Troikanomics pp 197-214 | Cite as

Troikanomics: Legacy and Lessons

  • Ray Kinsella
  • Maurice Kinsella


In this chapter we reflect on the legacy of Troikanomics, in particular as an expression of an existential crisis that continues to assail the EU. Drawing on the experience of its establishment and imposition, we discuss lessons that can be learnt that bear on the wider European Project's ability to perform as a democratic community. The era of the ‘Troika’ has been a time of great turmoil for the Eurozone and for the wider EU. For those countries compelledto enter into Bailout Programmes, it constitutes an existential epoch without precedent in modern European history. No dimension of people’s lives, or the autonomy of their governing authorities , was left unaffected by the intrusion of Troikanomics into their national psyche. It wasn’t alone the individual member nations caught up in these bailouts that were scarred by the experience. So too was the EU itself. Troikanomics made explicit a side of the EU that had not been witnessed to this degree before—a hegemony that has been willing to subjugate members’ autonomy so as to perpetuate a set of suboptimal institutional arrangements. The implications for ‘Project Europe’, 10 years on from the initial European Banking and Debt Crisis and as it approaches an era of profound change, are wide-ranging. These have to do with issues such as the EU’s identity, its purpose, and its values. In this context, what, if any, are the lessons that have been learnt over the last turbulent decade?


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ray Kinsella
    • 1
  • Maurice Kinsella
    • 2
  1. 1.Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business (Formerly)Co DublinIreland
  2. 2.The Galilee House of StudiesAthyIreland

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