Abstract
In this chapter secession is analyzed in combination with the use of force. Force is often resorted to by secessionists, parent states and external actors involved in secessionist conflicts. The complexity of this issue renders a legal judgment on the use of force rather difficult: for instance, when external actors fight against the authorities in favor of secessionists, from the secessionists’ perspective, such external involvement represents the furtherance of self-determination and human rights, but from the perspective of non-secessionists, the military support for the secessionist rebellion is detrimental to their right to self-determination over territorial interests and human rights as both have been severely violated by the secessionist violence; worse yet, well-intended external involvement can be maliciously exploited by a conflicting party for political ends, and external actors can also conceal their self-interested motives in the name of upholding noble values of international law. How this theoretical and practical conundrum can be properly addressed through the interpretation of international law is the crux of the matter. A detailed discussion about the general prohibition of the use of force and likely exceptions, including the responsibility to protect and the choice between legality and legitimacy, as well as how to escape from the vicious circle of the use of force, will help bring about a reasonable solution to the highly controversial issue of the use of force in secessionist conflicts. Four cases regarding the use of force in secessionist conflicts, namely Katanga, Bangladesh, Kosovo and Crimea, are analyzed for a better understanding of this issue.
Keywords
- Secessionist Conflicts
- External Involvement
- Katanga
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- Self-determination Conflicts
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Notes
- 1.
Weller (2008), p. xi.
- 2.
Christakis (2011), p. 80.
- 3.
See Chap. 1, Note 1.
- 4.
Pellet (2013).
- 5.
S/RES/1199 (1998), paras. 4 and 6, S/RES/1203 (1998), paras. 3, 4 and 10.
- 6.
Kuperman (2008), p. 61.
- 7.
Ibid.
- 8.
Ibid.
- 9.
Nair (1998), p. 11.
- 10.
Clapham (2006), p. 50.
- 11.
Watkin (2004), p. 30.
- 12.
Caroline Mortimer, Catalan referendum: Jeremy Corbyn urges Theresa May to intervene ‘to find political solution to the crisis’, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/catalonia-independence-referendum-jeremy-corbyn-theresa-may-violence-intervention-mariano-rajoy-a7976976.html, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 13.
Spain Catalonia: Court blocks independence referendum, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41196677, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 14.
Kuperman (2013), p. 304.
- 15.
Mackenzie (1993), p. 159.
- 16.
Rose (1998), p. 141.
- 17.
Janik (2013), p. 69.
- 18.
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1832 (2011): National sovereignty and statehood in contemporary international law: the need for clarification, para. 5.1.
- 19.
Corfu Channel case, Judgement of April 9th 1949: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 34.
- 20.
Ibid. p. 35.
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
- 23.
Brownlie (1981), pp. 272–275.
- 24.
John R. Dugard, First report on diplomatic protection, A/CN.4/506, 7 March 2000, para. 57.
- 25.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits, Judgement. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176.
- 26.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 245, para. 41.
- 27.
John R. Dugard, First report on diplomatic protection, A/CN.4/506, 7 March 2000, para. 58.
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 440.
- 30.
This article reads as follows: “The threat or use of force is prohibited as a means of diplomatic protection, except in the case of rescue of nationals where: (a) The protecting State has failed to secure the safety of its nationals by peaceful means; (b) The injuring State is unwilling or unable to secure the safety of the nationals of the protecting State; (c) The nationals of the protecting State are exposed to immediate danger to their persons; (d) The use of force is proportionate in the circumstances of the situation; (e) The use of force is terminated, and the protecting State withdraws its forces, as soon as the nationals are rescued.”
- 31.
John R. Dugard, First report on diplomatic protection, A/CN.4/506, 7 March 2000, para. 59.
- 32.
Kingsbury (1998), p. 602.
- 33.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, paras. 42–53.
- 34.
Ibid.
- 35.
Wippman (2000), p. 316.
