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The Phenomenology of Shared Emotions—Reassessing Gerda Walther

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Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology

Part of the book series: Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ((WHPS,volume 1))

Abstract

To get an initial grip of what is and, in particular, what is not at stake in the phenomenology of SE, it is helpful to distinguish four dimensions of the sociality of emotions. As we shall see, the phenomenology of emotions, in the sense in which I will explore Walther ’s account, is primarily, though certainly not exclusively, concerned with the fourth dimension. Roughly, the three first layers or levels in which social relations and facts come into play in the affective life of individuals and groups are i) the interpersonal, ii) the group and intergroup, and iii) the sociological and sociocultural dimensions. Whereas most phenomenologists, and certainly Walther , touch upon the interpersonal and group -level dimensions (especially in terms of empathic understanding (Einfühlung) and analyzing various collective and group phenomena ), the intergroup and sociological and sociocultural levels have been mined extensively by sociologists, as well as cross-cultural and social psychologists. Here is how the social psychologists Parkinson , Fischer and Manstead concisely delineate these dimensions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    One should also mention, first and foremost, Scheler ’s analysis (1926b) of the different strata of affectivity (especially, emotional contagion and feeling -in-common, or Miteinanderfühlen) corresponding to different social formations (see Szanto 2016a and Zahavi 2018), Husserl ’s analysis of communal spirit (Gemeingeist) (cf. Szanto 2016a), or von Hildebrand ’s account of social emotions (see Salice 2016).

  2. 2.

    For sociology , see, e.g., Rimé (2009), Collins (2004), Rivera and Paéz (2007), Sullivan (2015); for psychology, e.g., Parkinson et al. (2005), Smith et al. (2007).

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., Schmid (2009); Schmid forthcoming a; Zahavi (2015), Krebs (2015), Schloßberger (2016), Sánchez Guerrero (2016), León et al. 2018.

  4. 4.

    Surely, grief is not necessarily other-directed, in the sense of involving other persons; though arguably non-standard cases, think of grieving for one’s own lost childhood or the loss of some good or value , etc. For an intriguing phenomenological account of grief as a form of social cognitions, see Ratcliffe (2016).

  5. 5.

    For Goldie , the idea is somewhat more precisely that emotional experiences have an intentional, object-directed as well as affective or “feeling ” aspect. The two aspects are intrinsically interlinked. Thus, if I am affectively directed towards an object or person, the object is given as something that already and directly has a certain emotional import; I am “emotionally engaged” with it. To put it differently, affective intentionality picks out certain irreducibly emotionally salient properties of the emotional target. Schmid (2009, 64–77) has also suggested construing shared feelings in terms of Goldie ’s account of affective intentionality (see also Szanto 2015 and Sánchez Guerrero 2016). However, as we shall see, he arrives at different conclusions.

  6. 6.

    For more on the relevant notion of “identifying-with ” in this connection, see León , Szanto, Zahavi 2018.

  7. 7.

    Cf. also Szanto (2015) and León et al. 2018; I have argued elsewhere for similar requirements for collective mentality (Szanto 2014) and collective intentionality (Szanto 2016a).

  8. 8.

    For the in my view most convincing contemporary alternative account within the analytic tradition, see Salmela (2012, 2014), Salmela and Nagatsu (2016a, 2016b). For a convincing recent phenomenologically inspired alternative, see Zahavi 2015.

  9. 9.

    Schmid (2009, 61) critically and rightly points out that the emotions favored by Gilbert for shared affectivity , in particular collective guilt , presuppose a link to actions (I typically feel guilty for actions I have or have not done) that makes them more amenable to the conceptual tools of Gilbert ’s joint commitment account of collective intentionality and agency , inadequate tools, however, which Gilbert then simply reapplies to collective emotions .

  10. 10.

    Notwithstanding my criticism of Gilbert ’s joint commitment account of SE (see also Szanto 2015), I do think that she makes an important and correct claim when it comes to collective intentionality , agency and beliefs (for detailed criticisms, see however e.g., Schmid 2005, 2014, and Salmela 2014).

  11. 11.

    See also Schmid’s “difference condition” (2009, 79).

  12. 12.

    On such a concern-based account of SE in terms of what we care about as something that matters to us, see also Schmid forthcoming b. The most sustained (and convincing) different but still concern-based account of SE has recently been developed by Salmela and Nagatsu (2016a, 2016b).

  13. 13.

    For a much more detailed criticism of Schmid’s and Krueger ’s token-identity view, see León , Szanto , and Zahavi 2018; for a view put forth by Krueger that is much closer to the present account of the different but strongly related issue of (socially) extended emotions, see Krueger and Szanto forthcoming.

  14. 14.

    In particular Scheler (1926a), Stein (2010), or the equally unduly forgotten Otaka (1932), but also Husserl (cf. Szanto 2016a), Gurwitsch (1931) and the later Sartre (1960).

  15. 15.

    For useful concise explorations of the different social formations and the role of we-experiences, empathy , and shared emotion therein, especially concerning Scheler , Walther and Gurwitsch , see León and Zahavi (2016), Zahavi and Salice (2017), Chelstrom (2016), and Zahavi 2018.

  16. 16.

    Stein (1922, 126–127) gives virtually the same example and draws congenial conclusions for communal forms of imagination; see Szanto 2017.

  17. 17.

    To be sure, Gurwitsch (1931, 173–179) attacks the more general claim that emotions and feelings as such—not only positive ones—are necessary for the constitution of communities (see also Schmalenbach 1922, 54 ff.). But as I try to show this is a criticism that Walther cannot (and should not) accept, at least not when it comes to communities sharing an experiential domain.

  18. 18.

    In this connection, it would be worthwhile to discuss Solomon ’s (1994) “shared selves” conception of love , which involves a non-fusional conception of unification , see Krebs (2015).

  19. 19.

    For intriguing contemporary sociological elaborations of such “feeling norms” and “rules” (see Hochschild 1979 and von Scheve and Ismer 2013) and a congenial conception of “emotional habitus ”, see Illouz (2007).

  20. 20.

    For a further possible reply, see Roberts ’ convincing analysis according to which one can indeed have both emotions that one does not feel and emotions that one is unaware of having (2003, 60–69, 318–323).

  21. 21.

    Regarding the normative implications, within the framework of the double aspect account, we may ask at least two sorts of questions: (a) what is appropriate of the individual ’s and the collective’s emotions vis-à-vis the evaluative target and (b) what is appropriate vis-à-vis the sharedness, i.e., in Stein ’s terms, what is “required” of an individual emotion to be part of our match a shared emotion , and what is “required” of a shared emotion to be appropriately shared and adequate to the respective group ? See especially Stein (1922, 117). Though Walther does not dwell much on such normative questions, she does briefly discuss the issue of authentic and inauthentic communal experiences (echte, unechte), namely when individual experiences “in the name of a group ” and the experiences “from the standpoint of the group ” itself come apart (1923, 107–109).

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  1. University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Thomas Szanto

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, USA

    Sebastian Luft

  2. Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists, Institut für Humanwissenschaften, University of Paderborn, Paderborn, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Ruth Hagengruber

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Szanto, T. (2018). The Phenomenology of Shared Emotions—Reassessing Gerda Walther. In: Luft, S., Hagengruber, R. (eds) Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97861-1_7

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