Abstract
This chapter provides a case study of the Croatian Bureau for Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (USKOK). The chapter reviews its organisational evolution and enforcement patterns. The empirical analysis will show that, as a suppressive ACA, the USKOK could not develop the harshest form of enforcement pattern, until it received stronger organisational powers in the criminal procedure and bigger organisational resources. The chapter reveals that high levels of legal independence will not necessarily translate into high levels of de facto independence, and that, for suppressive ACAs, the role of organisational settings, which directly determine the prospects of achieving successful prosecutions, is essential in fostering high levels of de facto autonomy. This is crucial for successful exercise of audience-driven accountability, which overrode the principal-oriented accountability as the key driver behind the USKOK’s choice of actions.
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Notes
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With certain authorities in foreign policy and army control.
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Croatia joined GRECO on the 2nd December 2000. See: https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/croatia
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Dr. Josip Kregar, the Dean of the School of Law of the University of Zagreb, stated: ‘When Tuđman died, there was the first indication that corruption existed. Mainly because of the media. […] “There were hundreds of new scandals regarding corruption”’ (Kuris 2013: 3).
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Which follows from the provision that the status of USKOK’s prosecutors, including its Director, is regulated in the same manner as the status of the other prosecutors under the command of the State Attorney (LBSCOC 2001, Article 4).
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And their later amendments, as summarised in a table below; the same pertains to the other laws mentioned in this paragraph.
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Tomić, S. (2019). Croatia (Case Study 5): Bureau for the Suppression of Organised Crime and Corruption (USKOK). In: Leadership, Institutions and Enforcement. Executive Politics and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97583-2_6
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