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Conclusion: One Last Chance

  • Jonathan CristolEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter shows that even after 9/11 the Taliban had the chance to expel Osama bin Laden, but they refused to do so. Many Taliban officials did want to expel bin Laden, but Mullah Omar was steadfast, and the US invaded Afghanistan. This chapter argues that the United States may have been able to prevent the Taliban/Al Qaeda connection if it had recognized the Taliban government in the time between the Taliban’s conquest of Kabul and bin Laden’s move to Kandahar. It argues that the case of the non-recognition of the Taliban government shows that the United States adheres to a constitutive theory of diplomatic recognition and recognizes new governments for political reasons.

Keywords

Clinton Administration Diplomatic recognition George W. Bush Invasion of Afghanistan Taliban 9/11 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Levermore Global Scholars ProgramAdelphi UniversityGarden CityUSA

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