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Equilibrium Analysis for Common-Pool Resources

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Dynamics of Disasters (DOD 2017)

Part of the book series: Springer Optimization and Its Applications ((SOIA,volume 140))

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Abstract

We present an aggregative normal form game to describe the investment decision making situation for a CPR: we will consider a non-cooperative approach searching a Nash equilibrium of it, as well as a cooperative one searching a fully cooperative equilibrium. An application in the Environmental Economics will be illustrated and, in this context, we will introduce a threshold investment as a random variable and we will study the resulting game with aggregative uncertainty looking for a Nash equilibrium and a fully cooperative equilibrium.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Games in which the payoff functions depend on an aggregation of strategy are called aggregative games (see [2]) and if, moreover, there is some uncertainty that hits the payoff functions these games are called aggregative games under uncertainty (see [20])

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Acknowledgements

This work has been supported by STAR 2014 (linea 1) “Variational Analysis and Equilibrium Models in Physical and Social Economic Phenomena,” University of Naples Federico II, Italy.

We would like to thank the referee for carefully reading our paper and for giving such constructive comments, which helped improving the quality of the paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Applications, University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy

    Lina Mallozzi

  2. Department of Economic and Statistic Science, University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy

    Roberta Messalli

Authors
  1. Lina Mallozzi
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  2. Roberta Messalli
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Roberta Messalli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Physics & Computer Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada

    Ilias S. Kotsireas

  2. Department of Operations and Information Management, Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA

    Anna Nagurney

  3. Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Florida, Center for Applied Optimization, Gainesville, FL, USA

    Panos M. Pardalos

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Mallozzi, L., Messalli, R. (2018). Equilibrium Analysis for Common-Pool Resources. In: Kotsireas, I., Nagurney, A., Pardalos, P. (eds) Dynamics of Disasters. DOD 2017. Springer Optimization and Its Applications, vol 140. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97442-2_4

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