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Why Did Chambres de Justice Disappear in Eighteenth-Century France? Fiscal Profit and Institutional Change, 1688–1788

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The War Within

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance ((PSHF))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the vexing question of the causes for the waning, in eighteenth century France, of Chambres de Justice, or extraordinary courts periodically set up by the French kings to try their financiers. To this effect, we analyse the relationship between government and tax-farmers, and calculate the profits made by these financiers during the years 1688–1780. Results do not reveal any obvious link between return on capital invested by financiers to run their business on behalf of the king and the setting up of Chambres de Justice. Yet, analysis also indicate that government adjusted its relationship with financiers across time, as a result of fiscal strains, external pressure from competitors, and public criticism of excessive profits and the fiscal system, alternating periods of private and direct administration. We conclude that Chambres de Justice, or the threat to establish one, were essentially a political instrument.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the relevant chapters in this volume by Agustin Gonzales-Enciso and Toon Kerkhoff.

  2. 2.

    Archives nationales [AN], 144AP 102, pièce 106, Mémoire (juin 1769).

  3. 3.

    On these points see Marquet de Bourgade’s papers at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. Fr. 8013–8018.

  4. 4.

    Id., fos. 1–2.

  5. 5.

    Following 25 years of alterations of its value, the French currency was stabilized in 1726 and, as a result, the livre tournois was ca. 40% lower than during the period 1689–1715.

  6. 6.

    They rightly argue that the tax farmers and their lenders were able to distinguish between defaults buy the borrower due to unavoidable shocks from nature and true defaults due to lack of credibility. In the War of the Spanish Succession, however, these two aspects seem to have compounded.

  7. 7.

    BNF, manuscrit français 7584, Déclarations des personnes sujettes à la Chambre de justice (1716). Accessible on-line on gallica.

  8. 8.

    BNF, Nouv. Acq. Fr. 2565, Addition à l’histoire des Fermes du Roi depuis l’année 987, 1746, f. 1.

  9. 9.

    Id.

  10. 10.

    Archives nationales, 144 AP 113, Résultat des Comptes de société des Fermes générales depuis le 1er octobre 1726, 245 ff. The information was probably assembled for the attention of the finance minister in preparation for a new lease in 1767.

  11. 11.

    According to Lavoisier, 137, at the moment of their suppression in 1756, the sous-fermiers numbered 215 individuals, divided into 27 companies, who were paid in excess of 3 million per year.

  12. 12.

    BNF, manuscrit français 14102, Mémoire sur les finances, f. 6 vo.

  13. 13.

    They were initially recorded as 12 million, a sum reduced to 8.9 million from lease La Rue onwards.

  14. 14.

    The purpose of the summary of the Comptes de société was to calculate how much money would be saved for the king if the interests the tax farmers paid themselves for their working capital were reduced to 5 per cent.

  15. 15.

    AN, G7 1566, Traité des veaux et volailles. Chamillart recalculated the net profit at 550,441 lt. and imposed a 270,000 lt. fine on the traitants.

  16. 16.

    For this reason, Necker increased it to 50,000 lt.

  17. 17.

    According to Lavoisier, they only needed to raise 45 million in working capital in this lease.

  18. 18.

    Its annual lease was ca. 11.5 million lt.

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  1. Departmernt of History, University of Reading, Reading, UK

    Joël Félix

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  1. University of Reading, Reading, UK

    Joël Félix

  2. University of Auvergne, Clermont-Ferrand, France

    Anne Dubet

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Félix, J. (2018). Why Did Chambres de Justice Disappear in Eighteenth-Century France? Fiscal Profit and Institutional Change, 1688–1788. In: Félix, J., Dubet, A. (eds) The War Within . Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98050-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98050-8_9

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