- 36.
Treaty of Guarantee, Art. 4, 382 UNTS 3 (1960).
- 37.
Wippman (2000), pp. 316–317.
- 38.
Abdallah Baali, Permanent Representative of Algeria, Statement to the Informal Thematic Consultations of the General Assembly, to Discuss the Four Clusters Contained in the Secretary-General’s Report In Larger Freedom, Cluster III: Freedom to Live in Dignity, 19 April 2005.
- 39.
United Nations Security Council, 66th year, 6627th meeting, 4 October 2011, S/PV.6627, p. 4.
- 40.
Evans (2011), p. 10.
- 41.
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 11.
- 42.
Ibid.
- 43.
Lowe and Tzanakopoulos (2011), para. 4.
- 44.
See above Note 41.
- 45.
Lowe and Tzanakopoulos (2011), para. 39.
- 46.
British Foreign Office (Foreign Policy Document No. 148): British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 57 (1986), p. 619.
- 47.
UN Doc. A/54/2000, para. 217.
- 48.
Annan and Mousavizadeh (2012), pp. 53–54.
- 49.
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. USA), ICJ Provisional Measures, Monday 10 May 1999 at 10 a.m., CR 99/14.
- 50.
See Chap. 1, Note 9.
- 51.
See Chap. 1, Note 29.
- 52.
Verdirame (2013).
- 53.
See above Note 46.
- 54.
Verdirame (2013).
- 55.
See Chap. 1, Note 29.
- 56.
Luban (2011), p. 36.
- 57.
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 39.
- 58.
See the official website of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/related-themes/2417-pbc-and-rtop, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 59.
Schnabel (2012), p. 57.
- 60.
Ibid.
- 61.
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 26.
- 62.
Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Choosing War, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-11.htm#P867_332547, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 63.
Ibid.
- 64.
ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Articles 1 and 2.
- 65.
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 11.
- 66.
Winkelmann (2010).
- 67.
UN Doc. A/54/2000, para. 217.
- 68.
See above Note 15.
- 69.
See above Note 6.
- 70.
United Nations Security Council, 66th year, 6627th meeting, 4 October 2011, S/PV.6627, pp. 3 and 5.
- 71.
See above Note 66.
- 72.
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 4.
- 73.
Ibid. p. 298.
- 74.
For instance, Brownlie pointed out that there was “the use of very powerful modern weapons in urban areas, the offensive generally against the economy of a whole country, and the use of cluster bombs. Many civilians were killed or maimed, hospitals were damaged and internal refugee flows induced”, see Brownlie and Apperley (2000), p. 910.
- 75.
The first three articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
- 76.
See Chap. 3, Note 88.
- 77.
Grigorian (2006), p. 52.
- 78.
See Chap. 3, Note 88.
- 79.
Kuperman (2008), Note 57.
- 80.
Henkin (1999), p. 10.
- 81.
Grotius (1964), p. 567.
- 82.
Declaration of The South Summit, para. 54, http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 83.
Ibid.
- 84.
UN Doc. A/63/677, p. 9.
- 85.
See Chap. 3, Note 143.
- 86.
Ibid.
- 87.
Kuperman (2008), pp. 65 and 68.
- 88.
Janik (2013), p. 57.
- 89.
Ibid.
- 90.
Kuperman (2008), p. 69.
- 91.
Allan Little, “Moral Combat: NATO At War”, A BBC2 special, 9pm Sunday 12 March 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/panorama/transcripts/transcript_12_03_00.txt, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 92.
Crawford (2001/2002), p. 501.
- 93.
Ibid. p. 503.
- 94.
See above Note 92.
- 95.
See Chap. 3, Note 92.
- 96.
Kuperman (2008), p. 71.
- 97.
See above Note 91.
- 98.
UN Doc. A/63/677, p. 9.
- 99.
See above Note 15.
- 100.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 81.
- 101.
