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On the Nash Equilibrium in Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation on a Graph

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Recent Developments in Data Science and Intelligent Analysis of Information (ICDSIAI 2018)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 836))

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Abstract

This paper discusses some applications of the theory of controlled Markov fields defined on some finite undirected graph. This graph describes a system of “neighborhood dependence” of the evolution of a random process described by local and synchronously change of state of vertices, depending on the decisions made in them. The main attention is paid to solving the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for stochastic games of capital accumulation with many players.

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Correspondence to Ruslan Chornei .

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Chornei, R. (2019). On the Nash Equilibrium in Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation on a Graph. In: Chertov, O., Mylovanov, T., Kondratenko, Y., Kacprzyk, J., Kreinovich, V., Stefanuk, V. (eds) Recent Developments in Data Science and Intelligent Analysis of Information. ICDSIAI 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 836. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97885-7_13

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