields.

8.1 Review

Regional public policy fields, for example, health, education, energy, or infrastructure, are constituted by transgovernmental cooperation between national ministerial representatives of the respective departments. Accordingly, these fields correspond to the national administration of member states in regional organizations. Regional public policy-making, hence, is defined as the interaction of policy-makers at the regional level who are pursuing a common objective. This form of cooperation is constitutive for regions. Hence, the objective of this analysis was to understand how regional public policy-making works in practice and, in particular, how it responds to institutional structures. It followed the assumption that intergovernmental institutions support the development of different policy fields at a regional level. In a situation of transformation in many regions, we can empirically observe that policy fields develop differently, although they are equal regarding formal structure. The central question of how different policy areas could develop in such different ways, even though being embedded into the same regional structure, has significant implications for the academic understanding of regions.

The analytical model that has been developed throughout this study to facilitate the study of regional public policy-making focuses on the role of ministerial representatives. To sufficiently capture this group of actors, they are conceptualized as transgovernmental networks. The relevance of transgovernmental networks for transnational policy-making was first emphasized by Keohane and Nye (1974), and recently by Raustalia (2002) or Slaughter and Hale (2010b). Slaughter and Hale argued that the “social nature” (2010a, 57) of transgovernmental networks will determine their interaction and the particular outcome. Thus, group-inherent factors are decisive for the development of policy-making processes and hence for successful collective action in regions. Accordingly, the study is based on the interactionist assumption of processes of collective action in groups of policy-makers.

Collective action depends on different group internal processes. At the same time, the institutional context of collectivities influences these group processes. For the national level of public policy-making, scholars such as Mayntz found that policy-making in networks advances best in subsystems (Mayntz 1993). Policy fields are such subsystems. At the same time, Messner points out that “tacit knowledge” (Messner 1995, 205), which he understands as policy field immanent logic, best develops in independent institutional structures. As regional public policy-making is based on transgovernmental networks, the institutional separation of policy fields here also applies as a favoring element. Intergovernmental organizations best provide this independence for different policy fields.

According to the study of policy networks in flexible institutional structures, this study responds to the conceptual context of regional governance. This concept has been increasingly discussed in recent times and focuses on the coordination of action and of structures, on the interdependencies in a regional setting. From an institutionalist point of view, flexibility is a necessary precondition for governance. Governance describes institutionalized systems of rules, where no authoritative imposition to rule compliance is given.

In particular, Nolte (2014) connected regional governance to intergovernmental organizations. In line with the idea that intergovernmental organizations contain different sectors of policy-making, Hveem (2003) indicates that the institutions of regional governance are connected to the national systems of member states. Policy-making in different policy fields in the context of one intergovernmental regional organization can, therefore, be described in terms of regional governance. The model of regional public policy-making, hence, is a model of regional governance. To illustrate this model in practice, it has been applied to the case of UNASUR.

8.2 Case Study

In the South American region, we can observe a failure of supranationality and dense institutionalization in many regional organizations. The South American Union, created in 2008, attempted to avoid such failures and therefore established a flexible institutional structure.

The case study of UNASUR, therefore, allows for investigating whether flexible structures permit policy fields to develop their working procedures. The analytical model separates the macro-level and the micro-level of regional public policy-making for conceptual purposes. While the macro-level is constituted by the formal structure and the political objectives (frames) of the regional organization, the micro-level is constituted by the different group processes of transgovernmental networks in the respective policy fields. The comparative analysis of the sectors revealed that any interference from the macro-level into sectoral policy-making, be it institutional or political, obstructs the development of sectoral rationality. The impeding character of politicization is an important finding. The involvement of political officials, the ideological instructions of governments, and the changing political landscape act as major impediments to independent sectoral work. Additionally, conceptual imprecision and diverging definitions of problems and solutions in policy fields obstructed the development of sectoral rationality.

According to collective action theory, a common rationality of actors is central to the development of joint objectives and helps to align their actions with each other. The definition of problems is based on the benefit each member will have. In other words, the agenda of a policy-maker depends on his problem-perception. If problem-perception is similar, policy-makers readily agree on an agenda. Different from political rationality, the sectoral rationality is based on shared experiences and the same identification and comprehension of problems and solutions.

Strong political leadership typically impedes collective action. Although it accelerates processes and makes policies happen, it is only rarely based on collective action. As a consequence, policies which are a result of political instrumentalization hardly contribute to long-term development. Instead, they might impede the development of regional perspectives of public policies.

The case of UNASUR shows that the independence of policy fields leads to independent policy processes. Policy-making, in this case, is based on a common perception of problems. As policy fields differ remarkably regarding problems, dimensions, and possible solutions, they will develop differently. To aspire equality of sectors, therefore, would mean to restrict their technical autonomy. The case of UNASUR proves that a flexible intergovernmental structure supports dissimilar processes within the same formal organization. Consequently, the South American Union supports the argument that institutional flexibility in intergovernmental organizations provides the space for collective action in a variety of possible processes.

