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International Workshop on Security

IWSEC 2018: Advances in Information and Computer Security pp 297–312Cite as

From Identification Using Rejection Sampling to Signatures via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Application to the BLISS Signature

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11049))

Abstract

In this paper, we present a reduction from non-lossy/lossy identification scheme using rejection sampling to signature in the Random Oracle Model (ROM). The rejection sampling is used to ensure that the last step in the identification scheme does not leak information about the secret key of the scheme. This last step may fail, and to hide these failures to an adversary we use a Fiat-Shamir transform where we rerun the identification protocol until we get a valid output. We also apply our result for non-lossy identification scheme to the well-known BLISS signature [DDLL13] and compare with the original proof.

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Acknowledgments

Pauline Bert is funded by the Direction Générale de l’Armement (Pôle de Recherche CYBER). This work has received a French government support granted to the CominLabs excellence laboratory and managed by the National Research Agency in the “Investing for the Future” program under reference ANR-10-LABX-07-01.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA, Rennes, France

    Pauline Bert & Adeline Roux-Langlois

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  1. Pauline Bert
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  2. Adeline Roux-Langlois
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Correspondence to Pauline Bert .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tokyo Denki University, Tokyo, Japan

    Atsuo Inomata

  2. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Tokyo, Japan

    Kan Yasuda

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Bert, P., Roux-Langlois, A. (2018). From Identification Using Rejection Sampling to Signatures via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Application to the BLISS Signature. In: Inomata, A., Yasuda, K. (eds) Advances in Information and Computer Security. IWSEC 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11049. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97916-8_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97916-8_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-97915-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-97916-8

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