Governance: Organizations and Management Issues

Abstract

Energy effectively constitutes a global public good, and nuclear energy belongs to its provision. The potential risks of high consequence accidents and the importance of strong safety culture, regulation, and governance, have been recognized early, and to an increasing extent over time. As a result, exceptional and leading efforts into risk and reliability analysis have and continue to take place within the nuclear community. However, the adequacy of existing governance and control mechanisms can be questioned. Indeed, authoritative organizations, notably the IAEA, provide standards, best practices, and platforms for exchange at the international level. And strong regulatory bodies provide assurances and verification of safety at the national level. However, ultimately minimum standards are not trivial to impose because they will only be adopted by states that consent. Further, case studies of major accidents show the pervasiveness of distorted information and sometimes risk information concealment—a common organizational deficit, highly problematic in this safety-sensitive domain.

Consulting governance principles, more specific improvements are put forth, relating to stronger and obligatory monitoring and standards, to help promote safe civilian operation of nuclear power. A better international collaboration and extensive peer-reviews are recommended; the role of the IAEA and related enforcement mechanisms should be strengthened.

Annexes

3.1.1 Annex 1: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of Nuclear Weapons

The only binding commitment on the use of nuclear energy is the NPT. With 190 state parties, it is the most widely adhered-to multilateral disarmament treaty.¹⁷ The NPT came into force in 1970 and, since then, has the objective to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons […], to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving disarmament […].¹⁸ States ratifying or acceding the NPT undertake not to transfer source material or equipment for nuclear fission to any other states. Safeguards to the NPT are implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The NPT was renewed in 2015 for an indefinite period. In addition, the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties decided on a measure for the review of the operation of the Treaty every 5 years. Not all nuclear-active countries have ratified the NPT. North Korea withdrew in 1993 but then suspended its withdrawal notice. It finally announced in 2003 that is was ending the suspension of its NPT withdrawal notification. The four UN member states that have never ratified the treaty are India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan. The world map below shows “ratifiers” and “acceders” to the NPT. The five recognized nuclear-weapon states (shown in blue) are the US, Russia, the UK, France and China (Fig. 3.4).

Fig. 3.4

List of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (NPT Participation file, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons)

Fig. 3.1

IAEA Portfolio of Services (“What we do”, IAEA Website, https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/areas-of-work/index.html). The TC support programs are intended to increase sharing of competences and safety improvements through partnerships. Peer reviews and advisory services (see red arrows) are examples or services designed to share safety-knowledge and strengthen an adequate safety culture among members

Fig. 3.2

IAEA published standards (IAEA Safety Standards, Nuclear Safety and Security Program, Brochure. https://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/standards/iaea-safety-standards-brochure.pdf) with a hierarchy based on increasing level of scope and detail: (a) Guides present best practices to help plant operators achieve high levels of safety; (b) Requirements are meant to be used by States for establishing national regulatory frameworks; (c) Fundamentals are accessible to the non-specialist reader and convey the basis and rationale for the safety standards

Fig. 3.3

Who controls the safe use of nuclear energy? Bold arrows: The operators of nuclear facilities are overseen by national regulators; both operators and national regulators are guided by the internationally agreed standards. Dashed arrows: Relationships that are non-binding and may be inadequately implemented: (1) National regulators to standards (e.g., member state requiring assistance or requesting peer review); (2) Operators to standards (e.g., newcomer state requiring help for safety implementation); and (3) Operators to national regulators (e.g., feedback loop so that national regulators are aware of all operators’ activities, including events of safety and operational relevance)

3.1.2 Annex 2: EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community)

The EURATOM treaty ensures a regular and equitable supply of nuclear fuels to EU users. The Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) applies a supply policy based on the principle of equal access of all users to ores and nuclear fuel. The ESA has exclusive right to conclude contracts for the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials (Article 52) within the EU. The ESA has an advisory committee responsible for linking ESA and users/producers. The Committee members are appointed by the EU Member States on the basis of their degree of relevant experience and expertise in nuclear issues.¹⁹

Table 3.6 Governmental organizations

Table 3.7 Cooperations