The study of UNASUR revealed that both levels, the macro- and the micro-levels, reflect ongoing processes. The values of UNASUR are not intrinsic but respond to a long enduring process of transformation of South American politics. In particular democracy, human rights, peace, and social development are all manifested in UNASUR and indicate an open-ended process. Instead of defining a final objective, the emphasis is on independent processes which are developed by regional actors. Connected to this finding is that UNASUR as an organization did not focus on any primacy of economics or security. In terms of formal structure, it does not prioritize any sector. Therefore, the independent development of sectoral, regional policies illustrates in which fields states can cooperate where transgovernmental politics are possible. Policy priorities are not induced but arise according to the logic of policy fields and according to their possibilities. In view of that, UNASUR does not seek to achieve a previously set goal but wants to identify fields of cooperation. The assessment of policy processes within UNASUR emphasizes the relevance of the micro-level of regional public policy-making and indicates that regional organizations respond to regional processes.

8.3 Assessment of Regional Public Policy-Making

Acharya and Johnston emphasize that “design issues are important” (2007, 10). The comparative analysis of policy-making in UNASUR supports this argument. A central finding of the analysis of institutional structures and transgovernmental networks is that there is a strong tendency to sectoralization. In particular, those networks which already developed independent processes have formulated their asset for more autonomy in policy-making. The study proved that intergovernmental structures enable parallel regional processes of collective action of policy-makers in different issue areas. This argument is not bound to UNASUR. Most regions are constituted by the parallelism of transgovernmental processes in different issue areas. Whether these processes lead to collective action responses or not depends on how institutions facilitate independent sectoral policy-making. The conditions to independent regional public policy-making have been elaborated for the case of UNASUR but can be transferred to other regions.

In all modern, democratic societies, we can find similarities between national political systems. Whether policy-makers have a similar background or not is a crucial point for the development of sectoral rationality and collective action. If there are delimited policy fields in the respective member states, and these policy fields resemble at the regional level, collective action becomes more probable. These conditions support group cohesion. According to assumptions from network analysis (Chap. 3) and the institutional analysis of organizations (Chap. 4), group cohesion is decisive for collective action. Cohesion in transgovernmental networks depends on a shared professional rationality, the mutual identification of group members with their counterparts, and a shared understanding of problems. Group cohesion is decisive for the development of a regional policy-making perspective. In the end, the internal processes in transgovernmental networks will decide whether interaction leads to regional public policy-making or the simple cooperation between policy-makers.

Internal group processes also depend on macro-structures, as mentioned before. The underlying conditions for the development of group cohesion, sectoral rationality, and accordingly collective action at the regional level are the programmatic as well as the institutional flexibility of policy fields. Strict formal structures and politicization are impediments to regional public policy-making. Institutional flexibility instead supports the independent development of sectoral policy-making.

The presented findings are particularly relevant in contrast to prevailing arguments about regional integration. Not only neofunctionalist and classic intergovernmentalist scholars but also a majority of today’s students of regional integration apply economic indicators to measure integration. Based on the results of the analysis, an opposite position can be defended: It is a condition to successful intergovernmental regional integration that no economic primacy prevails. As shown in the case of Mercosur and especially CAN, the economic orientation brought organs of economic rationality into decision-making positions. A hierarchical structure favoring economic policy fields, however, impedes the development of other, non-economic policy fields.

The common understanding that economic integration is the fundamental driver of regional processes, therefore, can be rejected. Every public sector, be it health, education, infrastructure, or energy, has to develop its rationality of action with its objectives, to work efficiently. Regional processes accordingly depend neither on the existence of economic cohesion nor on the willingness to cede sovereignty in favor of supranational institutions. On the contrary, they depend on a variety of possible factors related to institutional flexibility.

The advantage of intergovernmental organizations which provide formal equality to sectors is quite simple: In organizations with an economic primacy, integration will fail in all sectors, when economic integration is failing. This phenomenon can be observed in many market-oriented regional agreements. However, it is not the case in intergovernmental structures without such a primacy. The autonomy of sectors does not only provide the necessary independence for policy-making but also protects them from failure, possibly resulting from other policy fields.

If sectors are granted independence, policy-makers will engage in regional public policy-making, according to concrete demands. The solutions, respectively, will be answers to commonly perceived problems. The probability of effective regional public policy-making, therefore, is higher in loosely structured, intergovernmental organizations.

8.4 Outlook and Further Research

The case study of UNASUR exhibited the multiplicity of factors influencing regional public policy-making. At the same time, the study points to essential transformations, which are reflected in regional processes. The model of the European Union is no longer preeminent in institutional design. On the contrary, regional organizations increasingly deviate from the classic conceptualization of regional institutions.