U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960), O.R., 15th year, Supp. July–Sept. 1960, p. 11.
- 102.
S/RES/143 (1960).
- 103.
First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, S/4389, p. 5.
- 104.
Buchheit (1978), p. 145.
- 105.
S/RES/145 (1960).
- 106.
Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960, S/4417, para. 6.
- 107.
Ibid.
- 108.
Ibid. para. 5.
- 109.
United Nations Security Council Official Records, 887th Meeting, 21 August 1960, S/PV.887, paras. 68–69.
- 110.
Ibid. para. 8.
- 111.
Ibid. para. 11.
- 112.
Ibid. para. 70.
- 113.
Buchheit (1978), p. 149.
- 114.
Ibid.
- 115.
S/RES/161 (1961), para. 2.
- 116.
S/RES/169 (1961).
- 117.
Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Security Council Resolutions of 14 July 1960, 21 February and 24 November 1961, S/5240, para. 37.
- 118.
See b. in Sect. 4.1.2.1 of this chapter, pp. 169 – 173.
- 119.
United Nations Security Council Official Records, 887th Meeting, 21 August 1960, S/PV.887, para. 29.
- 120.
Ibid.
- 121.
S/PV.887, para. 86.
- 122.
S/PV.887, para. 88.
- 123.
S/PV.887, para. 94.
- 124.
See above Note 110.
- 125.
UN Doc. S/4389, p. 5 and S/4417, para. 6.
- 126.
UN Doc. S/5240, paras. 37 and 38.
- 127.
UN Doc. A/7720, para. 9.
- 128.
Ibid. para. 114.
- 129.
- 130.
- 131.
Sisson and Rose (1990), pp. 206–215.
- 132.
A/RES/2793 (XXVI).
- 133.
United Nations Security Council Official Records, 1611th Meeting, 12 December 1971, S/PV. 1611, para. 16.
- 134.
Ibid. paras. 100 and 128.
- 135.
Ibid. para. 124.
- 136.
Ibid. para. 185.
- 137.
United Nations Security Council Official Records, 1616th Meeting, 16 December 1971, S/PV. 1616, para. 5.
- 138.
S/RES/307(1971).
- 139.
See above Note 131.
- 140.
See above Note 135.
- 141.
See above Note 134.
- 142.
See Chap. 2, Note 125.
- 143.
Gray (2010), p. 622.
- 144.
Kasturi and Mehra (2001), p. 24.
- 145.
A/RES/25/2625, Annex, Principle 1, para. 9.
- 146.
See above Note 91.
- 147.
Kuperman (2008), p. 70.
- 148.
Ibid.
- 149.
UN Doc. S/1999/648, Annex: Rambouillet Accordes—Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo.
- 150.
S/RES/1160 (1998), para. 1; S/RES/1199 (1998), para. 4.
- 151.
UN Doc. S/1999/648, Appendix B, para. 8.
- 152.
S/RES/1199 (1998), S/RES/1203 (1998), S/RES/1244 (1999).
- 153.
Krieger (2001), p. xxiv.
- 154.
S/RES/1244 (1999), Annex 2, para. 4.
- 155.
See Chap. 3, Note 88.
- 156.
Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo, August 1999, Volume 11, No. 10 (D), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kosov2/, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 157.
Christakis (2015), p. 100.
- 158.
Uerpmann-Wittzack (2015), p. 20.
- 159.
Shaw (2008), p. 12.
- 160.
Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928, Article 1.
- 161.
Mearsheimer (2014).
- 162.
Ibid.
- 163.
See above Note 157.
- 164.
Address by President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
- 165.
See above Note 161.
- 166.
Oeter (2015), p. 73.
- 167.
See above Note 161.
- 168.
See above Note 166.
- 169.
A/RES/25/2625, Annex, Principle 4, para. 1.
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Lu, J. (2018). Secession and the Use of Force. In: On State Secession from International Law Perspectives. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97448-4_4
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