The study of UNASUR indicates that the institutional design of regional organizations responds to existing regional processes. As argued initially, these processes are constitutive for the region. Instead of focusing only on macro-structures of regional organizations, we should consider these intraregional micro-processes which build the foundation of regional organizations. Regional public policies, in particular, have not yet been studied. Although some policy fields have gained academic attention, they have not been related to the overall regional processes. This study presents a first attempt to conceptualize regional public policy-making. Throughout this book, I did not only illustrate the relevance of regional public policy-making but also disclose the necessity for further research. In the case of UNASUR, problems for policy-makers were connected to the high burden of work, of traveling, workload, and overly ambitious agendas. This aspect indicated that national administrations are not adequately prepared for regional public policy-making. This finding could lead us to the assumption that regional public agendas are a new phenomenon. We do not know the trajectories of regional cooperation in different policy fields and different regions. The case of the South American Health Council, for example, showed that today’s policy-making is based on a long tradition of cooperation. Whether the increase of regional public policy-making in South America is a novelty, or if academia simply did not perceive it, is an open question.

In view of such developments, the current situation in which half of UNASUR member states suspended leadership due to the inability to find a new General Secretary, does not seem too critical. On contrary, the reluctance of the leaving countries supports the arguments of this book. It illustratively shows how distinct the presidential level acts from the concrete policy-making level.

In this study, I have shown that intergovernmental networks do not need a General Secretary or the interference of their presidents to be able to work. Many policy fields reveal an astonishing capacity to interact at a regional level, even in insecure and instable environments. Even more, they continue contributing to institutional creation. Concrete examples are the Health and Culture Councils: The Culture Council created a technical committee that works on measures against the illegal trafficking of cultural goods in 2017, already after Ernesto Samper left office (Ministerio de Cultura y Patrimonio 2017). This committee is a joint endeavor of UNASUR and Mercosur and shows how cooperation in the field of culture envisages a long-term programmatic action. The Health Council, similarly, continues working through its technical institute, ISAGS. As the executive director of ISAGS, Carina Vance, declared, the institute as well as the Health Council will continue working even in the situation of suspended membership of some member states. Instead of progressing with the agenda, the institute will use the time to conduct studies and prepare policy recommendations. According to Vance, these activities have been on the agenda anyways and do not need direct participation of the states (Antunes and Vanca 2018).

Both, the joint activities with other regional organizations, such as Mercosur, and the transfer of tasks to technical institutes, are reactions of intergovernmental networks that continue pursuing a common interest in regional public policy-making. Both are indicative for the ability of intergovernmental networks to change their organizational context, for example, adapt to new institutional conditions in order to identify the best context for regional public policy-making. It proves that the organization, as such, is first of all the context for interaction and not any normative imposition to policy-making.

Accordingly, a missing General Secretary or disagreement between presidents might not favor the progress in regional public policy-making. However, it will also hardly obstruct it. But, what does the temporary suspension of half of UNASUR member states mean? This is unclear, as institutions keep on working, even without progress.

A final withdrawal, and consequently the dissolution of UNASUR could be problematic. To be more precise, the withdrawal from any organization providing regional public policies would pose a problem. What will destroy regional public policy-making is taking away the spaces of action of the networks. They only might need minimal resources, but these indeed are necessary. Ministerial representatives need to travel, they need to meet, they need to be able to pursue a regional agenda and accordingly need a minimum of technical autonomy. In the moment, in which a government decides that there is no necessity for regional cooperation in public policy fields, and therewith takes all resources away from regional policy-making, the work of networks gets extremely difficult. The consequence of such a decision would be the denial of a common regional progressive development—an idea that has been developed over decades and materialized in UNASUR.

In the past two years many crises in the South American member states also affected the work in UNASUR. The most relevant example is the case of Venezuela. Already in the past, it has proven how problematic the politicization of sectoral councils is. With the imposition of Maduro, also the participation in UNASUR changed. As a replacement for technical personnel, increasingly diplomatic staff participated in meetings and tried to pursue a political agenda. This behavior is detrimental for the work of councils, as technical rationality is the dominant logic (Hoffmann 2015). Instead, Venezuela tried to instrumentalize the councils’ work. Likewise, the Brazilian change in foreign policy affects the work of councils, as Brazil is continuously taking resources out of its international departments. Brazil has the ability to push regional processes, as, for example, in health. Now, however, the government favors cooperation that follows liberal economic principles and reduces regional public policies to a minimum.

The future of UNASUR will probably depend on the willingness of states to cooperate at a regional level (Comini and Sanahuja 2018). Yet, it is important to keep in mind that UNASUR is not an ideological project but an institutional space that managed to deliver a variety of public policies to the South American region. This study for the first time draws attention to these micro-processes of regional public policy-making and highlights the relevance of transgovernmental networks for regional processes. The case study of UNASUR can be seen as a starting point for an actor-based study of regions, with the objective of understanding the empirical phenomena we observe in regions. The observations made in the case of UNASUR, similarly, hold true for other spaces of regional public policy-making. Finally, with or without UNASUR, intergovernmental networks in different policy fields demonstrate astonishing patterns of interaction and cooperation at the regional level. These work in various settings, as long as they allow policy-makers to gather and develop a common perspective on regional public policies.